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Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Sustainable Development Goals
Peruvian Water and Sewage Service
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
National Electricity Society of the Democratic Republic of Congo
Trade-Related Investment Measures
United Nations Industrial Development Organization
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
United States Dollar
United States Patent and Technology Office
Women in Mining
World Trade Organization
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2014 they respectively spent 87% and 64% of total value
created on suppliers as compared to 2% and 11% on government payments. These figures explain why governments are
increasingly relying on local content regulations that require
EI companies to purchase goods and services domestically.
Apart from increasing the number of companies producing
goods and services for the EI sector, which in turn creates
additional indirect employment opportunities, upstream
linkages also have the potential to improve the expertise and
quality of goods and services of suppliers, given that EI companies require high international standards that have to be
met. However, in many resource-rich developing countries
domestic companies do not have the expertise to produce the
required goods and services due to lack of experience and
access to finance, and cannot make the necessary investments
to meet the standards. In such circumstances, there is a need
for financial, technical and technological support programmes
to domestic companies that have the potential to become
suppliers to the EI sector; long term procurement plans need
to be provided that lay out the potential opportunities for
suppliers over the lifetime of the project; tenders have to be
unbundled and adapted to fit the local context; and local
content strategies need to place importance on local valueadded rather than ownership and have realistic targets that
are updated on a regular basis. The upstream sector has the
greatest potential to promote female employment given that
it offers the opportunity to outsource activities in areas such
as catering that have higher female participation rates.

any developing countries have become increasingly
resource dependent over the last two decades. While the end
of the ‘commodity-super cycle’ may halt this trend in the short
term, half of the world’s known oil, gas and mineral reserves
are in non-OECD and non-OPEC countries (Mc Kinsey, 2013).
For these resource-rich developing countries, the extractive
industries (EI) sector presents one of the few comparative
advantage sectors, which will inevitably continue to play an
important role in their respective economic develop-ment
strategies. Historically, much emphasis has been placed on
how developing countries can attract foreign direct investment in the EI sector to increase domestic revenue collection.
Less focus has been placed on how foreign EI investments
can be ‘linked’ to the domestic economy to increase the skill
level in the country and diversify the economy in the long
term. This report explains the various linkages that can be
created to the EI sector, provides case studies that exemplify
how countries have successfully leveraged the respective
linkages, lays out the key constraints to linkage creation, and
provides recommendations to EI companies, governments
and international development cooperation on how each
stakeholder can contribute to linkage creation. The report
has been commissioned in the frame of German Development Cooperation, which supports many developing countries
where the EI sector plays an important role in their respective economies. Where relevant, special emphasis has been
placed on the impacts of linkages on employment creation
and gender equality, given that these two topics are of
strategic importance to German Development Cooperation.

While many resource-rich country governments prioritise
moving downstream to add value to their commodities
domestically rather than exporting them in an unprocessed
form, the literature does not find supporting evidence that
access to natural resources plays a big role in making the
downstream industries competitive. In most cases, moving
downstream therefore requires strong government interventions. Governments may use their negotiating power to
require further processing when awarding highly valuable
resource concessions, use incentives to make downstream
projects economically viable, or use export restrictions such
as taxes and bans. Governments should be aware that in all
cases where companies do not move downstream voluntarily, government intervention is likely to come at a cost in
the form of tax revenue losses from the EI project, required
spending to support the downstream sector and marginal
mining projects not going ahead or closing. Such a policy
decision therefore requires a cost-benefit analysis by govern-

Linkages to the EI sector
The report differentiates among upstream linkages, which
are related to the procurement of goods and services that
EI projects need to operate; downstream linkages, which
result from further processing of the extracted commodity;
horizontal linkages, which relate to the development of new
industries using the capabilities of the EI-related supply chain;
consumption linkages, which result from increased spending
of earnings originating from the EI sector; knowledge and
technology linkages, which relate to the transfer of knowledge and technical know-how within the EI value chain; and
spatial linkages, which are the benefits from shared use of infrastructure investments that the EI sector requires to operate.
The spending of EI companies on suppliers dwarfs royalty
and tax payments. BP and Anglo American estimate that in
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ting from the geographical advantage, the demand for these
goods and services is also closely associated with economic
growth in booming regions. Future demand analyses that
take into account the EI sector should be part of assessments
that identify investment opportunities for the private sector
to create these consumption linkages. Improving financial
access and attractive interest rates on savings may encourage workers and companies in the EI sector to keep earnings
within the country rather than channelling them offshore.
Out of all the linkages, consumption linkages have the greatest potential to create employment opportunities (referred
to as induced employment). But because the effect of EI
projects on the growth of local demand is not easy to trace, it
is difficult to measure induced employment and multipliers
vary widely. Therefore, care needs to be taken when induced
employment numbers are provided.

ments to assess whether the benefits associated with ‘first degree’ downstream processing such as smelting and refineries
compensate for the costs and whether there is potential for
the sector to be internationally competitive in the medium
to long term. These projects tend to be capital and energy
intensive, while also requiring good access to infrastructure.
The employment and technology transfer benefits associated
from moving downstream often only increase at the second
and third degree downstream industries, such as fabrication
and assembly, which are equally difficult to attract.
Whereas it is relatively straightforward to identify upstream
and downstream linkages, it is harder to assess whether
horizontal linkages have been created given that it is not
always clear what the main contributors are for new sectors
to emerge and whether the experience and expertise from the
EI sector had a role to play therein. Therefore the literature
on this linkage type is relatively sparse with few case studies
from which to learn. However, horizontal linkages provide a
unique opportunity to diversify the economy away from the
EI sector. Horizontal linkages can stem both from transferable skills that are not sector – specific (IT, finance, civil
engineering, etc.) and from the adaptation of the capabilities,
know-how and technologies developed to serve the EI sector.
As such, they are more likely to occur in countries where
upstream linkages have already been created (most horizontal linkages stem from suppliers to the EI sector). To foster
horizontal linkages, research and development initiatives
should be created that provide financial incentives for first
mover companies to explore opportunities in other sectors;
high skilled training institutes should be built that support
the transfer of capabilities from one sector to another; and
the creation of clusters of industries with synergies to the EI
sector should be promoted.

One of the key reasons to attract foreign direct investment in
the EI sector in the first place is the need for knowledge and
sophisticated technologies to extract the resources, which are
often not available domestically. There is a strong incentive
for host countries to absorb knowledge, skills and technology
from the foreign investor. Whereas horizontal linkages enable
actors to adapt their capabilities to other sectors, knowledge
and technology transfers enable them to improve those skills
within the EI value chain. There are four channels through
which knowledge and technology linkages can be transferred:
(1) the demonstration-imitation channel, by which knowledge and technology is adapted from EI companies, (2) the
labour mobility channel, by which employees trained by EI
companies move into the domestic economy and apply their
acquired knowledge and expertise there, (3) the upstreamlinkage channel, by which the multinational corporation
transfers knowledge and technology to domestic suppliers in
order to help them meet certain standards, and (4) the export
channel, by which EI companies enable local companies to
access international markets. The key determinant whether
knowledge and technology linkages can be created is the preexisting level of expertise available in the host country or the
existing ‘absorptive capacity’. If the knowledge and technology gap between the EI companies and national employees/
suppliers/state owned companies is too large, transfers are
likely to be minimal. Therefore partnerships between these
stakeholders should focus on skill development. Efforts
need to be taken to build the national expertise by improving
the education system through targeted vocational trainings,
integrating courses that will serve the EI sector in tertiary

Consumption linkages are less relevant today than they were
during the years when import substitution industrial policies were widely used, as earnings leak abroad through the
consumption of imported goods. The ‘natural’ geographical
barriers have also become less relevant today due to globalisation and falling transport costs. The sectors that are most
suited to create consumption linkages relate to services that
require local presence such as the transport and restaurant
industry; goods that have a high transport-to-value ratio
such as cement, bricks and other construction materials;
and perishable agricultural produce that cannot be stored
or transported for long time periods. Apart from benefit-
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educational programmes and promoting research and development with national institutions. Intellectual property
rights should be tailored to the development stage of the host
country.

(WTO) creation in 1995 and the subsequent proliferation
of international investment agreements. Under the WTO
three new international agreements entered into force that
set out rules relevant for linkage policies: (1) the Agreement
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), which
restricts government measures that require mining companies
to source domestic over foreign goods and impose export restrictions in order to incentivise downstream processing; (2)
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM), which prevent governments from using incentives
and granting subsidies that are contingent on sourcing goods
domestically; and (3) the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), which, in scheduled services sectors, can
prevent governments from providing advantages to domestic
firms that are not similarly provided to foreign enterprises,
as well as requiring domestic equity participation and joint
ventures. International investment treaties, of which presently roughly 3000 have been concluded, often go beyond
the restrictions of WTO agreements, e.g. by barring governments from requiring technology transfer and local research
and development programmes. These treaties usually also use
investor-state arbitration rather than WTO’s state-to-state
arbitration system, which increases the likelihood of actions
being filed. To avoid being taken to arbitration and to ensure
they retain appropriate policy tools for promoting linkages,
governments therefore need to ensure policy coherence when
signing investment treaties.

Spatial linkages provide an opportunity to address the
infrastructure-financing gap that developing countries face.
Given that resources are often located in remote regions, EI
companies invest in transport, power, water and ICT infrastructure that is required for their operations. In addition to
improving infrastructure access to surrounding regions and
thereby potentially unlocking economic opportunities that
were previously not economically viable, economies of scale
and scope can be achieved when this infrastructure is shared.
Economies of scale, because one infrastructure investment
with a larger capacity is oftentimes cheaper than investing
in two separate infrastructure projects (one 400MW power
plant, for example is going to be cheaper than two 200MW
power plants); and economies of scope, because costs associated with one type of infrastructure investment can be
shared with another type of infrastructure investment (when
building oil pipeline infrastructure, for example, fibre optics
cabling can be deployed at a reduced cost, given that up
to 80% of costs are associated with civil works). However,
building infrastructure at a higher capacity or adapting the
infrastructure for additional users is likely to result in higher
capital, operational and logistical costs, which explains why
EI companies may be against shared use. Requirements for
shared use therefore should only be made on a case-by-case
basis when the associated net benefits are higher than the
costs for society. To assess how EI infrastructure investments
can be leveraged, infrastructure master plans should map
out the economic potential of the regions and population
centres that may benefit from infrastructure investments.
Governments need to set aside resources to invest in feeder
infrastructure to benefit other users. The implementation of
shared use will require strong public utilities to serve as viable
partners to EI companies. An independent regulator that
oversees access and tariffs is also required.

Apart from the international legal framework, stakeholders
also need to be aware of changing production processes within the EI value chain. These are increasingly fragmented and
unbundled with countries becoming specialized in specific
tasks and business activities rather than sectors and industries. Higher value added functions are progressively concentrating in technologically advanced countries and lower value
added activities are located in countries with low labour
costs. Furthermore, there is a trend towards automation in
the sector. This will increase productivity and improve the
health and safety record of the industry, but at the same time
will further reduce the number of people employed in the
sector and alter procurement requirements. Resource-rich
countries therefore need forward-looking policies that have
education, skill and technology development at their core.

Constraints on creating linkages
International law places some restrictions on the tools
governments can use to encourage the development of the
linkages discussed above. These rules have both proliferated
and become more stringent over the last 20 years, implying that countries which are now seeking to develop these
linkages are governed by a legal framework very different
than the one in place prior to the World Trade Organisation’s

Recommendations by stakeholder
Extractive industry companies
EI companies can play a major role in supporting the creation of linkages, particularly those that are directly relevant
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to their core operations, which include upstream, knowledge
and technology, and spatial linkages. To support the former
two, EI companies can publish long-term procurement plans
in order for potential suppliers to have sufficient time to
prepare for tenders, adapt tenders to local realities for domestic companies to be able to bid for them, provide financial
assistance to local suppliers, design vocational training
programmes to train future employees and service providers,
and create joint research projects with universities to specialize and improve the technology suited for the geology of the
country. To develop spatial linkages EI companies should
collaborate with government entities and other companies to
explore potential economies of scale and scope. Lastly, it is
important for EI companies to manage expectations - especially when it comes to direct, indirect and induced employment opportunities. In this regard, EI companies should
act with care and roll out public awareness campaigns that
explain whether opportunities are likely to benefit international, national and/or local employees/suppliers.

ated infrastructure investments and to domestic suppliers of
the EI project. Apart from requiring high social and environmental standards, financial development support often
comes with technical assistance that may help maximise the
potential linkages. Technical cooperation can leverage its
expertise and experience in private sector development programmes from other sectors to support suppliers or potential
future suppliers in meeting the required standards of the EI
sector. Furthermore, technical cooperation is well placed
to support governments with providing neutral analytical
assessments that can feed into the long-term development
strategy and industrial/diversification policy. As highlighted
throughout the document, cost-benefit analyses are required
to determine whether many of these linkages are worth
pursuing. Finally, if looking to support linkage creation from
the EI sector, international development cooperation should
consider adapting their development assistance by aligning policy advice within and among development partners.
Measures may include avoiding conflicting advice on local
content and trade/investment treaties; lengthening project
timelines given that linkage creation is a long-term process
and unlikely to succeed in the short run; placing greater focus on artisanal and small scale mining given that this sector
provides significant employment opportunities (including for
women, who make up 30% of the world’s artisanal miners),
is often neglected by the government, and has devastating impacts on health and the environment; and designing support
programmes that fit into the political economy of a country
– the EI sector is characterised by large investment flows
and rent seeking behaviour, which requires a fine balance
between good practices while fitting into the local context,
institutions and politics to have a meaningful impact.

Host country governments
The lack of policy coherence and coordination among
government agencies is one of the biggest stumbling blocks
in creating linkages. A long-term development strategy can
provide a vision and guidance for the development targets
the country wants to achieve. In resource-rich countries
industrial, diversification and local content policies can guide
how the EI sector contributes to achieve these targets. These
should not conflict with international commitments made
under the WTO and international investment agreements.
A significant emphasis should be placed on strengthening
the absorptive capacity of the local population by improving education, providing vocational trainings in disciplines
that are and will be in high demand, and promoting research
and development programmes. Small and medium sized
enterprises, especially those that do not qualify for company
supplier programmes, should be supported. To foster spatial
linkages the legal framework should allow for governments to
require shared-use infrastructure access when the benefits are
larger than the costs for society. Finally, governments should
consider opportunities beyond their countries’ borders when
assessing linkages from the EI sector. Unviable linkages at
the national level may become viable at the regional level
and costs may be reduced significantly by sharing these with
neighbouring countries.

Germany has four characteristics, which make it a good
candidate to support linkage creation from the EI sector: (1)
It has various agencies already involved in providing financial
and technical support to both governments and EI companies in linkage creation; (2) Germany may benefit from
being perceived as a neutral agent by both governments and
EI companies given that it has less of a colonial history and
the large EI companies are not based in Germany; (3) Germany’s experience from its technologically advanced “Mittelstand” companies may prove useful in supporting small
and medium sized companies to become suppliers to the
EI sector; and (4) Germany is renowned for its dual education system and vocational training programmes. These four
characteristics enable Germany to give targeted support to
both governments and EI companies that will maximize the
potential of linkages and contribute to sustainable development in resource-rich countries.

International development cooperation
Both technical and financial development cooperation have a
role to play in helping to create linkages to the EI sector. The
latter can provide financing to the EI project itself, to associ-
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INTRODUCTION
The last decades have seen an unprecedented inflow of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in extractive industry (EI)
projects in developing countries. With the best deposits in
established resource-producing countries being exhausted
and high commodity prices in the first decade of the new
Millennium, EI companies (private, publicly-listed and
state-owned) have been more willing to venture into riskier
resource-rich low-income (frontier) countries with the prospect of high profits if successful.1 This trend is likely going
to continue once commodity prices recover. Given that these
frontier countries have a comparative advantage in the extraction of resources (often one of the only ones) and that EI
projects make up a large proportion of their total investments,
the question arises how to maximize the benefits of these.

In this context, and given that German Development
Cooperation has been working to support resource-rich
low-income countries in developing their EI sectors, the
Sector Project Sustainable Economic Development (GIZ)
approached the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
(CCSI) to provide an overview of the potential linkages to
the EI sector and to provide recommendations as to how EI
companies, governments and the development cooperation
can support the creation of linkages. This report is based
on an extensive literature review as well as interviews with
government officials, EI company representatives, development cooperation representatives, and academics working in
this area. Case studies have been used throughout to provide
examples where EI linkages have been created, both in terms
of ‘breadth’ (number of linkages) and ‘depth’ (local value
added). Where relevant, special emphasis has been placed
on the impacts of the linkages on employment creation and
gender equality, given that these two topics are of strategic
importance to German Development Cooperation.
The report is structured as follows: Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the different
linkages to the EI sector. It includes a brief summary of the
theory underpinning each linkage type, a literature review
of the determinants required to capture the linkage; country
case studies that illustrate how stakeholders have successfully supported the development of this type of linkage; and
lessons learned, which are accompanied by a SWOT 
analysis2 of each linkage type. Chapter 3 lays out the constraints that resource-rich countries face in creating linkages
to the EI sector. It includes the impact that trade and investment agreements have on the policy space of governments
to support linkage creation; the increasing fragmentation of
global value chains requiring particular expertise; and the
increased automation of the EI sector. Finally, building on
the lessons learned, Chapter 4 suggests a set of recommendations for governments, EI companies and international
development cooperation, with a special focus on the value
added that German Development Cooperation may bring.

While economic diversification is an often stated goal of
resource-rich countries, developing new industries in sectors
that are unrelated to current economic activities is more
difficult than in sectors where the country already has a
comparative advantage. As stated in the context of promoting development in Sub-Saharan Africa: the question “is not
whether Africa can industrialize by ‘ignoring’ its commodities,
but rather how the latter can be used to promote value addition, new service industries and technological capabilities that
span the sub regions of the continent.” (UNECA 2013: 95).
Tackling this question is at the core of the African Union’s
Agenda, the African Mining Vision, and the Plan of Action
for Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa. It is also
subsumed under Goal 9 of the recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Indeed SDG 9 – “Build
resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable
industrialization and foster innovation” – gives a platform to
address the question as to how countries can leverage their
natural resources to industrialize and diversify. It is noteworthy that the SDGs place a lot more importance on how
the private sector can contribute to development than their
predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals, and this
report also considers that EI companies have a major role to
play to enable these linkages.
1 The broader term “resource-rich countries” has been chosen over “resource
dependent countries”, given that German Development Cooperation also provides
support to developing countries that may not reach the export or revenue
thresholds that are required to qualify for the latter term, but where support
to create linkages to the EI sector may still be an important policy choice to
consider.

2 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats analysis
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Overview of Linkages

LINKAGES

Sidestream linkages (or enabling factors): relate to the supporting services, know-how and infrastructure necessary for
the EI value chain to function. These can benefit the wider
economy and can be sub-divided into:

Typology of Linkages
There are seven types of linkages:
Fiscal linkages refer to the payments – such as royalties –
that EI companies make to governments in order to extract
and sell the resources. At the request of GIZ, this study does
not focus on fiscal linkages, since these will be addressed in a
separate report.

• Knowledge (technological) linkages: relate to the transfer

Production linkages refer to the goods and services that
can be developed as a result of EI operations. These can be
further divided into:

•

• Upstream (or backward) linkages: that relate to the pro-

•

•

curement of goods and services that the EI sector requires
to operate. For example, this includes welding services
needed to maintain mining equipment.
Downstream (or forward) linkages: that relate to the
beneficiation of extracted commodities through refining,
smelting and further downstream processing of the commodity before reaching the final consumer. For example,
98% of the world’s mined iron ore is used to make steel
and therefore needs to pass through a steel mill.
Horizontal (or lateral) linkages: that relate to the development of new industries using the capabilities of the
EI-related supply chain. Apart from originating from the
EI project, horizontal linkages can occur from the upstream and downstream level. For example, mining trucks
could be re-engineered and adapted to service the logging
industry.

of knowledge and technological know-how. For example
a mining company may require IT services with higher
expertise. Apart from benefitting the mining company
itself, the developed IT expertise may also benefit other
sectors in the economy.
Spatial (infrastructure) linkages: relate to the benefits
associated with the infrastructure developed for an EI
project profiting other actors in the economy. For example
an iron-ore mine is likely going to require railway infrastructure. Other companies (from the mining sector and
non-mining sectors) and passengers will benefit from this
railway infrastructure if they are granted access.

The literature refers to three channels through which mining
projects create employment in resource-rich countries:

• Direct employment: refers to the people directly em•
•

• Consumption linkages: relate to the demand for goods

ployed by the EI company. For example, this includes the
mine truck drivers in a mine.
Indirect employment: refers to the people employed upstream and downstream from the EI sector.3 For example
employees of a catering company that services a mine site.
Induced employment: refers to the economic activity
resulting from the spending of direct and indirect employees of an EI project (see example given for consumption
linkages).

The figure on the next page provides an overview of the
various linkages. Upstream, downstream and fiscal linkages
are linked with the project itself. Horizontal, knowledge
and spatial linkages can originate from the whole value
chain, which is represented by the red arrow. Consumption
linkages originate from the spending of employees from the
EI project itself (direct employment) and the upstream and
downstream businesses (indirect employment). The dot-

and services resulting from the spending of earnings from
the EI sector. This effect is also referred to as induced
employment. For example, when a truck driver employed
to work at a mine site spends his salary on buying construction materials to build a family house.

3 Some reports only include upstream linkages when referring to indirect
employment.
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ted yellow line represents those linkages which feed directly
into the core operation of the project. This is of importance,
because it indicates whether it is in the self-interest of the
company to develop that particular linkage (domestically or
internationally). For example, it is in the self-interest of an
EI company to procure high quality goods and services from
upstream companies and therefore it may consider support
programmes that help transfer knowledge to meet these
standards However, the company is less likely to be concerned about potential developments in unrelated sectors of
the economy and therefore the support of horizontal linkages
would have to be government driven. While consumption
linkages are not related to the core business of the EI company, they might still be of interest to EI companies to the
extent that they might contribute to saving its social license
to operate (see section 2.7 for further explanations).

Linkages depend on:

1. The commodity being extracted and extraction 		
method:
Some commodities, such as diamonds require limited inputs,
whereas others, such as copper, may require considerable
processing. In turn, the type of operation can play a role; for
example, offshore oil and gas and very deep underground
mining require high level technical expertise. Depending on
the local know-how and skills base, the type of commodity
and extraction method may act as a barrier or enhancement
of upstream and knowledge linkage creation (Kaplinsky,
2011). The production processes vary, with precious metals
often having shorter exploitation periods than basic metals,
which in turn will also determine whether there is sufficient
extraction time that makes upstream and downstream linkages viable. Spatial linkages around rails and ports tend to be
larger for bulk commodity projects, such as iron-ore and coal
mines since these projects require large transport infrastructure investments to become viable. Fiscal linkages, on the
other hand are more likely to be larger in oil projects, given
that these tend to be more profitable.

Linkage opportunities are context specific
While each of the following sections sets out some of the
preconditions for creating linkages and provides concrete examples of where linkages were successfully created, it must be
borne in mind that linkage-creation is very context specific.
Generalised conclusions are therefore of limited applicability.

2. The country context:
The opportunities for upstream, downstream, horizontal,
knowledge, and technology linkages are highly dependent
on the existing know-how and expertise in the country and
region where the EI project operates. If the knowledge gap

Figure 2.1: Linkages to the EI sector
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4. The ownership structure of the EI company:

is too large, the opportunities for these linkages are small.
A country’s history and experience with the EI sector plays
an important role for all linkage types. With the exception
of Botswana4, all countries analysed in Morris et al. (2012)
show a positive correlation between how long the EI sector
has been in operation and the depth and breadth of linkages.
Hansen (2014) reports that there is a consensus in the literature that the time factor is essential. He finds that according
to several authors (Amendolagine et al., 2013; Merlevede
et al., 2011) the lack of linkages observed in many African
countries could, in part, be attributable the “recent nature”
of the “extractive FDI-based development”.

Morris et al. (2012) argue that foreign ownership might be
less conducive to linkage creation than domestic ownership
for cultural and nationalistic reasons. This is most evident
with state-owned EI companies that are often established
with the mandate to spur economic domestic activities
through upstream, downstream, spatial, and knowledge
linkages. Their mismanagement can however negatively
impact fiscal linkages. Among foreign investors, the Chinese
state owned enterprises (SOE) stand out. These Chinese
SOEs tend to display little appetite for investing in building
the capabilities of the local workforce employed to work on
investment projects. Instead, where skills are lacking in the
local work force, Chinese companies tend to be quicker than
their Western counterparts in replacing them with expatriate
staff.

3. The life cycle of the project:
Few opportunities exist during the exploration phase given
that this activity usually only involves a small specialized team
on the ground. Employment figures peak during the construction phase, which is also the period in which consumption linkages could be maximized given the large number of
employees/ contractors who may spend their earnings domestically. However, this time period may be too short to create
sustainable upstream linkages if the contractors used for the
construction phase cannot find additional opportunities in
other infrastructure projects in the country when the phase
ends. The production phase, in turn, is more suitable to build
long-term upstream and downstream linkages to a project.

Employment
Intimately related to what determines the extent of linkages
is the question of how many jobs will be created. While each
chapter tries to address the extent to which each linkage type
will lead to job creation, it is important to remember that
multiple factors influence the employment creation potential
of an investment, including: (1) the type of ownership (pub-

4 In Botswana, downstream linkages only started 2005 despite a long history of
diamond exploitation.

Figure 2.2: Employment opportunities throughout the life cycle of an EI project

Source: ICMM (2014), The Role of Mining in National Economies (2nd edition): Mining’s Contribution to Sustainable Development.
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lic versus private, foreign versus domestic); (2) the size of
the project (small versus large-scale); (3) the life cycle phase
of the project (see figure below); (4) the type of operation
(off-shore versus on-shore, or open-pit versus underground);
and (5) the type of commodity being extracted (as explained
above) (CCSI, 2016 forthcoming).

induced employment opportunities will depend on the
extractive region’s ability to offer and ideally produce the
consumption products that are in demand by employees
in the resource sector. Multipliers capturing indirect and
induced employment effects are calculated in different ways
from one study to the next and are generated by different
models, principally input-output (I-O) models and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (CCSI, 2016
forthcoming). While the World Bank (2009) estimates that
on average indirect employment is around 2-4 times larger

Indirect employment opportunities will largely depend on
the ability of local businesses to offer services and goods
meeting the standards required by EI companies, whereas

Figure 2.3: Employment multipliers of various analyses
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Source: World Gold Council (2015), The Social and Economic Impacts of Gold Mining.
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than direct employment in the mining sector and 1-4 times
in the oil sector, it is very difficult to generalize the employment impact of linkages. This finding is also exemplified by
the figure on the previous page, which provides an overview
of the indirect multipliers in various projects in the gold sector.
Multipliers vary significantly even for gold projects in the same
country, such as in Tanzania (multiplier estimate of 6.87 vs. 3).

Box 2.1: Employment and gender impact of ASM
It is estimated that more than 20 million people are
working globally in the ASM sector, 30% of which are
female (World Bank, 2012). This means that just the
proportion of women working in ASM is more than double
the number of global employees in large-scale mining,
which has been estimated at 2.5 million (ICMM, 2014).

Taking into account the impact of induced employment, the
multiplier can be as high as 10 or more according to certain
studies (Apoyo 2009, Kapstein and Kim 2011).5 In fact, as
shown in figures above and below respectively, induced employment is always much larger than indirect employment.

In some countries ASM plays an even bigger role in the
economy and the female participation is higher. In the
Central African Republic, for example, two thirds of the
population are thought to directly or indirectly rely on
diamond mining. In Uganda it is estimated that 200,000
people (out of which 45% are estimated to be female)
were engaged in ASM in gold, tin, coltan, wolfram and
other industrial minerals in 2012.

Figure 2.4: Examples of direct, indirect and induced
employment figures

However, the quality of the jobs in the ASM sector is
often not as high as in the large-scale mining sector.
Apart from often operating in the informal sector of the
economy, the ASM sector is often associated with unsafe
mining practices, low and unsteady salaries, health
problems, environmental damage and conflict.

EMPLOYMENT
Escondida mine
(Chile - 2004)
Obuasi mine
(Ghana - 2005)
Sepon mine
(Chile - 2008)

Direct
2,800
6,670
2,460

Indirect
5,270

Indirect*
8,500
(up to 12,800)
1,000
20,000
(up to 5,000) (up to 50,000)
2,450
12,300

* The indirect and induced employment figures are based on estimates on the
assumption that certain multipliers(or multiplier options) apply. they relate
solely to domestic employment effects.
Source: ICMM March & July 2007, 2011.

2.2

Source: GIZ (2015), Sustainable Economic Development in Resource-Rich Countries,
Guidelines for Technical Cooperation.

Production Linkages: Upstream/
Backward Linkages

Upstream or backward linkages relate to the procurement
of goods and services that the EI sector requires to operate.
The Figure 2.6 shows that this makes up the bulk of the
money spent by EI companies. In 2014 upstream spending
by BP and Anglo American made up 87% and 64% respectively (BP combined the capital cost spending into the supplier spending in its annual report, whereas Anglo American
has separated it out). This compares with 2% and 11% of
total spending on government payments respectively.

What is less well understood and not reflected in direct,
indirect and induced employment figures are the job
losses that may result from large-scale EI projects. This is
particularly relevant for the Artisanal and Small Scale Mining
(ASM) sector, given that these miners often compete for the
same deposits. The employment and gender impact of the
ASM sector is often significantly larger in many developing countries where precious stones and metals are mined,
as highlighted in the box 2.1, and should therefore play a
central role in government policies and support programmes
of international development cooperation (see recommen-
dation D9).

5 Kapstein and Kim( 2011) find that the employment multiplier for the Ahafo mine
in Ghana was 28.	
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Figure 2.5: Upstream linkages

Consumption linkages

Horizontal linkages

EI‘s sphere
of interest

(Induced Employment)

Employment

Knowledge linkages

Spatial linkages

VALUE CHAIN
Upstream linkages
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Downstream linkages

(Indirect Employment)

(Direct Employment)

(Indirect Employment)

Fiscal linkages

Figure 2.6 Value created by BP and Anglo American in 2014
Anglo American

BP

2%
4%

3%

0%

2%
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11%

43%
16%

21%

n Suppliers
n Taxes

n Capex
n Dividends

87%

n Employes
n Interest

n Suppliers
n Employes

Source: Own graph with data from Anglo American (2015) and BP (2015)

18

n Communities
n Governments

n Capital providers
n Retaining earnings

LINKAGES

Figure 2.7: Company types and spending patterns

Type of industries

Characteristics and areas of activities

Examples of services and equipment needed

Global giants

Diversified portfolio, highly integrated

Insurance, trading services, consumables,
transport services, employment agencies,
market consultants, media relations, mining
equipment, explosive and accessories

Senior companies

Vertical; Strategy (controllers); Commodity
focus; Acquisitional

Insurance, consumables, employment agencies

Intermediate and
national companies

Commodity focus; Acquisitional; Production;
Investor/controller

Insurance, mining equipment, consumables,
engineering contractors, consultancies

Expansory junior compa- Production; Development; Investment;
nies (large firms: assets Exploration
worth > $ 100 million)

Risk assessors, camp services, consultancies, computer software, metal analysis, lab
services, geophysics, drill contractors, mining
equipment, environmental services

Exploration junior
companies (small firms:
assets worth < $ 100
million)

Production; Development; Investment;
Exploration

Same as above

Prospectors,
private firms

Exploration

Regional promotion, leagl and fiscal infrastructure consultants, airborne surveyors,
mapping services pegging records

Source: Ramdoo (2015), Resource-based Industrialisation in Africa Optimising Linkages and Value Chains in the Extractive Sector.

It should be noted that the spending pattern of companies
and the implications on the supply chain vary depending on
the type of companies, as highlighted above.

the production stage. While varying by commodity and mine
type, mining companies spend between 75-90% of their
undiscounted nominal value during this phase of the project.
This is illustrated in figure 2.8, which also indicates that the
goods and services procured are predominantly basic materials and manual and low skilled labour.

Furthermore, different types of upstream linkage
opportunities exist at the different stages of the project life
cycle, with the greatest scope for upstream linkages during
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Figure 2.8: Mining spending on goods and services along the mining life cycle (Share of life of mine cost, %)

0– 3

10 –25

Exploration and
feasibility

Goods

Basic materials

0-11

Low- to mediumcomplexity equipment
and parts

0–11

High -complexity
equipment and parts

0–11 –2

Integrated plant
equipment solutions

Services

Production

Midtiers killed labor

0–11

Technical support
services

0–11 –2

Closure

0– 1 8– 17

6-8

0– 1 7– 14
4–10

3-7

1-44
0-12

0– 2

7–11

-4

Manual and low-skill
labor services

–8

5– 12

-5

8-13

–3

5-9
2–6

0-1 10 –20

0-1 6– 14

0-1 3– 10
0– 10

Management/EPCM1
Utilities

Site
development

-4

Business support
services

Utilities

75–90

1–47
0-1

–10

1–39

8– 14
-12

0– 1 10 –17

1 Engineering, procurement, and construction management .
NOTE: Analysis based on expert interviews and quantitative estimates of capital and operational expenditure over the life of
a mine . Figures are subject to variation according to the specific metal and type of mine considered . The totals shown for
each element of the mine life cycle will therefore not necessarily equal the sum of the individual items below .
6

Source: McKinsey (2013), Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven economies.

• Services:
»» Legal and regulatory services when there is a need for

According to a 2012 World Bank report analysing local
procurement in mining in West Africa, the following
mining –related opportunities could be realistically seized in
the short-to-medium term (these opportunities are shown
graphically along the mine life cycle in annex 1):

local knowledge

»» Mining and drilling services (waste haulage, secondary
crushing, specialized drilling, sample analysis)
»» Transport and logistics services
»» Spare part warehousing
»» Supply of lubricants
»» Analysis and testing, including ore samples, water, oil,
»» Civil works

6 Exhibit from “Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven
economies ”, December 2013, McKinsey Global Institute, www.mckinsey.com. Copyright (c) 2013 McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.
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»» Supply of metal fabrication
»» Mining village management (including cleaning, main-

• Non-core goods and services
»» Food and beverages
»» Local training service providers
»» Sample bags and packaging
»» Uniforms

tenance, catering, non-hazardous waste management)

• Capital Equipment:
»» Kilns and furnaces
»» Plastic products (pipes)
»» Cement
»» Assembly of small motors
• Consumables
»» Tires when there are rubber plantations
»» Lime
»» Cyanide, caustic soda, hydrochloric acid, ammonia, and

The spending pattern in the oil and gas sector is more
geared towards high complexity goods and integrated plant
equipment solution, as can be seen in the figure below. This
can reduce the scope of upstream linkages opportunities in
developing countries with a low skill base.

activated carbon

»» Crucibles

Figure 2.9: Difference between mining and oil and gas expenditure over goods and services
(Cost breakdown by cost type, %)
Major spend buckets
Cost categories
Basic materials

Goods

Low- to medium-complexity
equipment and parts
High-complexity equipment
and parts

Integrated plant equipment
solutions

Metals and mining

13 –23

8–17

5–10

7–14

12 –20

4–10

15 –25

5–12

Manual and low-skill labor
services
Midtier skilled labor
Services

Oil and gas

2–7

6–14

Technical support services

7–12

3–10

0–5

0–10

Business support services

8–14

Management/EPCM
Utilities

2–7

10 –20

2–12

Utilities

10–17

8–13

Total

100

100

Source: McKinsey (2013), Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resourcedriven economies.7

7 Exhibit from “Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven economies ”, December 2013, McKinsey Global Institute, www.mckinsey.com. Copyright (c) 2013
McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.
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The potential for upstream linkages in the oil sector is likely
to be limited during the exploration and development stages
because of the highly specialized and technical nature of
goods and services required at these stages (Tordo et al.,
2013). The scope for upstream linkages thus tends to be
greater during the production stage, as the inputs required
are less specialized than during the previous phases. However during the further downstream phases, this potential
becomes limited again given the demand for specialized
content in inputs. Some temporary opportunities remain in
the construction of pipes, pipelines and storage facilities and
some more permanent ones in the primary distribution of
refined products to customers. The figures in annex 1 set out

the upstream opportunities along the value chain of the oil
and gas sector.
The evaluation of whether the local economy has seized
such local procurement opportunities should be done with
caution. Zambia is a case in point: as shown in the figure
below, while most of the mining services are provided by
local entrepreneurs, most of the goods are not manufactured
in Zambia but imported from abroad through Zambian
companies. Therefore, while the mining companies would
present substantive local expenses in terms of local procurement, only a small proportion is attributed to goods that are
actually produced locally.

Figure 2.10: Procurement of goods and services in Zambia’s copper sector.
Mining company procurement
(2012 data from the four mining companies, US$ million)
2,500

2,000

Zambian
produced

1,500

1,000

Imports
bought from
Zambian
companies

500

Direct
imports

0
Goods

Services

Source: ICMM (2014), Enhancing mining’s contribution to the Zambian economy and society.

2.2.1.	 Literature review and case studies

1. The conviction that the EI sector is an enclave sector
(legacy from the theories of the 50’s); and
2. The underestimation of the EI sector’s potential to
generate technological spill-overs based on the perceptions that either the sector’s technological content is too
high for successful participation in its supply chain or
too low to produce spill-overs and enable the creation
of a knowledge-based industry.

The value chain literature (Akinlo, 2004; Bwalya, 2006;
Larsen et al., 2009; Fessehaie, 2011; Mjimba, 2011; Morrissey 2012; Morris et al., 2012) suggests that local linkages
to the African EI sector are “few and shallow” (Hansen, 2014).
This is often the result of upstream linkages being neglected
by policy makers. Kaplinsky (2011) suggests two reasons for
this negligence:
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Kaplinsky refutes the first reason with the argument that the
unique specificity of each deposit requires the creation of
local skills and technologies. South Africa, Brazil, Angola and
Tanzania serve as examples. Local suppliers may also have an
advantage over global suppliers because of the lower cost of
local knowledge (Ramdoo, 2013). Kaplinsky also debunks
the second argument by asserting that the production process
requires considerable inputs involving a broad range of skills
levels. These range from the provision of basic utilities (water
and power), food and office supplies over the provision
of services in internet and telecommunication technology
(ICT)8 and engineering maintenance9 to more technological
inputs such as “the assembly and sub-manufacture of the cables
link[ing] sub-sea oil wells to surface vessels and to land”, which
are sourced locally in Angola.

The breadth and depth of upstream linkages to a country’s
EI sector are dependent on 1) how long commodities have
been exploited in that country; 2) the nature of ownership of
the lead extractive company; 3) the skills level of local suppliers and the extent to which national institutions support the
technological development of local suppliers or its National
System of Innovation (NSI);11 4) local suppliers’ access to infrastructure and finance; 5) the quality of the policy around
linkage promotion; and 6) the structure of the sector (Morris
et al. 2012, Hansen 2014). Determinants 3-6 are reviewed in
more detail below, given that the first two have already been
described in section 2.1.

Kaplinsky (2011) therefore concludes that despite the widespread perception that the EI sector operates in an enclave
model, the potential for upstream linkages when assessing
the whole range of inputs required by the project is high. If
the country offers reliable, low cost, high quality suppliers,
EI companies will prefer to outsource non-core competences
creating further opportunities to create upstream linkages.10

In a report on commodities and development, UNCTAD
(2013) found that the local workforce’s low absorptive
capacity12, especially due to a lack of skills, limits the scale
of upstream linkages. The report concludes that the impact
of FDI in the EI sector on a host country’s development
is therefore limited. Fesshaie (2011) finds that low public
investment in technological capacities leads African suppliers
into a vicious circle of “low access to investment capital, low
technological capabilities to start with, low incentives to adopt
new technologies, and high risk that the market will not reward
such investment“ (Hansen 2014).13

The capabilities and skills of the local suppliers,
and the technological support they receive from a
NSI

Hansen (2014) suggests that the enclave hypothesis is now
outdated, in particular considering the recent change in the
dynamics of extractive FDI:
1. Multinationals evolve towards greater outsourcing of
their non-core competencies.
2. Multinationals have integrated community-oriented
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies as
risk-reducing strategies (‘social license to operate’) and
see linkages as part of those strategies.
3. Western multinationals are now in competition
with firms from emerging markets and increasingly
competent local African extractive ‘champions’,
enabling African governments to strengthen their
bargaining power to require local content and the
promotion of linkages.
4. The international development cooperation is
increasingly looking at the promotion of linkages from
the EI sector

Peek and Gantes (2008) observe that the shortage of skills
in the African oil and gas sectors is directly attributable to
a combination of scarce educational facilities, weak vocational and technical training, which is not targeted at the
EI sector, and the lack of school accreditation. Morris et al.
(2012) add that the NSI is often not in synergy with the
sector, which lacks industry clusters. “[Such clusters] contribute to the development of a network between government,
universities and foreign and domestic firms that allows a progressive incorporation of domestic firms in the main activities”
(UNCTAD, 2012). As demonstrated on the next page by
the case of South Africa, suppliers operating in an industrial
cluster benefit from faster knowledge dissemination, reduced
11 Freeman (1995), Lundvall (1992), and Morris et al. (2012) all use the expression of a “National System of Innovation”.
12 The absorptive capacity refers to the capacity of local firms to learn new
competencies through linkages.
13 A similar situation is present in Mongolia, where SMEs have little access to
finance and are hampered by their inability to invest in better machinery, technology and training to improve their competitiveness and meet the quality standards
that would be required to compete with imported goods or in foreign markets.
Public investment to promote technological advances of SMEs would go a long
way to support linkages to the EI sector by improving the quality to price ratio
of Mongolia’s locally produced goods and services. (Interview with GIZ Mongolia,
August 2015).

8 Nigeria has built up its ICT sector and its EI source these services locally.
9 Zambia is seen as a successful case study where engineering services are
provided locally.
10 Many authors (Altenburg, 2001; Nunnenkamp, 2002; Meyer & Sinan, 2009;
Morris 2001) argue that companies will be reluctant to outsource anything that
has to do with the companies’ core competencies in order to avoid creating future
competitors. Therefore, intra-industry linkages will be less extensive than interindustry linkages.
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transaction costs, the acquisition of best practices, and increases in competitiveness and innovation capacities (UNCTAD, 2012). The links that are created in industrial clusters
also help establish industry-university collaborations aimed
at designing educational programmes that serve the needs
of the industry (as also mentioned in recommendations E8,
G2 and G5). For instance, the Center for Energy Enterprise
Development in Trinidad and Tobago was established in
2004 to “increase local participation in value-added energy
projects, facilitate the expansion in-depth and scope of the local

energy industry, develop business skills in the small and medium
enterprises, encourage innovation and foster new thinking, helping entrepreneurs to capture supply chain niches” (UNCTAD,
2012).

Box 2.2: South Africa’s upstream supplier sector

3.	 The structure of the mining industry, which was
dominated by large mining houses that cooperated e.g.
by jointly financing technological improvements.
4.	 The development of a NSI in close collaboration
with the mining industry. The development of special expertise in deep gold and platinum mining was
incentivized by the cooperative research institute of
the mining industry (COMRO). This industry association
undertook several research and development (R&D)
initiatives in the 1960s to develop technologies that
were adapted by local equipment manufacturers for
deep gold mining, which led to the development of
hydraulic equipment. COMRO also outsourced some of
its R&D to equipment suppliers, other research organizations and South African universities (Progue 2008).
5.	 The development of the industry in geographical
clusters concentrated east of Johannesburg and was
characterized by frequent interactions between mining
producers, specialized manufacturers, input providers,
agents and distributors. The cluster included companies specializing in metallurgy, machinery, electrical
equipment, and construction activities (Walker 2005).

South Africa is a case in point to understand the first three
determinants of upstream linkage creation (long history of
commodity exploitation, local ownership of the lead companies, and the skills, capabilities and technological support
given by the South African public-private NSI).

South Africa’s large-scale minerals exploitation started
150 years ago with the discovery of diamonds, followed
by gold and platinum in the 1870s. As a result, South
Africa has built up significant expertise in the mining
sector and boasts the most developed mining and mining
supply industry in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In the early years of the mining sector, South African
policies were geared towards two main goals: 1) providing a favourable environment for mining investors, notably
by keeping costs, such as wages, low and financially
supporting their technological and training efforts; and 2)
encouraging upstream linkages by protecting the domestic
industry through tariffs which lasted until the end of the
Apartheid regime in 1994. Those policies were combined
with an early realisation by mining entrepreneurs that the
specificity of the geology of the country’s mining deposits, which is characterized by great depth, necessitated
advanced technologies and systems.
Over time, technological capabilities were also strengthened as a result of (Kaplan, 2011):

The share of patents related to mining technology is
much higher in South Africa than in other resource-rich
and technologically advanced countries.15 In fact, the
country has become a world leader in supplying deep
level mining projects. South African export products include “spirals for washing coal; pumping up water from
deep levels; hydropower; tracked mining; underground
locomotives; ventilation; shaft sinking; turnkey new mine
design and operation; and many others.,” (Morris et al.
2012)

1.	 The scale and longevity of South Africa’s mining
sector, which provided the possibility of amortizing any
investment in technology over time.
2.	 Economies of scope due to the variety of minerals.14

14 The same core capabilities were required by mining projects extracting different commodities, thus providing the opportunity to realize economies of scope and
reducing the projects’ development costs.

15 According to the United States Patent and Technology Office (USPTO), the average share of patents related to mining technology in South Africa between 1976
and 2006 stands at 4.5%, compared to 0.5% in the U.S., 1.9% in Canada and 1.3%
in Australia.	
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South Africa’s long history of mining and its successful
development of upstream linkages as described in the case
study demonstrates how a mature mining sector as well as
targeted policy interventions and support mechanisms, such
as a NSI, can contribute to establishing a globally competitive supplier network possessing specialized expertise regarding the country’s unique geological characteristics.

ment contracts, EI companies’ ongoing needs and small and
medium-sized enterprise (SME) capacities, as explained in
the Box below and recommendation G6.

Box 2.3: Dealing with access to information
1.	 In Chile, the Industrial Association of Antofagasta,
Xstrata, BHP Billiton, and Barrick developed the Goods
and Services Supplier Company Classification System,
which provides an up-to-date database of suppliers
and contractors (World Bank, 2009).
2.	 In Chad, the IFC helped compile a supplier database of
over 1,000 vendors for ExxonMobil (World Bank, 2012).
3.	 In Kazakhstan, oil and gas companies are required to
upload all procurement information and documents to
the Kazakhstan Contract Agency Register. Brazil has
a similar system with the Site Opportunities Supply
Chain of Petroleum and Natural Gas, launched in 2009
(McKinsey, 2013).
4.	 In Guinea, Rio Tinto and the IFC set up a database
of over 400 SMEs and an enterprise center providing
business services in the city of Beyla. Both initiatives
facilitate the communication between local suppliers
and Rio Tinto (IFC, 2015).
5.	 In Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, the Subcontractor and
Partnership Exchanges, a joint effort by the state,
the private sector and UNIDO, maintain a database
containing 450 and 700 SMEs respectively (World Bank,
2012).

An acknowledgment of the success factors through which
South Africa historically promoted and developed upstream
linkages to its mining sector is unfortunately missing in the
current government’s policy to maintain South African suppliers’ comparative advantage. According to Kaplan (2011),
in order to keep a sustainable comparative advantage, South
Africa’s supply base is in dire need of government-supported
investments in R&D, tertiary education institutions and
science councils. These investments are necessary for South
Africa to keep up with rising competition in manufacturing
from Asia as well as in knowledge and innovation (mainly
from Australia). However, the government is focusing most
of its efforts on downstream beneficiation. The National
Industrial Policy Framework and the Industrial Policy Action
Plan ignore the sectors producing mining equipment and
offering related services (Morris et al., 2012).

Local suppliers’ access to infrastructure, finance and
information
While the major EI companies may be in a sufficiently
strong financial position to be able to construct, operate and
maintain infrastructure necessary to make the project viable,
local suppliers are not. Local suppliers therefore often severely suffer from a lack of adequate power, transport, water,
and/or ICT infrastructure.

The quality of local content policy
According to Morris et al. (2012), the creation of upstream
linkages is included in the national development visions of
Angola, Botswana, Gabon and Nigeria, while, by 2012, this
was not the case in Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania and South
Africa.16 Even when countries have a vision, it often only
encourages local ownership instead of local value addition:
this can result in a situation of “broad” linkages with very
little depth, leading to “the localization of the import 
function” 17 (Morris et al., 2012).18

Access to finance is crucial for suppliers with limited working capital. This access to finance is all the more important
if suppliers are subjected to unfavourable tax and customs
duties, currency risks (e.g. if contracts are denominated in
U.S. dollars), and transactional risk (Hansen, 2014). In
Azerbaijan, BP set up a Supplier Finance Facility of $15
million over eight years to provide financing to suppliers,
with support from the IFC. BP (40%), the IFC (40%) and a
local bank holding (20%), financed the Facility jointly (Also
see recommendations E10, G6, D6).

16 However, Ghana and Tanzania have developed petroleum laws and regulations,
respectively, in 2013 and 2015, with the objective of clearly defining their vision
for local content in the petroleum sector (see Local Content - Ghana Petroleum CCSI - June 104 and Local Content - Tanzania Petroleum - CCSI - July 2015).
17 The promotion of local ownership often leads to the creation of front companies that import goods from abroad instead of producing goods locally and
contributing to local manufacturing skills. This leads to “shallow” linkages.	
18 For a discussion on this issue in the context of Nigeria, see Ovadia (2013b).

In addition to access to finance and adequate infrastructure,
local suppliers benefit from access to information about
procurement opportunities. Governments, companies and
international development cooperation have often overcome
this issue by putting together a database describing procure-
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Box 2.4: Nigeria’s local content development

In addition, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC) and all other major oil companies are required to
finance training programmes and scholarships (Oyejide
and Adewuyi (2011)). Consequently, a supply of highly
trained Nigerian engineers, geologists and geophysicists
has emerged, some of whom have established private oil
prospecting and services companies.

• Nigeria discovered commercial quantities of oil in 1956
but had to wait for the end of the civil war in 1970
in order for the oil sector to play a significant role.
Along with the relatively long history of the oil sector,
there has been a long history of local content policy to
deepen upstream linkages, which include:

Nigeria has also recognized the responsibility of the government to implement and monitor local content requirements and policies. The National Content Act established
the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board
(the “NCDMB”), which is in charge of developing procedures that will guide, monitor, coordinate and implement
the provisions of the Act. The Act requires the NCDMB to
manage the Nigerian Content Development Fund (NCDF),
which was established to assist in the implementation
of the Act by guaranteeing lending to Nigerian service
companies as well as to infrastructure and training
projects and is financed by 1% of the value of every
contract awarded. In 2014 the fund reached $350m and
it is projected to reach $700 million over the next five
years.19 The NCDMB also established the Nigerian Content
Consultative Forum as a platform for information sharing
and collaboration in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.

• The Petroleum Act from 1969, which protects
indigenous Nigerian firms and promotes human
capacity development.
The Production Sharing Contracts of 1991 and 1993,
which encourage local procurement even if it is at a
higher cost than international procurement.
• The 2005 directives, which mandate the use of local
services and low-tech on-shore goods and services
supplied by indigenous firms.
• The Nigerian Content Act of 2010, which is dedicated
to local content and promotes value added by Nigerian
firms.
• The 2020 Vision, which sets targets of 35.5 % of local
content in 2010 and 70% in 2013.
• The First Implementation Plan (covering the periods
2010-2013), which promotes the participation of the
private sector in both upstream and downstream
linkages as well as the growth of national value 
added (Morris et al., 2012).

All of those measures seem to have had some success
since local content rose from 3-5% in the 1970’s to 20%
in 2004 to 39% in 2009 (Morris et al., 2011). NCDMB has
released that service companies have invested $5bn20 in
the last four years thanks to the NCDF.21 This investment
has led to the creation of 38,000 jobs (Ramdoo, 2015).
Progress has been made especially in the fields of fabrication and construction, well construction and completion,
transportation, control systems, design and engineering,
and ICT. Among those areas, the fabrication of structures
and parts is the most locally grounded. Many of the suppliers in this sector have technical agreements22 with oil
companies, local research centres and universities, which
have enabled knowledge and technology transfer and
information exchange (Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011).

In addition to the regulations, post-civil war Nigeria
created a NSI. In 1973, it established the Petroleum Technology Development Fund to advance petroleum technology education in six national universities and conducted
several programmes in design engineering and welding.
Moreover, the government established the Petroleum
Training Institute in the Delta State to provide low and
mid-level skills training in engineering aimed at the
petroleum sector. Later, the National College of Petroleum
Studies in Kaduna was set up in 1995 to train senior
and executive-level skills so as to enable local personnel to take on corporate and technical responsibilities.

19 http://www.natlawreview.com/article/nigeria-local-content-update-oil-gas-industry
20 Nigerian annual petroleum revenues are generally estimated to be $3-$5 b illion.
This would make local content roughly equivalent in significance to petroleum
revenues for Nigeria (Ovadia, 2014)
21 Ibid.
22 The Nigerian Content Act requires oil operators to submit an annual plan
“setting out a programme of planned initiatives aimed at promoting the effective
transfer of technologies from the operator and alliance partners to Nigerian individuals and companies.”
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Morris et al. (2012) find that upstream linkage policies are
often inconsistent or even contradictory. For example, policies granting duty free exemptions to (foreign) EI companies
but not to domestic suppliers incentivise the import of goods
and services and may crowd out local sourcing. Policies are
often also not backed by incentives and if they are, monitoring tends to be inadequate due to a lack of resources,
institutional capacity and/or political will. Kaplinsky (2011)
notes that the agenda of upstream linkage policies has often
been “passive“, i.e. limited to the establishment of mandatory
local content targets on foreign-owned companies. It stands
in contrast with the agenda of downstream linkage policies,
which frequently involves heavy commitments of government financial support.

The Nigerian case study illustrates the country’s vision of
developing local content and increasing it over time. According to Morris et al. (2012), the Nigerian government is
one of few African governments that had an early focus on
local content. Emphasizing local value added rather than
local ownership has facilitated the development of upstream
linkages. In the National Content Act Nigerian content is
defined as “the quantum of composite value added to or created
in the Nigerian economy by a systematic development of capacity
and capabilities through the deliberate utilization of Nigerian
human, material resources and services in the Nigerian oil and
gas industry”. (See recommendations G3,G5,G6). Such a
definition also involves the challenge of adequately measuring local content targets. Ovadia (2013) notes that the
NCDMB still needs to address the fact that concrete definitions and guidelines for measuring Nigerian content are
absent; without these, the NCDMB has to rely on informal,
opaque and discretionary procedures with regard to monitoring local content.

The literature concurs that there is both a tremendous potential for upstream linkages and a high risk of implementing
ill-suited policies that fail to foster market driven linkages
which are in the mutual interest of both the host country
and the EI sector. Such policies may not only generate inefficiencies and be costly to implement, but may also slow down
linkage creation and make the linkages “shallower” while
reducing the resource rents from EI projects.

Furthermore, to sustain its advances in local content,
Nigeria needs to tackle a few challenges that local suppliers
still confront. Oil companies’ active supplier development
programmes do not extend to the second or farther tiers of
suppliers. Suppliers complain about high import tariffs and
taxation (which are often alleviated for foreigners) hurting
their participation in the oil and gas sector. Transportation
and power supply are inadequate for the development of a
more robust supply chain. Last, the supply chain’s technological content needs to be upgraded in order to serve the more
demanding deep-water fabrication.

Successful policies to cope with all the issues mentioned
above can be clustered into four non-exclusive areas
(UNCTAD, 2010a, Hansen, 2014): (1) the strategic and selective attraction of FDI depending on its potential for linkages;23 (2) consistent linkage policies and institutions focused
on the implementation of linkage policies (see also recommendation G1); (3) the development of absorptive capacity
in the local industry (see also recommendation G4); and (4)
improving the general investment climate (see also recommendation G2). A 2012 World Bank report adds a fifth area,
namely regional integration policies. The report highlights
that poor regional integration increases the costs associated
with intra-regional procurement even if the demanded goods
and services are available. In Senegal, for example, water tests
required for the mining process used to be done in Ghana,
but the long journey (due to deficient cross border infrastructure and delays at the border) makes the water results
inaccurate, so now water testing is done in the Netherlands.
Thus suppliers miss regional market opportunities and the
possibility to build on economies of scale and scope to develop their capacities (see recommendations G9).
The case study on the previous page illustrates how Nigeria
has targeted its local content policy and created dedicated
institutions to implement it.

Similarly, the recent reform of the petroleum sector in
Mexico also displays the desire to promote a local content
policy around value–added, to address the measurement issue
and to ground it within a strategic industrial policy (see box
2.5):

23 Blomström et al., (2003) explains that developed countries would use subsidies
to attract a particular type of investors but low income countries are left with tax
and regulatory exemptions as policy options.
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Box 2.5: Mexico’s approach to local content as of 2014

Box 2.6: The Australian Industry Participation 		
Framework

In 2014, Mexico passed the Hydrocarbons Act, which reformed the country’s approach to the hydrocarbons sector
and to the promotion of local content. The Act mandates
the Ministry of Energy to develop a methodology on how
to measure and monitor the implementation of local
content, define an industrial strategy for the hydrocarbons
sector, create a national registry of domestic suppliers to
identify their development needs, and create an advisory
board to help formulate policies fostering the development of domestic suppliers.

Australia has a long mining history and has created
strong upstream linkages with local and regional
suppliers. However, due the competition of low cost
supplies from the Asian economies, an increasing number
of Australian manufacturing and service companies have
closed or moved offshore. To help its local m
 anufacturing
and service sectors compete for procurement and
supply contracts in large-scale projects, the Australian
Government – at the commonwealth, state and local
level – has implemented a number of “soft approach”
measures.

The methodology published by the Ministry of Economy in
November 2014 defines national content as “a percentage
that represents the value in Mexican pesos of the goods,
services, work force (labor), training, transfer of technology and physical infrastructure on a local and regional
basis, from the total value in Mexican pesos of such
concepts as defined in this Methodology”.

The Australian Industry Participation Framework (AIP
National Framework) was signed by Commonwealth,
State and Territory Industry Ministers in April 2001 “to
promote, develop and maintain a sustainable Australian
industry capability by encouraging competitive Australian
industry participation in investment projects.” 25 The key
principle of the AIP National Framework is to ensure that
the Australian industry and especially SMEs have the
opportunity to participate in major investment projects in
Australia and overseas. This is achieved through the early
identification of opportunities and the facilitation of local
participation through capacity building. The Australian
Jobs Act 2013 further clarifies the requirements under
the AIP Framework. Project proponents carrying out a
project with a capital expenditure of $500 million or more
are required to meet the following criteria:

Structure of the sector
The chain of contractors involved in commissioning a mine
or an oil field plays a role in determining the breadth of
linkages. Construction is generally sub-contracted to specialized construction and installation companies that themselves
sub-contract companies with which they have established
long-term relationships. Investment contracts do not always
impose local content requirements on subcontractors engaged
by the investor or company and, even if they do, contractors
might not be diligent in monitoring local content requirements. Another reason why companies do not maximize
the use of local suppliers arises when the mine or oil well
is located in isolated areas or in harsh conditions. In those
circumstances “supply chain management staff and the purchasing function characteristically work on short and intensive work
cycles” (Hansen, 2014). There is no time to create the longterm personal relationships with local suppliers that are necessary for the successful development of upstream linkages.

• Notify the AIP Authority of a potential project;
• Complete and submit an AIP plan that outlines how
the project will provide opportunities for capable and
competitive Australian businesses to bid for goods and
services;
• Once the AIP plan is approved, demonstrate and 
report compliance with the plan for the duration of the
project.26

Supporting policies by government, companies and
international development cooperation

The Industry Capability Network (ICN) and the Supplier
Access to Major Projects (SAMP) support the AIP National Framework. The ICN is responsible for funding and
promoting Australian SMEs’ participation in major projects
and communicating new business opportunities. The SAMP
funds the ICN to work with project developers to identify
supply opportunities for capable and competitive Australian companies both within the country and abroad.

Apart from focusing on local content policy, governments
can also rely on broader policies to target upstream linkages.
Australia’s approach is a point in case, as it has developed a
framework enabling suppliers to seize procurement opportunities domestically and abroad. This framework applies to
both the mining and petroleum sectors.24
24 Also see CCSI’s local content profile on Australia, which is available at: 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/Local-Content-Australia-Mining-and-
Petroleum-CCSI-4-December-2015.pdf.
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Australia’s very recent case study illustrates the types of
policies that may help to create local procurement opportunities for local suppliers in addition to the local content
requirements imposed on the private sector to prevent a
well-established service industry from relocating abroad (see
recommendation G3).

Apart from government policy and support mechanisms, the
EI companies and international development cooperation
both have an important role to play in creating upstream
linkages. The Madagascar case studies below illustrate these
two actors can work together to increase local procurement.

Box 2.7: Partnerships between companies and 	
international development cooperation in
Madagascar27

In 2013, QMM spent around US$ 12 million in purchases
from local suppliers and organized training programme
for 335 participants. QMM also established a database of
900 suppliers (CSRM, World Bank, 2015).

Rio Tinto and GIZ:
Rio Tinto (80%) and the Malagasy government (20%)
jointly own QIT Madagascar Minerals S.A. (QMM) - a
$940-million mining operation that started production in
2009. To develop an effective local suppliers development
programme, Rio Tinto entered into a strategic alliance
with GIZ in 2013.

IFC and Ambatovy
The Ambatovy mining operation is a $5.5 billion joint
venture composed of Sherritt International, Sumitomo
Corporation, Korea Resources, and SNC-Lavalin. It is
the world’s largest nickel and cobalt operation, and
Madagascar’s biggest investment. In order to realize its
commitment to local content, Ambatovy, in collaboration
with the IFC and Training Management Africa, created
a business training centre, which provides vocational
training to local SMEs, in 2008. The company also
supported the construction of three bulk purchasing
centres and established a database listing 3,500 potential
local suppliers.

GIZ and QMM designed four activities to promote upstream linkages, including:
1. The development of a preferential procurement policy,
which considers the location and ownership structure of
the suppliers;
2. The creation of a cross-departmental local content
committee, which regularly convenes directors from
operations, procurement, finance and community
development;
3. The identification of the following four low-value/lowrisk areas in which local supply can make a short-term
impact: facility maintenance and food services, vehicle
repairs, waste management and fabrication of bags used
to transport sands; and
4. Building the capacity of local SMEs via a Regional
Business Centre (CARA), which focuses on the
development of business skills, access to capital, 
quality standards and responding to tenders.

In 2013, Ambatovy spent over $400 million on local
goods and services, which accounted for half of its total
procurement. Specifically, it purchased over 1.5 million
kilograms of local fruits, vegetables and dry foods from
regional centres supplied by over 3,000 small-scale
farmers, and bought over 13,000 wooden pallets, 20,000
timbers and 9,000 uniforms from local suppliers.

25 Australian Department of Trade and Industry website, available at: http://www.industry.gov.au/industry/IndustryInitiatives/AustralianIndustryParticipation/Pages/default.aspx
26 Further information on developing an AIP plan, along with supporting documentation, is available at www.industry.gov.au/aip. The Australian Jobs (Australian Industry Participation) Rule 2014 (the Rule) was registered on 6 February 2014 and is published on ComLaw. The Rule details notification obligations, categories of key goods and services,
and compliance report requirements as well as the functions of the AIP Authority and exceptions to the AIP plan requirements.
27 https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2014-fr-alliance-strategic-rio-tinto.pdf
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These case studies illustrate that strategic alliances between
companies and development partners can help leveraging
each partner’s expertise. Actors of the international development cooperation have experience in private sector development and support of SMEs, and the miners know their
companies’ procurement needs. Both are required to devise
effective local content programmes (see recommendations
D5,D7).

However, a partnership between Rio Tinto and the IFC in
Guinea has shown that encouraging the participation of
women among the suppliers is not without challenges.

Box 2.8: Rio Tinto, IFC and Women Suppliers in Guinea
Rio Tinto and the IFC launched the Local Supplier
Development Project in late 2012 to support Rio Tinto’s
efforts in building a strong local supply chain for its
Simandou project in Guinea. While the programme has
been relatively successful in terms of the number of
SMEs trained, performance improvement and the number
of local SMEs working with Rio Tinto, the project has
experienced limited success with regard to the inclusion
of women, even though this was a key component of the
project.

Addressing the gender bias in upstream linkage
creation
The indirect employment opportunities created around the
EI sector can be particularly significant for women. While
direct employment opportunities for women at mine sites is
only slowly starting to increase as a result of focused efforts
by companies and governments,28 indirect employment
figures already suggest a proportionally higher participation of women. Mines often outsource “catering, laundry,
clothing, and uniform supply and repair, agricultural produce,
financial services and clerical support”, jobs that are usually
done by women (World Bank, 2009). Apart from gender
equality, increased female income is correlated with rising
expenditures on health, education, and nutrition. This provides a strong argument for companies to incentivize female
upstream employment. According to the World Bank, this
could be achieved by “giving preference in bid evaluations for
women’s business or businesses with a large proportion of women
employees” or requiring minimum quotas of female employment. For instance, in South Africa, Lonmin awarded “a
45 million rand contract to three companies managed largely
by black South African women for the conversion of single-sex
mining hostels to family housing units” (World Bank, 2009).
However, often businesses owned or operated by women
have even less access to finance than their male counterparts.
This is particularly a problem in Africa. An IFC programme
dedicated to encouraging African banks to make loans to
women’s businesses has been rolled out in Nigeria, Tanzania,
and Uganda (IFC, 2008).

The IFC concluded that if a programme wants to appeal to women, it needs to specifically target women in
its advertising and marketing campaigns, hold events
for women only and design training curricula containing
modules that address woman entrepreneurship needs in
particular (IFC, 2015).
While increased access to jobs directly or indirectly
linked to the EI fosters the social and economic
empowerment of women, the literature explains that an
“explicit focus on hiring women” has sometimes created tensions in families and communities by clashing
with cultural and social norms. Those tensions might be
exacerbated if unemployment among men increases as a
consequence of these programmes. Moreover, to compensate for the absence of working women at home, families
may require the children and particularly girls to help
with domestic tasks instead of going to school (World
Bank, 2009).

Moreover, governments, companies and development partners can help increase the organizational capacity of women
by providing support to women’s organizations, e.g. in the
form of trainings on organizational skills, funding, budgeting
and management. Helping women’s capacity to support each
other can lead to further empowerment (World Bank, 2009).
28 Worldwide it is extremely rare to find any EI companies with higher than 10%
female participation, with many being less than 5%.” However, lately, many EI
companies are focusing their efforts on hiring more women. In Newmont’s mining
operations in Australia, 30% of new hires in 2007 were women, while in South
Africa companies are making strong efforts to achieve the 10% target that the
government has imposed (World Bank, 2009, IFC, 2015)
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suppliers’ employees or contractors. Although they are not
the EI companies’ employees, if any contract workers or
supplier workers or contractors are provided with poor living
and housing conditions in worker camps or are not paid a
living wage, or if any on-site contractors’ staff are subject to
poorer employment conditions than EI company employees
and lack access to any grievance mechanism, the EI company’s responsibility to respect human rights is in violation
(European Commission, 2012).

Box 2.9: The World Bank’s Gender and EI Programme
The Gender and EI programme works with governments,
communities and companies to better understand and
address the gender dimension of EI. It has gathered
knowledge through research, analyses, and publications in order to help mainstream gender in policy and
operational activities. The resources of the programme
include a factsheet and in-depth publications on the relation between gender and the EI; a study and toolkit on
gender and artisanal small-scale mining; guidance notes
on mainstreaming gender in mining; and detailed countryspecific case studies of gender and mining in Peru, Tanzania and Papua New Guinea; a variety of presentations and
a cartoon calendar to raise awareness about gender and
mining issues that are often distributed to government
partners. With the Japanese Social Development Foundation, the Programme has provided women in miningaffected communities with training in vocational skills,
business skills, financial literacy, and basic literacy and
numeracy. The Programme is also launching a new initiative on combating sexual and gender-based violence in
mining-affected territories (GIZ, 2014).

2.2.2.	 Lessons learned from the literature
		
and case studies
While some of the determinants highlighted above, such as
the history of EI in a particular country, the ownership of the
EI companies, or the structure of the sector are difficult to
influence, other determinants, such as local suppliers’ access
to infrastructure and finance, the robustness of the NSI and
the quality of the local content policy, can be improved and
should be targeted by all stakeholders genuinely interested in
expanding the scope of upstream linkages.
Governments should devise a local content policy that is
realistic, increases in ambition over time, seeks to increase
value added rather than local ownership requirements and
monitors or enforces the achievements through dedicated
institutions (herein, Nigeria and Australia can serve as good
examples). Companies should develop a local procurement
plan for the lifetime of the project. Companies and governments should come to an agreement around this plan to
carry it forward together with complementary interventions.
Development partners can support this process by supporting the convening process and acting as neutral brokers.
Structural gaps that prevent local suppliers from expanding
their capacity, including such factors as poor infrastructure,
lack of access to finance and limited technological support,
need to be addressed (as demonstrated by the cases of South
Africa and Australia). The case of South Africa in particular
highlights the importance of continued governmental support of innovation, R&D and the development of capabilities to ensure that the supply chain is capable of seizing
opportunities for upstream linkages. Bridging those gaps
requires resources and should be a joint undertaking between
the government, the companies and international development cooperation. Last, upstream linkages can exacerbate
gender inequality as well as compromise the EI’s company
responsibility to respect human rights. These risks should be
anticipated and addressed and at worse mitigated through
targeted interventions.

Addressing human rights in upstream linkage
creation
EI companies have a corporate social responsibility to respect
human rights. This responsibility is twofold. It requires EI
companies to (1) “avoid causing or contributing to adverse
human rights impacts through their own activities, and
address such impacts when they occur”; and (2) “seek to
prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are
directly linked to their operations, products or services by
their business relationships, even if they have not contributed
to those impacts” (UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (II.B.13); 2011). “Business relationships” in
this context are understood to include, among other things,
relationships between EI companies and suppliers in their
value chain. So, in addition to ensuring that their operations comply with international human rights standards, EI
companies need to ensure that any contractors they engage
or suppliers from which they are procuring goods or services
are complying with human rights.
Human rights grievances related to contract workers or
suppliers can occur in a range of activities related to backward linkages. Examples include contract work related to
drilling or seismic testing for oil and gas operations, on-site
construction contract work, or the working conditions of
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Table 2.1: Summary of key characteristics of upstream linkages

BENEFITS

-- Indirect job creation, which is larger than direct job creation.
-- Positive impact on the knowledge and technology linkage and the basis for
horizontal linkages.

DRAWBACKS

-- Non-market-driven linkages will be resisted by companies.
-- Takes time to develop and requires commitment by all stakeholders.
-- Precious metals have short exploitation cycles, making them less attractive for
upstream linkages.
-- Oil and gas require sophisticated development processes that are often not
accessible with the level of skills available in developing countries.
-- Oil and gas projects require higher skills to participate in the production.

COMMODITY SUITABILITY

REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SKILL LEVEL
EMPLOYMENT

-- Multiplier is said to be 1 to 4 for indirect job creation in mining and 1 to 3 in
oil. However, these numbers should not be generalized given that they are very
context specific.

GENDER

-- An increasing number women are employed in upstream industries in sectors
such as catering, laundry, clothing, uniform supply and repair, agricultural
produce, financial services and clerical support.
-- Coherent vision, strategy and dedicated institutions
-- Carefully drafted local content policies and regulations
-- Targeted support to SMEs
-- EI Companies:
1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10
-- Governments:
1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10
-- Development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10

MAIN POLICY MEASURES
RECOMMENDATIONS
(CHAPTER 4)

SWOT Analysis for upstream linkages:

Unfortunately many resource-rich developing countries that
have only recently started exploiting natural resources lack all
five of these requirements.

Strengths (internal):
1. Companies may be interested in outsourcing their noncore business functions and creating further upstream
opportunities.
2. Companies want to maintain their social license to operate. Employing locals or nationals indirectly through
upstream linkages may increase public support for the
project at the local or national level.
3. Case studies show that with the right combination of
initiatives, linkages can be fostered. While these should
not be replicated without taking the local context into
account, valuable lessons can be learned from past
experiences when designing programmes to strengthen
upstream linkages.

Opportunities (external):
1. There are development partners interested in this area.
2. There is an increasing amount of literature and
guidance around this topic.
3. Regional integration improves the business case for
local and regional procurement.
Threats (external):
1. The automation of many mine and oil field functions
will further limit the scope of low skill linkages (see
Chapter 3).
2. A growing body of investment treaties restrict the policy space for local content (see Chapter 3).
3. Global value chains require specialization and innovation, which few countries manage to do (see Chapter 3).
4. The structure of the EI sector does not always facilitate
upstream linkages: contractors might not impose local
content requirements on their subcontractors.

Weaknesses (internal):
Upstream linkages require:
1. Access to adequate infrastructure
2. Access to finance
3. A well-educated labour force
4. A well-designed local content policy with resources to
support it
5. Time to develop
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Figure 2.11: SWOT Analysis for upstream linkages
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2.3

BITs

Production Linkages: Downstream/
Forward Linkages

Downstream or forward linkages relate to the processing,
beneficiation and value addition of the extracted commodities. While these processes vary by commodity, the figure
below illustrates what downstream activities in the mining
and oil & gas sector may entail.

Gobal Value Chains
Structure of sector

Source: Authors

Figure 2.12: Downstream linkages
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Source: Authors

33

LINKAGES

Figure 2.13: Typical EI value chain
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The value chain of oil and gas starts at the well. After being
extracted from the ground the oil/gas needs to be refined
into various products such as methane, liquefied petroleum
gas, propylene, gasoline, jet fuel, diesel and sulphur to name
a few. These products are used for power generation, transport, and as inputs in the heavy and petrochemical industries. The mining value chain starts with the rocks containing
the mineral being extracted in an open pit or underground
mine. The rocks are then crushed and ground before being
beneficiated through separation, concentration and filtration methods. These methods increase the mineral content
to the point where they can be smelted and transformed into
ingots, cathodes or other forms that feed into the semifabrication sector. There may be many additional steps and
stages within the semi-fabrication and fabrication process
before the extracted resource reaches the end user in the form
of a product.

Depending on the commodity and the quality of the ore,
refining and processing (beyond crushing and grinding) may
be geographically bound. For example, iron ores with a high
iron content (above ca. 60% iron), which are also called
‘direct shipping ore’ do not need to be beneficiated prior to
being used as an input in blast furnaces, whereas lower grade
iron ores do go through a refining and beneficiation process
prior to being shipped, irrespective of any linkage policy. Because of the high transport costs associated with transporting
low-grade iron ore or coal this downstream process is locked
to the location of production. Similarly, gas destined to be
sold on overseas markets far from the gas field has to be liquefied prior to transport, a process that reduces the volume
to 1/600th of the natural gas in its gaseous state. The downstream activities, beyond refining/processing in the case of
bulky minerals and beyond liquefaction in the case of gas, are
not geographically bound. For instance it is not uncommon
for smelting, semi-fabrication and assembly processes to be
distributed around the world as illustrated by the examples of
tantalite and cassiterite in the figure 2.14.
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Figure 2.14: Tin and tantalum in the value chain of Fairphone 2

29

Source: Fairphone (n.d.), A mass balance model for conflict-free tin and tantalum

Resource-rich countries have placed much emphasis on moving into downstream segments of the value chain in order
to capture more value added, create additional employment
opportunities and diversify their economies. Downstream
value addition prominently features as a key policy objective
in the Africa Mining Vision (African Union, 2009). While
some resource-rich countries have provided incentives for
and co-financed the construction of refineries (for example
Angola and Uganda), others have used taxes and restrictions
on exports to encourage downstream processing. In Africa
alone 21 countries apply export taxes on EI to incentivise
local processing (Ramdoo and Bilal, 2014). Indonesia has
gone a step further and put in place an export ban on minerals below certain comparatively high concentration rates. To
reach these levels of concentration, large-scale investments in
smelters are necessary.

intensive, require good infrastructure access and are highly
competitive at the global level, given that there is not much
room for product differentiation. While potentially having a
significant impact on the gross domestic product of a country and supporting an expansion into activities further downstream, such as petrochemical or semi-fabrication industries,
these industries are difficult to set up in developing countries
with poor or inadequate infrastructure and are unlikely to be
large employment providers on their own.30

2.3.1

Literature review and case studies

The literature sheds some light on the determinants of downstream linkages and gives a nuanced view on several of them.
This section reviews the impact of the proximity to resources,
the government’s negotiating position, the use of export
restriction instruments and the resort to special incentives for
the development of downstream linkages.

It is noteworthy that these government interventions mainly
target smelting activities in the mining sector and refining activities in the oil sector. These industries are capital
30 Timor-Leste is a good example for this, as a proposed LNG plant would double
Timor-Leste’s GDP but account for less than 1% of official employment numbers
(Maennling, 2012).

29 https://www.fairphone.com/2015/08/20/supporting-fairer-mineral-initiativeswith-the-fairphone-2/ (accessed October 2015)
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Proximity to resources not a major determinant of
comparative advantage

do not possess many competitive advantages, downstream
activities in the EI sector may be one of the few opportunities to diversify their economies and become less dependent
on raw commodity exports. However, such policies come at
a cost and require government commitment to support the
implementation of these decisions.

Proximity to the raw material and lower transportation costs
of processed materials are arguments put forward as to why,
from an economic viewpoint, there may be a comparative
advantage to move downstream locally. In theory, this is
particularly true for commodities that are bulky and heavy
to transport prior to processing. However, on an aggregate
level, empirical analyses of the comparative advantage resulting from proximity to the source have not substantiated this
argument. Using trade data, Hausmann et al. (2008) find
that raw commodities play a small role in determining comparative advantages, even for high volume products that are
associated with higher transport costs. These findings persist
for both developing and developed countries.

Leveraging a government’s negotiating power to
move downstream
One country that has recently leveraged its extractive sector
to move downstream is Botswana. The figure below shows
the value chain of the diamond industry. For many years,
the Government of Botswana has tried to move downstream
from mining into the sorting, valuing and polishing sectors. India dominates the polishing sector due to a large
pool of low cost specialized labour, with 14 out of every 15
diamonds being polished there. The major manufacturers
of jewellery are India, China and other countries of the Far
East, though the top-end pieces are produced in traditional
manufacturing locations such as Italy and New York.

The iron-ore/steel sector is a good example that supports
these results. Australia is one of the world’s largest iron-ore
producers, but a net importer of steel. Even though Western
Australia signed downstream processing agreements with
Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton in the mid-1990s which led to
investments into the A$2.5bn Boodarie hot briquetted iron
plant and the A$1bn Kwinana Hismelt pig iron venture,
both operations were never economically viable and were
ultimately shut down (Klinger, 2011; FitzGerald, 2004).
Japan, on the other hand, has a long history in steel production and was the second largest producer of crude steel after
China in 2014 but does not have access to the raw materials
domestically (World Steel Association, 2014). One explanation put forward by Hirshman (1981) is that downstream
processing requires technologically advanced production processes, which commodity-exporting countries are less familiar
with. Access to cheap and reliable energy and other types
of infrastructure are also factors that are more important to
moving downstream than proximity to resources.

Figure 2.15: Diamond value chain

Whereas it might not be advantageous to move downstream
from a comparative advantage perspective, it is a different
question whether governments should use policy instruments
(e.g. incentives such as taxes or regulations such as export
bans on unprocessed goods) or a strong negotiation position to promote moving into downstream activities. This
can be justified if there is a possibility to create a competitive
advantage in the long run by protecting the industry in the
short run, which is known as the infant industry argument.
Benefits of such policy decisions may include increased
GDP, foreign exchange earnings, government revenues,
employment opportunities, and expanding into technologically more advanced sectors, all of which are associated with
substantial spillover effects. Especially for countries that

Diamond
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Diamond
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Source: Authors

The box on the next page illustrates that diamond polishing
and manufacturing in Botswana would not naturally occur
in the country now if the government had not negotiated a
fixed allocation of rough diamonds for domestic processing.
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Box 2.10: Botswana moving downstream in the 		
diamond value chain

the company’s help with regard to developing a domestic cutting and polishing industry. Given that De Beers
sources 60% of its diamonds from Botswana, it ultimately
agreed to this demand. Consequently, a set amount of
rough diamonds were allocated to the domestic cutting
and polishing industry, wherein companies were required
to hire locals and provide training in order to guarantee
the allocation of diamonds. The target allocation would
increase over time, with the agreement including fines for
non-compliance with these targets. Moreover, the government would support the industry through fiscal incentives
and infrastructure investments. De Beers also agreed to
move its aggregation business – selecting and mixing the
diamonds from DeBeers mines for its customers – from
London to Gaborone, in the hope of creating considerable
spillovers to other industries such as hospitality, finance
and transportation, since diamond buyers would now
have to go through Gaborone to buy De Beers’ diamonds
(Morris et al., 2011).

Diamond deposits were first discovered in Botswana
shortly after independence in 1966, with large-scale
production starting in 1971. Shortly thereafter, diamond
mining became the most important sector in Botswana’s
economy in terms of contribution to GDP (recently around
30%) and government revenue (recently around 60%)
(Brook, 2012). In order to increase employment opportunities, the Government of Botswana first tried to develop
the cutting and polishing industry in the 1980s. However,
De Beers, the company that dominates the sales and
marketing of diamonds both in Botswana and worldwide,
argued that this was not profitable in Botswana.
In 2005, when De Beers wanted to renew its mining
license for Debswana, a 50-50 joint venture between De
Beers and the Government, the Government insisted on

It‘s cheaper to cut diamonds in Asia than in Africa …

… but polishing diamonds is becoming less profitable …
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In 2014, it was estimated that the cutting and polishing industry in Botswana employed 3,750 people with
salaries above the manufacturing industry’s minimum
wage. However, it remains to be seen whether the sector
will be competitive in the long term. In 2015, the country’s oldest diamond cutting and polishing company shut
down, causing the layoff of 350 workers, due to falling
diamond prices and smaller margins in the polishing
industry. Nonetheless, the more fundamental issue is that
Botswana cannot compete with the low-cost and highproductivity producers in the Far East and, especially,
India (Grynberg, 2015). The cost of cutting and polishing
diamonds in India in terms of dollars per carat is three
to five times lower than that in Botswana (see figure
on previous side). This shows that the only reason why
cutting and polishing happens in Botswana (and even
more so in South Africa and Namibia) and not in India is
government policy instead of the existence of a comparative advantage.

when the rough diamond reserves in Botswana will be
exhausted, resulting in a decrease of Botswana’s bargaining power, which is expected to be in 30-40 years.
However, Botswana has clear comparative advantages in
a few other sectors (tourism may be one of them) and a
30-40 year timeline may be sufficient to create a large
and skilled labour pool in the polishing industry to make
Botswana competitive. Even if the polishing sector collapses within the next 40 years, a well-educated labour
force, is more likely to be able to adapt to structural
change by developing horizontal linkages from a relatively sophisticated industry like diamond polishing than from
one purely based on the extraction of the raw material, or
as Hirschman nicely puts it– ‘one thing leads to another’
(Hirschman, 1968).
German Technical Cooperation has supported the Government’s efforts to move downstream in the diamond value
chain through the ‘Capacity Development to achieve the
Botswana Vision 2016’ programme, which ran from 2008 –
2014 with a budget of EUR4.2 million. The project strongly
focused on technical and vocational education and training, e.g. in jewellery design and manufacturing (GIZ, 2012).

The government of Botswana is aware that unless investments in support infrastructure decrease production costs
substantially, the diamond-polishing sector is unlikely
to survive in the long term. This is especially true for

Using export restriction policies to move
downstream

The Botswana case study shows that the government has
successfully leveraged its negotiating power to move downstream. The Government has understood that in order to
become competitive, it needs to support its policy decision
by investing its own resources (see recommendation G2).
It remains to be seen whether the downstream sector in
Botswana becomes sustainable in the long term (see recommendation D8). However, even if it does not prove successful, the skills acquired by those employed and trained in the
sector are likely to be valuable in the future, even if applied
in other industries.

Indonesia has imposed export restrictions and, more
recently, a ban on the export of raw materials. Such policy
instruments are likely going to decrease investment in
the mining sector and result in the closure of marginally
profitable mines that either cannot invest in capital-intensive
processing facilities or where the operating costs associated
with the processing facilities are too high. Nathan Associates
assessment of Indonesia’s export ban on raw materials is a
case in point.
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The Indonesian case study shows that the costs associated
with processing facilities may outweigh the benefits. Therefore, cost-benefit analyses of the likely impacts of measures
like export bans are necessary (see recommendations G2,
D4). One of the key problems with such analyses is that it is
difficult to quantify some of the long-term potential benefits,
whereas it is relatively straightforward to estimate the shortterm costs associated with the closure of marginally profitable mines.

Box 2.11: Cost-benefit analysis of the economic impact
of Indonesia’s export ban

Indonesia is the biggest exporter of thermal coal, nickel
ore and tin in the world and a powerhouse in copper and
gold production. The country implemented a ban on the
export of unprocessed mineral resources in January 2014,
which requires companies to process the mineral up to a
certain grade prior to exportation. The minerals affected
by this policy include copper, nickel, tin, bauxite, iron,
lead and zinc, which are highly relevant to Indonesia’s
mining sector. During the current phase, companies will
have to pay high export taxes for unprocessed ores until
the ban takes effect.

Using incentives to move downstream
Countries that do not have a strong negotiating position to
move downstream or cannot rely on prescriptive measures
because they do not have a large market share in a particular
commodity may only rely on incentives to try and move
downstream. When considering whether to offer investment incentives, a similar cost-benefit assessment as set out
further above is required. The Mozal aluminium project in
Mozambique, while not directly linked to bauxite mining,
provides a good example where the government provided
significant investment incentives and signed a long-term
low-cost electricity agreement with BHP Billiton in order
to attract the large scale aluminium smelter. There have
been concerns that the incentives were (and are) too costly
and the expected benefits - a domestic supplier base and an
aluminium cluster around the smelter - did not materialize as
expected.

Nathan Associates (2013) prepared a welfare analysis
of the potential impacts of such a ban and found that
investments in processing facilities are often unprofitable.
While the report finds that investments in nickel processing could be feasible when modelled in conjunction
with a mining project, investments in aluminium smelting
would require large energy subsidies. Copper smelting
investments, on the other hand, would not be undertaken
due to excess smelting capacity in world markets, which
have substantially driven down the margins of the copper
smelting industry. This would make it difficult to raise
sufficient capital to finance these large-scale smelter
investments. Under the medium investment scenario
that foresees some nickel and aluminium smelters going
ahead but the copper mines having to shut down, the report estimates that the export ban policy would result in
a net welfare loss of $5.2bn a year, with export earnings
falling by $4.9bn.

The Mozambique case study illustrates that the smelting
sector, which is often a sector targeted by policy makers, is
still a very capital- and energy-intensive industry and further
downstream linkages take time to materialize (see recommendation D8). The case study further shows that incentives
should be applied with care and should be linked to the
profitability of projects rather than granted for the lifetime
of projects. Special care needs to be taken when providing
long-term energy incentives in order to attract downstream
investments.

Although the government of Indonesia agrees with the
report that the policy will lead to short term losses (the
Minister of Finance, for example, stated that this policy
would reduce government revenues by $820 million in
2014), it believes that the policy will result in a net positive impact in the medium to long term. 25 companies
have begun constructing processing facilities and, in 2013
alone, investments into smelting and refining reached $6
billion. The Minister of Finance anticipates a positive net
impact by 2017 (Bellefleur, 2014).
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Box 2.12: Costs and benefits of the Mozal aluminium
smelter in Mozambique

The indirect employment benefits and knowledge spillovers from the Mozal aluminium smelter have been
harder to quantify. The IFC has been involved in promoting
the creation of upstream linkages through SME linkages
programmes. In 1998/1999, prior to the start of Mozal’s
operation, the Center of Investment Promotion (CPI) conducted a survey to identify potential upstream linkages.
It concluded that 90% of the 370 identified SMEs did not
have the quality standards, technological capacity or
experience to provide the services demanded by Mozal
(Castel-Branco and Goldin, 2003). During the first construction phase, the linkages to the Mozambican economy
were minimal, mainly because the contracts were bundled
with components that Mozambican SMEs could not fulfil
and because the procurement contracts were in English
instead of Portuguese (Robins, 2009). During the second
construction phase and subsequent operational phase, the
programme identified specific contracts for local sourcing.
Mozal increased its monthly spending from US$5 million
with 40 local firms in 2002 to US$17 million with 250
firms in 2007 (IFC, 2007). Between 2006 and 2009, over
140 SMEs were trained in management and technical skills
and 75 SMEs were actively enrolled in the programme.

The $1.3 billion Mozal aluminium smelter investment was
awarded in 1997 to a consortium composed of BHP Billiton (47%), Mitsubishi (25%), the Industrial Development
Corporation of South Africa (24%) and the Government
of Mozambique (4%). The IFC provided financing for this
project. In addition to exemptions from the value added
tax, excise duties, customs duties, stamp tax, property tax
and municipal tax on rental income, Mozal is also exempt
from corporate income tax payments and instead pays
a 1% turnover tax. It has been estimated that in 2006
alone, these incentives resulted in foregone public revenues equivalent to 11.9% of total government revenues
(Arndt and Tarp, 2009). These incentives have been granted for a 50-year time period, with an option for renewal.
It could be argued that these incentives are not a direct
cost to Mozambique, because without these incentives
the smelter would not have materialized. However, there
is a strong case that the internal rate of return, based
upon which investment decisions are made, would have
been sufficiently high for Mozal even without such lengthy
incentives (Justica Ambiental, 2012). In addition, Mozal
also negotiated a beneficial electricity tariff until 2026 as
part of the investment agreement.31 Access to reliable and
low-cost electricity is key for the aluminium-smelting
sector, given that it makes up ca.30% of total operating
costs. In 2007 peak electricity demand in Mozambique
was less than half of Mozal’s peak demand. This illustrates the opportunity cost that this electricity agreement
may entail for Mozambique, especially as residential and
industrial demand for electricity increases and alternative investments are willing to pay for a higher electricity
tariff allowing the power utility to achieve cost recovery.

However, there has been criticism that many of the SMEs,
while registered in Mozambique, were importing most
goods from South Africa and not manufacturing them
in Mozambique itself. On average, about two-thirds of
expenditure spent on “Mozambican” companies has gone
into imports of raw materials and intermediate goods,
spare parts, equipment, energy, and fuel from South
Africa. Therefore, the expenditure has generated limited
value-added in the local economy (Castel-Brance and
Goldin, 2003). Knowledge spillovers are also thought
to have been minimal due to the contracted companies
servicing a small market niche, which is completely
dependent on Mozal (Krause and Kafuman, 2011).

The benefits associated with Mozal aluminium smelter
investments include (a) an increase in GDP by 3.2%, (b)
a significant positive impact on the balance of trade, (c)
a positive impact on the balance of payments, (d) 1,100
direct employment opportunities, and (e) the financing of
public infrastructure to support the project, which was
repaid by the government in the form of amortised deductions from the turnover taxes. Investments comprised
roads, bridges, sewage, harbour quays and water connections (Castel-Branco and Goldin, 2003).

The expected downstream cluster that would make use of
Mozal’s aluminium domestically has yet to materialize. Only
in 2015 – 15 years after operations at Mozal started – has
Midal Cables invested in a semi-fabrication plant, which
will process 10% of Mozal’s aluminium ingots. Continuing its support to create linkages to the Mozal aluminium
smelter, the IFC has provided financing and has acquired
an equity share in the project. The company will employ
110 workers directly and receives the fiscal benefits associated with setting up in the export processing zone.

31 A portion of the electricity comes from Mozambique, which does not have a power grid connecting the north of the country (the main power source) to its south (the main
power consumption center) and therefore exports the power from Cahora Bassa damn to South Africa and re-imports it along the Maputo corridor.
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2.3.2
		

Lessons learned from the literature
and case studies

technical assessments are still required in order to make the
best possible policy decision.

As illustrated by the various case studies, the downstream
activities of extractive sectors are very commodity specific,
while the opportunities of moving downstream are very
country specific. The costs and benefits of moving downstream therefore vary tremendously. The policy tools available to governments in order to move downstream include
prescriptive policies like export taxes or restrictions, as in the
case of Indonesia, the negotiation or re-negotiation of existing contracts, as in the case of Botswana, or incentives, as in
the case of Mozambique. All these tools, however, require a
detailed cost-benefit analysis. Even in the case of Botswana’s
diamond cutting and polishing industry, the government will
incur costs from moving downstream, as it has to invest in
support infrastructure and has given up on tax revenues in
return for the allocation of diamonds to domestic downstream industries. These costs should not be underestimated;
while it is difficult to quantify all potential benefits and costs
(even in retrospect as shown by the Mozambican case), such

The downstream sector should be treated the same as other
sectors in the economy when deciding whether to support
it through an industrial policy, given that the closeness to
natural resource does not seem to be a major contributor to
determining the comparative advantage of the country (see
recommendations G2, D4). The opportunities of moving
further downstream from the smelting and refining processes
should play a key role when deciding to whether these intermediate value addition industries should feature in the industrial policy. While the smelting and refining facilities are
capital-intensive investments that do not provide large employment opportunities, clusters in the semi-manufacturing
and manufacturing or assembly industries are more labour
intensive. Most of the benefits from moving downstream
occur in these sectors. If there is little potential of moving
further down the value chain, it is questionable whether it is
worth trying to attract smelting or refining industries.

Table 2.2: Summary of key characteristics of downstream linkages

BENEFITS

-- Potential of positive impact on GDP, the balance of trade and export earnings.
-- Price swings of downstream products tend to be less volatile than of unprocessed commodities.
-- Skill development in new areas and potential to create further downstream
industries.

DRAWBACKS

------

COMMODITY SUITABILITY
REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SKILL LEVEL

Takes time to develop.
Capital and energy intensive industries.
Often expensive for governments to support.
Oil processing not geographically bound, but LNG processing is.
Only few minerals are geographically bound (beyond crushing and grinding) as
a result of falling bulk commodity shipping costs.
-- High infrastructure and power requirements.

EMPLOYMENT

First step beneficiation (smelters and refineries) does not create many employment opportunities. Need to move further downstream in order to have a bigger
impact on employment.

GENDER
MAIN POLICY MEASURES

Capital intensive industries do not tend to employ many women.

RECOMMENDATIONS
(CHAPTER 4)

Cost-benefit analyses required,
Policy measures adapted to context (negotiation, export restrictions, incentives)
Required support mechanisms such as industrial parks
-- EI Companies:
2,5
-- Governments:
1,2,4,8,9,10
-- Development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,8,10
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SWOT Analysis for downstream linkages:

Figure 2.16: SWOT Analysis for downstream linkages

Strengths (internal):
1. Widespread host government interest to adding value
to minerals, oil and gas locally through downstream
processing.
2. In a few limited cases, minerals and gas deposits are
geographically bound, creating a natural incentive for
downstream beneficiation.
Weaknesses (internal):
3. Unlike other linkages, moving downstream is often not
in the self-interest of EI companies.
4. Downstream activities tend to require particular skills,
are highly dependent on good infrastructure access and
are often energy intensive. Countries that cannot offer
these prerequisites will struggle to attract downstream
industries.

Strengths

Weaknesses

Government awarnesses

Missing self-interest

Availability of raw
material (For limited commodities

Infrastructure
requirements

Opportunities

Threats

New mining actors

Overcapacity

Energy requirements

Falling transport costs
WTO/BITs

Opportunities (external):
1. In recent years, mining companies from the global
South have increasingly played a role in FDI. Chinese
companies in particular have invested in downstream
projects in order to gain access to resources.32
Source: Authors

Threats (external):
1. The potential for downstream linkages is related to
a globally very competitive, low margin industry. In
a world with excess smelting and refining capacity, it
would require governments to offer excessive incentives
in order to setup new smelters and refineries. It does
not make economic sense for each country that has iron
ore reserves to have a steel mill or every country that
has bauxite to have an aluminium smelter.
3. Continuously falling transport costs due to increases
in the size of bulk carriers further decrease the benefit
associated with beneficiation close to the source of
extraction.
4. Prescriptive export restrictions may be against WTO
and investment treaty rules (see chapter 3).

2.4

Production Linkages: Horizontal /
Lateral Linkages

Horizontal (lateral) linkages: while upstream and downstream linkages constitute “vertical links” created along
the value chain, horizontal (lateral) linkages relate to the
development of new industries using the capabilities of the
EI-related supply chain. By enabling the emergence of new
economic sectors, these linkages play a key role in the diversification of the economy and lowering the dependence on the
EI sector. While the upstream and downstream sectors are
likely to be adversely affected by price downturns or the closure of projects, horizontal industries will not be impacted.

32 Examples for this include refineries in Angola, Nigeria and South Sudan. In
Afghanistan, the Chinese consortium won the bid for the Aynak copper concession, partly by including a proposal to build a copper concentrator, which not all
bidders included.
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Figure 2.17: Horizontal linkages

Consumption linkages
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2.4.1

The key concept at the core of horizontal linkages is the
adaptability of capabilities. As Kaplinsky (2011) put it: “the
probability that a country will develop the capability to be good
at producing one good is related to its installed capability in
the production of other similar, or nearby goods for which the
currently existing productive capabilities can be easily adapted”.
While horizontal and knowledge transfer linkages are related
concepts, this report differentiates between the two. Herein,
the key difference is that whereas knowledge and technology
transfers enable actors to improve their capabilities within
the EI value chain, horizontal linkages enable them to adapt
those skills to other sectors. This may be another sub-sector
within EIs (for instance from coal mining to tar sands as in
South Africa) or another sector away from the EI altogether
(from gold mining to construction, agriculture, and general manufacturing, as in South Africa, or from forestry to
electronics, as in Finland). Focusing on horizontal linkages is
a particularly attractive policy for countries that have already
established upstream linkages and developed good capabilities in their supply base (given that horizontal linkages are
most likely to occur from upstream activities).

Literature review and case studies

Kaplinsky (2011) defines horizontal linkages as capabilities developed for the EI sector and used by other sectors,
thereby enabling the development of new industries; those
capabilities are generally relatively high skilled and/or
technologically oriented. The literature is less expansive on
horizontal linkages than on Hirschman’s two other pillars
of the production linkages and therefore there are only few
case studies. When exploring eight resource-rich countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Morris et al. (2012) observed conclusive evidence for the creation of horizontal linkages only in
South Africa (see box 2.13); in two other countries, Ghana
and Zambia, the existence of such linkages could be assumed
but no supporting evidence was found. While providing
macroeconomic evidence for horizontal linkage creation is
difficult, a number of papers provide anecdotal evidence of
how the EI sector may have created horizontal linkages. Teka
(2011), for example, finds that in Angola the manufacturing
and assembly of oil rig control lines between the sub-sea and
the surface require basic metal working capabilities, which
could be adapted to spur development in the construction
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and other manufacturing sectors. In Nigeria, the oil sector
has outsourced information technology (IT) services; Oyejide
and Adewuyi (2011) report that those IT skills are being applied to other sectors in the economy. More generally, Perkins
and Robins (2011) claim that engineering skills developed
during the construction phase of EI projects can be leveraged
for other infrastructure-intensive industries. These experiences suggest that certain skills are particularly conducive for
creating horizontal linkages. In Madagascar, GIZ’s linkage
creation programme determined that welding was particularly
suitable to develop the skills in unrelated sectors as well.33

More recently, horizontal linkages to South Africa’s mining
sector weakened. Kaplan (2011) attributes this to 1) a growing knowledge and information gap between the mining-related companies and the non-mining sectors and 2) a market
failure problem whereby first mover companies take the risks
of venturing into non-mining sectors while much of the success falls to follower companies.
The case of South Africa shows that governments should address market failures associated with first mover problems by
offering technologically more advanced suppliers incentives
to branch out of the mining sector into new markets and
products. This could be achieved through a fund financing
training, market research and support infrastructure, all of
which encourage the sharing of technological competencies. Such support could be given on a competitive and on a
matching grant basis (see recommendations G5, D7).

Kaplan (2011) and Morris et al. (2012) argue that because
every mining or energy resource is location-specific, the creation of horizontal linkages out of upstream linkages should
be possible. The specificity of the resource leads to the development of specialized local skills and knowledge aimed at the
EI sector. Those special capabilities can then serve specific
niches in the market, both domestically and abroad. South
Africa is a case in point.

While not linked to mining or oil & gas projects, the case of
Finland shows how the country used its expertise in forestbased industries to move into engineering and later into ICT
and electronics.

Box 2.13: South Africa and horizontal linkages

The Finnish case study highlights the key role that the
Government played in the various phases of the country’s
development, placing high importance on tertiary education,
knowledge, R&D, and forward-looking industrial policy34
(see recommendations G2, G4, G6, D4, D7).

In South Africa, the coal deposits suffer from impurities,
which require specific coal washing capabilities. “Arising
from the development of capabilities by supplier firms
to meet this challenge, horizontal linkages developed
enabling the supplier firms to penetrate new and different
markets, for example washing spirals for utilization in the
Canadian tar sands” (Morris et al., 2012).
South Africa has also developed special expertise in deep
gold and platinum mining. When mining activity declined
at the end of the apartheid era in 1994, South Africa’s
highly specialized equipment manufacturers diversified
by either expanding abroad or by modifying and adapting
their generic technologies for use in other industries such
as the construction, agriculture, and general manufacturing sectors (Walker, 2005).

34 Already in the 1960s, the government first set up the “Advanced Data
Processing initiative” to review how the public sector was processing information
and then the Advance Data Processing Board under the Ministry of Finance to
analyze at the consequences of automation technologies for employment. In
addition, in 1979 the Council of State appointed the Technology Council to explore
this issue. In 1992, the parliament created the Committee for the Future, which
became permanent in 2000. Recently, the committee refocused its analysis on
globalization and competitiveness (Dahlman et al. 2006).

33 In Madagascar, GIZ worked with the Chamber of Mines, which was made up
of 27 members including mining companies and suppliers, in order to develop a
training programme that would provide skills not only applicable to the mining
sector but also to other sectors of the economy relevant in the present and future
(Interview with GIZ South Africa, August 2015).
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by adopting foreign technologies and further developing
them. Expertise was developed in the fields of engineering, energy technology and papermaking machinery. A
strong national consensus emerged in favour of investment over consumption. Capital was channelled towards
particular industries, which also benefited from tax
incentives. During this period, the Research Innovation
Council (OKM) was established, which was chaired by the
Prime Minister and mandated to advise the government
on questions relating to science and technology. In 1983,
the National Technology Agency was created under the
Ministry of Trade and Industry to “formulate the Finnish
innovation and technology policy“. It provided funds in the
form of grants and loans to incentivise R&D in private
companies, institutes and universities.35

Box 2.14: Finland’s leadership in electronics arose
from its forestry sector

Finland went through three phases of development
(Dahlman et al., 2006). The first two phases created a
knowledge base for the forestry sector based on knowledge transfer from foreign technologies and the build-up
of its absorptive capacity. During the third phase, this
knowledge base was used to form an electronic sector serving first the forestry sector through upstream
linkages and then other sectors and markets through
horizontal linkages.
Phase 1: The resource-driven stage of the economy
started in the mid-1800s and lasted until the 1930s.
During this stage, Finland relied on its abundant timber
resources, some minerals and hydropower. It produced
very few equipment goods and the economy relied on
technological imports. The economy grew due to the
export of timber and wood products. The growing export
revenues were reinvested into infrastructure, financial
systems and educational institutions. Among the latter,
the Academy of Finland was created in 1918 in order to
promote high-level scientific research. It benefited from
15% of the Government’s research funding. In 1943, the
Technical Research Center of Finland was established as
an applied research organization to develop new applied
technological solutions and promote knowledge and technology transfers by participating in national and international research programmes and collaboration networks.

Phase 3: The knowledge-driven stage started in the late
1980s with the emergence of a strong electronics sector,
which was originally developed in the 1960s to serve the
traditional forest industry by providing process control,
factory automation, and information technologies. During
the knowledge-driven stage, the economy also opened
up, supported by policies shifting from traditional market interventions36 towards the creation of competitive
capabilities and the improvement of Finland’s business
environment. “A national innovation system in the context
of industrial clusters”, was prioritized, as highlighted
by the National Industrial Strategy White Paper (1993).
A component of this strategy was to promote “networks
among companies; and among companies, universities,
and research institutes”. Additionally, in 1997, 15 Employment and Economic Development Centers, publicly owned
institutions providing various business-related services
and financing to SMEs, were created. The emergence of
the (former) world’s largest telecommunications company,
Nokia, exemplifies the success of these measures

Phase 2: The investment-driven stage lasted from the
1950s to the late 1980s when national companies started
to invest in modern and efficient production technologies

2.4.2
		

Lessons learned from the literature
and case studies

synergies with the EI sector, related industries, and technological institutes (as recommended by the Finnish National
Industrial Strategy White Paper (1993)); the creation of high
skills training institutes supporting the transfer of capabilities from one sector to the other (such as the Finish TEKES);

The case studies from South Africa and Finland suggest that
horizontal linkages can be created if the skills and knowledge
used to address specific needs of the domestic EI sector are
leveraged and adapted to serve other markets at home or
abroad. In order to incentivise this positive externality and
diminish the first mover market failure, broad government
support is needed. This support can take the form of encouraging the formation of clusters with industries that have

35 In 20 years, TEKES’ budget for R&D activities increased eightfold and
constitutes now about 28% of the government’s total R&D budget (Dahlman et al.
2006).
36 The Finnish government used aggressive exchange-rate policies to boost
exports in the 1960s.
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the creation of a “new product” development fund that
supports horizontal linkages (as recommended by Kaplan
in South Africa); and the creation of a conducive environment for public-private partnerships involving economic
research organizations, industry federations and companies

to raise initiatives aiming at the transfer of capabilities from
one sector the other (see recommendations E7, E8, G4,
G5). Development partners have a major coordination role
to play, while financial cooperation could help financing
technological institutes (see recommendations D1, D7).

Table 2.3: Summary of key characteristics of horizontal linkages

BENEFITS

-- Diversification with less reliance on extractive industries & associated price
swings

DRAWBACKS

-- Requires an existing supply base with technical expertise
-- Necessitates new strategies that are not yet designed in developing countries
-- Bulky commodities and LNG projects, which require significant construction of
infrastructures, will generate civil engineering skills that may be transferable
to other sectors.
-- Only once the skills have been developed through upstream linkages,
horizontal linkages are likely to occur.

COMMODITY SUITABILITY
REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SKILL LEVEL
EMPLOYMENT

-- Dependent on the sector to which horizontal linkages are created (Capital vs.
labour intensive)

GENDER

-- Dependent on the sector to which horizontal linkages are created (high vs. low
female participation rate)
-- Develop upstream linkages first (if not already in place)
-- Build transferable skills
-- Promote industrial clusters that may benefit from technologies applied in the
EI sector
-- Set up funding mechanisms that encourages first mover companies to venture
into new sectors
-- EI Companies:
7,8
-- Governments:
1,2,4,5
-- Development cooperation: 1,2,4,7,8,1

MAIN POLICY MEASURES

RECOMMENDATIONS
(CHAPTER 4)

SWOT Analysis for horizontal linkages:

Opportunities (external):
2. Economic diversification looms large on resource-rich
countries’ agenda, thus more attention might be placed
on the promotion of horizontal linkages.

Strengths (internal):
1. The location and geology of ore and hydrocarbon
deposits often require specialized tools and skills to be
extracted. These can become a comparative advantage
of the country and provide the opportunity to be adapted in order to serve niche markets at home or abroad.
2. The EI sector requires the development of engineering
skills and metallurgy capabilities, which are sought after
by other sectors.

Threats (external):
1. Development partners have not paid much attention to
horizontal linkages so far as compared to the other types
of production linkages.

Weaknesses (internal):
1. Governments lack an awareness of the potential for horizontal linkages, which translates into a lack of policies
targeting those linkages and of institutions facilitating
them.
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2.5

Figure 2.18: SWOT Analysis for horizontal linkages
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Knowledge or technological linkages are related to transfers
in know-how and skills. One of the key reasons to attract
FDI in the EI sector in the first place is the need for knowledge and sophisticated technologies to extract the resources,
which are often not available domestically. There is a strong
incentive for host countries to absorb knowledge, skills and
technology from the foreign investor. An optimal policy
would convert the depleting natural resources into productive human and capital assets over time, which can be the basis for expanding the production possibility frontier. One of
the objectives of state owned companies – more prominent
in the oil and gas sector than in the mineral sector – is to
acquire foreign expertise, which will allow the country to
have greater leverage and control over future projects in the
EI sector.
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Figure 2.19 Knowledge and technology linkages
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Apart from learning about the extraction phase, there are
also opportunities for knowledge and technology transfer
throughout the value chain. The extraction process is likely
to require inputs (upstream) that require knowledge and
technology not available domestically. Similarly, there could
be knowledge and technology transfer opportunities at the
processing stage (downstream). Finally, other sectors of the
economy could benefit from knowledge and technology
spillovers from the EI value chain (horizontal).

channel, by which knowledge and technology is adapted from
EI companies (Wang and Blomström 1992; Blomström and
Kokko 1998; Sönmez 2013); (2) the labour mobility channel,
by which employees trained by EI companies move into
the domestic economy and apply their acquired knowledge
and expertise (Fosfuri et al., 2001); (3) the upstream-linkage
channel, by which the multinational corporation transfers
knowledge and technology to domestic suppliers in order
to meet their required standards (Bwalya, 2006; Javorcik,
2004; Kugler, 2006); and (4) the export channel, by which
EI companies may enable local companies to access international markets (Aitken et al., 1997; Clerides et al., 1998;
Greenaway et al., 2004).

The channels through which knowledge and technology
can be transferred are illustrated in the figure below and can
be categorized as follows: (1) The demonstration-imitation

Figure 2.20: Channels through which knowledge and technology can be transferred

Labor mobility
Channel

DemonstrationImitation Channel

Backward-linkage
Channel

Knowledge/
Technology
Transfer

Export Channel

Source: Authors

2.5.1

Literature review and case studies

spillovers, the FDI know-how should be slightly above that
of the host economy (see for example Findlay, 1978; Wang
and Blomström, 1992; Kokko, 1994; Lapan and Bardhan,
1973; Kinoshita, 2001; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007).

It is difficult to measure the extent to which domestic
economies benefit from knowledge and technology spillovers
from FDI and the literature is inconclusive in this regard.
Studies find positive, neutral or even negative impacts of FDI
on knowledge and technology spillovers37. However, the literature shows that the pre-existing level of know-how in the
economy (also referred to as the absorptive capacity) is a key
determinant of the level of spillovers (Ghebrihiwet, 2016).
If the technological or knowledge gap is too great between
the FDI and the host country, the opportunities will be few.
To maximize the potential for knowledge and technological

One policy tool available to governments to influence private
sector R&D, knowledge and technology transfers is the level
of protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). There is
much debate around how stringent these should be in order
to foster R&D and maximize knowledge spillovers. Proponents of strong IPRs suggest these are the basis to assure
companies that their research investments provide adequate
returns (Maskus, 2004; Foray, 2009), and that they provide
ownership advantages to companies in developed countries

37 For an overview of empirical studies, see Knell and Rojec (2011).
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Demonstration-Imitation Channel

that are less inclined to invest abroad if their technologies
are not protected (Hassan et. al, 2010). Opponents argue
that strong IPRs increase market power for investors, who
will seek to sell the technology at a higher price than the
social optimum (Hassan et. al, 2010) and that weak IPRs
can encourage ‘non-market based’38 involuntary international
technology transfers through reverse engineering and imitation (Foray, 2009).

Brazil, Chile and Norway have been relatively successful at benefiting from the imitation channel through their
respective state-owned companies. Petrobras imitated the
Early Production Systems39 approach from the North Sea
to develop Brazil’s deep and ultra-deep offshore oil deposits
(Dwyer et al., 2013), Codelco enhanced and ultimately exported copper smelting technologies to Zambia, which were
first introduced in Chile by Japanese and Canadian investors
in the 1970s (Gana, 1992), and Norway’s Statoil acquired
management practices from Mobil as explained below.

Empirical studies have mainly focused on market-based technology transfers. Smith (2001) finds that strong IPRs give
incentives to firms in developed countries to license their
technologies to other companies in developing countries. In
weaker IPR jurisdictions, companies prefer to keep technologies within their foreign affiliates, given that they have less
control over the technology transfer process. Using U.S. FDI
data, Nicholson (2007) finds that capital-intensive industries
are more likely to keep control over their technologies in
countries with weaker IPRs. The likelihood of companies
with high R&D expenses contracting unaffiliated companies
increases with more stringent IPRs. Leger (2007), on the
other hand, finds that IPRs and past R&D investments have
a positive and significant impact on innovation in developed
countries, but not in developing countries. This is in line
with several studies that have found a non-linear U-shaped
relationship between IPRs and economic development
(Maskus, 2000; Braga et al, 2000; Chen and Puttitanun
2005) suggesting that less developed countries are harmed
by stringent IRPs up to a certain point in their development where the relationship changes. The benefits from less
stringent IPRs are likely to result from the non-market-based
technology transfer channel via involuntary dissemination of
technologies that are copied and reverse engineered. Foray
(2009) provides several historical case studies that show
how developed countries have used weak IPRs to boost the
development of their own industries. The empirical literature
suggests that proper attention must be given to the level of
existing IPRs in the country and the economic circumstances; it also argues that blanket rules may actually be harmful if
they are set too high. To address the specificities of particular
industries, the IPRs might also have to be adapted by sector.
While much research has been done on industries such as
the pharmaceutical sector, little research has been done on
EI. Hence, lessons learned from this linkage type have to be
deducted from anecdotal evidence and case studies.

Box 2.15: Statoil acquires management practices from
Mobil
After the discovery of oil in the late 1960s, Norway created the state-owned enterprise Statoil in 1972 with the
primary purpose of participating 50% in all allocated
production licenses. Two years later Mobil discovered
Statfjord, one of the largest oil fields in the North Sea.
Statoil partnered with Mobil, which was the operator of
the field, and followed its management practices until
taking over its operations in 1986. Apart from replicating
the company structure and recruiting foreign nationals for
top management positions that would later be substituted by Norwegians, the Government required foreign
companies to closely collaborate with local universities
and required that at least 50% of research done by IOCs
on developing oil from the Norwegian continental shelf
be done domestically. This led to the creation of research
centres such as Sintef, Christian Mechelsens Research,
and Rogaland Research, which specialized on applied geology, well drilling technology and enhanced oil recovery
(Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum, 2007). Licensing rounds were
used to reward companies that offered R&D partnerships
and preferential treatment was given to those that would
source from domestic companies. This policy contributed
to Norway today exporting its offshore service expertise
to the rest of the world.

The case study from Norway highlights the role that stateowned companies (see recommendation G8) and R&D
requirements with domestic universities (see recommendations E8, G5,) may play to foster knowledge and technology
linkages.
39 Early Production Systems are used to reduce reservoir risks. They involve the
production of oil through a temporary processing system and an export of the
processed crude to a storage vessel for subsequent transport to market.

38 Market based channels being trade, FDI and licensing
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Labour mobility channel

Upstream-linkage channel

With its long mining history, South Africa is thought to
have benefitted from the labour mobility channel. Many of
the senior and skilled workers in the mining supplier sector – that does not only serve the mining industry in South
Africa but also exports its services to neighbouring countries
– were previously directly employed by mine sites where they
acquired their skills and expertise (Walker, 2005). However,
by hiring the most qualified and knowledgeable people in the
country, the EI sector can also create a ‘brain drain’ in other
sectors, thereby creating negative knowledge spillovers in the
economy (Sinani and Meyer, 2004).

When sourcing locally, EI companies have an incentive to
support the supplier in reducing the cost and improving the
quality of the procured goods and services. This may enhance
the competitiveness of both the multinational and the local
suppliers. The Anglo Zimele programme by Anglo American
in South Africa provides a good illustration of how transfer
of knowledge from the mining company to the suppliers can
create benefits for both and create technological spillovers.

Box 2.16: Anglo Zimele Programme in South Africa

officer is appointed as non-executive director to monitor the development of the SME and to provide support
in management, marketing, operational and financial
decisions. Training courses are also offered in areas such
as financial management, computer literacy, business
management, production management and accounting.
The exit phase entails the sale of Anglo Zimele’s shares
to the entrepreneurs based on commercial terms and
conditions as set out in the shareholders’ agreement. This
phase usually commences 3 to 5 years after the initial
investment and should be completed within a year after
commencement (Anglo American and The IFC, 2008). A
survey from 2005 showed that 72% of the companies
Anglo American had invested in, survived 8 years or
longer (Wise and Shtylla, 2007).

Anglo Zimele is the enterprise development and empowerment initiative of Anglo American in South Africa, which
started in 1989 with the aim to develop small businesses
that were owned by black entrepreneurs. The Supply
Chain Development component supports the creation of
SME that will provide goods and/or services to the mine
site. It acts as an incubator helping to create the necessary expertise and financial start-up capital before exiting the partnership.
If the initial investment proposal is accepted, A
 nglo
Zimele enters into an equity partnership (between
10-49%) and provides additional loans for the
implementation of the project. A business development

The South Africa case study highlights how mining companies can contribute to the knowledge and technology
spillovers through the upstream linkages channel. Apart from
providing the suppliers with start-up capital, the programme
also foresees support to the management of the company
during the initial phases (see recommendations E7, E10)
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Export channel
The presence of foreign EI companies may also enhance
the export capacity of local companies. Apart from providing valuable information about export markets and learning
about the requirements necessary in order to access those
markets, EI companies can act as channels to help local companies accessing these markets (Greenaway et al., 2004). One
third of domestic suppliers in Ghana and 42% of domestic
suppliers in Chile that were servicing foreign mining companies were also found to be exporting their services to other
jurisdictions (Farole and Winkler, 2014). The World Class
Suppliers Programme (see box 2.17) is an illustration of the
export channel.

Chile’s case study exemplifies how changes in procurement
strategies can lead to innovative solutions by suppliers and
how the EI sector may support suppliers to access foreign
markets. Furthermore, it shows the benefits of collaboration
between EI companies in order to achieve economies of scale
(see recommendations E3, E9, G8, D6)

2.5.2
		

Lessons learned from the literature
and case studies

The level of expertise available in a country is a key determinant of which technologies and knowledge can be transferred: if the gap between the company and the foreign investor is too large, the domestic companies will not be able to
replicate the technologies required by the EI company. From
a policy perspective, the first step should therefore be to
identify the current technological boundaries of the domestic
labour force and companies, and to perform a needs assessment of the skill requirements of the EI company. Support
programmes will have to be tailored to push the production
possibility frontier outwards. The IPRs will also need to be
tailored to the development stage of the country and the
absorptive capacity of the industrial base.

Box 2.17: World Class Suppliers Programme in Chile
The World Class Suppliers programme, launched by BHP
Billiton in 2009 and joined by Codelco in 2011, aims to
provide the right collaborative environment for s uppliers
to innovate. The collaboration is based on the s upplier
proposing new technological solutions to problems
faced by the mining company, financing the R&D, and
acquiring the intellectual property if the research results
in a successful product. The mining company provides
technical, managerial and financial support; offers the
mining operations as testing grounds for the new technologies; and offers assistance in accessing international
markets. By 2013, BHP Billiton had operated 43 innovation
projects with 36 suppliers participating. These suppliers
with around 5,000 employees had combined sales of $400
million. BHP Billiton has invested around $50 million in
the programme, which is less than half of the estimated
savings resulting from the innovations of around $121
million.

The case studies have shown several ways in which governments can promote knowledge and technology transfers, including partnerships between state owned companies and the
EI companies (as seen in Norway and Chile); joint ventures
between domestic suppliers and the EI companies (as seen in
South Africa); and joint R&D centres and programmes (as
seen in Norway and Chile). Furthermore, governments need
to design academic courses that elevate the technological
level of the workforce according to the labour requirements
within the EI sector and adapt the intellectual property rights
to the economic circumstances.

In 2012, suppliers participating in this programme were
more likely to export to other markets than those who
supplied to the mining sector that did not have the same
support mechanisms. Of the suppliers who did not participate, 34% of them exported compared with 51% that
were part of the programme (Innovum, 2014). Prodinsa,
for example, which developed steel cables for BHP Billiton that resulted in the shelf life of the cables being
extended by 40%, started exporting these to BHP Billiton’s
Antamina mine in Peru, thereby accessing a new market.
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Table 2.4: Summary of key characteristics of knowledge and technology linkages

BENEFITS

-- Knowledge and technical expertise are the basis for economic development
-- Labour force with technical expertise more adaptable to structural changes

DRAWBACKS

-- EI companies will try to prevent knowledge and technology transfers to
domestic competitors.

COMMODITY SUITABILITY

-- Precious metals have short exploitation cycles, which result in less time to
develop linkages
-- The oil and gas sector is characterised by more state owned companies, which
may be used as a tool to create knowledge and technology linkages

REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SKILL LEVEL
EMPLOYMENT

-- This linkage is mainly dependent on existing expertise and absorptive capacity.

GENDER
MAIN POLICY MEASURES

-- N/A

RECOMMENDATIONS
(CHAPTER 4)

-- EI Companies:
1,2,3,4,7,8
-- Governments:
1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10
-- Development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10

-- Highly adaptable workforce will avoid long term unemployment due to structural changes in the economy
-- Tailor intellectual property rights to the country context
-- Promote joint research centers and programmes with universities
-- Encourage joint ventures with technologically advanced companies

SWOT Analysis for knowledge and technology
linkages

2. The development of knowledge linkages highly
depends on absorptive capacity. Most of the resourcerich developing countries supported by development
cooperation have a significant knowledge gap, which
makes technological transfer very difficult to achieve.

Strengths (internal):
1. The upstream-linkage and export channels of knowledge and technology transfers are in the self-interest 
of EI companies. The former leads to a reduction of
operating expenditures in the country of operation
and the latter leads other mine sites of international
EI companies to benefit from potential technological
advances as well.
2. It is hard for EI companies to prevent technology
transfers through the demonstration-imitation and
labour mobility channels.

Opportunities (external):
1. The recent commodity slump has meant that EI companies are looking to cut costs and increase efficiencies
by embracing new technologies. This may provide an
opportunity for making the sector technologically more
advanced, which in turn may result in increased spillovers.
2. Increasing focus on technology transfer in international
development frameworks such as the recently adopted
SDGs (see SDG 10).

Weaknesses (internal):
1. This linkage does not feature high on the government
agenda. Illustrative of this observation is that only a
limited number of local content legislations specifically and effectively address the need for technology
transfers. This can partly be explained by the fact that
technology transfers are not associated with tangible
results and therefore politically less appealing.
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2.6
Threats (external):
1. Investment treaties as explored in more depth in
Chapter 3 can contain clauses that restrict prescriptive measures to leverage knowledge and technology
transfers.
2. Knowledge and technology transfers are difficult to
measure, which explains the lack of consensus in the
academic community about whether technology transfers are occurring and how stringent IPR rules should
be in order to foster technology transfer. This topic
clearly needs more research.
3. While the EI sector’s search for technological solutions is an opportunity for technologically advanced
countries, it might be a threat for countries that suffer
from low absorptive capacity, given that the knowledge
gap may increase even further, thus making it more
difficult to transfer knowledge and technologies (as also
discussed in Chapter 3).

Spatial (infrastructure) linkages relate to the benefits associated with the infrastructure developed for an EI project for
other actors in the economy. Sharing or opening up access
to essential resource-related infrastructure is one of the most
viable ways by which the EI – and particularly mining or
onshore oil & gas activities – can support the establishment
of industries that will survive long after a country’s mineral
resources are fully exhausted.
EI projects require considerable infrastructure to meet their
power, water and transport needs to extract, process and
export the commodity. Traditionally, extractive companies
build and operate their own infrastructure in an enclave
model. The capital investment required to build or rehabilitate the required infrastructure can amount to a sizable portion of the overall capital expenditures required to develop an
EI project. For example, it is estimated that, for bulk mineral
projects – such as iron ore, which requires a railway line and
port for export purposes – the development of transport infrastructure alone represents around 60% of the total capital
expenditure for developing a greenfield project (McKinsey
Global Institute, 2013). At times of depressed commodity prices, such huge capital requirements can render an EI
project economically unviable.

Figure 2.21: SWOT Analysis of knowledge linkages

Strengths

Weaknesses

Self interest

Government awarenes

Hard to prevent by company

Knowledge gap

Opportunities

Threats

EI in search of innovative
solutions

BITs

International
development frameworks

Side-stream Linkages: Spatial/ 
Infrastructure Linkages

At the same time, resource companies often operate in
resource-rich, low- to middle-income countries where there
are huge infrastructure gaps that can make it more challenging to transform resource wealth into long-term development
(CCSI, 2014). The resource-related infrastructure investments therefore present an opportunity to leverage such
extractive companies’ investments in infrastructure for broadbased economic development. This can be achieved by either
investing fiscal revenues in long-term infrastructure assets
(fiscal linkages), or by requiring the shared use of or open access to resource-related infrastructure. In addition, where the
shared use of transport-related resource infrastructure (roads
or optic fibre cables along the accompanying right-of-way40
of a railway line or pipeline) results in the development of resource corridors, investments in last mile or feeder projects to
connect actors that operate along such resource corridors can
further widen the scope of the anchor resource infrastructure,
thereby multiplying the spatial linkages (Ramdoo 2015).

Increasing
technological gap
Lack of consensus in
research

Source: Authors

40 A right-of-way or servitude is a type of easement granted or reserved over the
land for transportation purposes. An example of a right-of-way would be the land
on which a railway line or pipeline is located. There is scope to lay other types of
infrastructure (optic fiber cables, power lines, etc.) along these rights-of-way.
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Figure 2.22: Spatial linkages
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The concept of “shared use” in an EI context refers to the
opportunity to have resource-related transport, power,
water, or ICT infrastructure benefit multiple (resource
and non-resource) users. Multi-purpose projects, whereby
infrastructure is designed and operated to accommodate both
EI and non-EI users allows a wider range of stakeholders to
access and benefit from the infrastructure. This, in turn, can
facilitate the development of upstream and downstream linkages where the lack of adequate infrastructure has prevented
SMEs from being able to manufacture or transport their
goods, or to communicate with the mines in an affordable
manner.41

distances. Similarly, offshore oil deposits will not require
much onshore infrastructure to be built and may have little
scope for developing spatial linkages.

However, not all types of commodities provide the same
opportunities for shared use or open access infrastructure
given that different EI projects have different infrastructure
requirements. As illustrated in the figure on the next page,
for example, not all types of minerals require the construction of railway lines. Rail transport is generally only suited
for bulk commodities that need to be transported over long

It is also very important that a careful cost-benefit analysis is
done before imposing shared infrastructure requirements on
a particular EI project. As can be seen in the figure on the
next page, the benefits and related costs of sharing different
types of infrastructure vary substantially across projects
and commodity types. For rail and port infrastructure, the
costs of sharing are among the highest, whereas for power
(and ICT, which is not reflected in the figure), the range of
benefits from adopting a shared-use arrangements is often
larger than the associated costs.

Similarly, different types of commodities have different water
and power requirements. As illustrated in the figures on the
next page, while some commodities that require considerable processing like copper and gold are both water and
power intensive, other commodities like iron ore and coal
only require water for dust suppression and, in the case of
coal, washing of the coal, thus requiring much less water and
power overall.

41 In a 2013 report, McKinsey Global Institute estimated that as much as US$2
trillion of EI-related investments in infrastructure could benefit from some form of
shared use between 2013 and 2030. It estimates that nearly 70 % of infrastructure
investment could be multi-user, and the remaining 30 % could be multi-purpose
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2013).
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Figure 2.23: Transport linkage potential by commodity
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Figure 2.24: Water linkage potential by commodity

MINERAL/METAL TYPE

Figure 2.25: Power linkage potential by commodity
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Figure 2.26: Costs and benefits of sharing infrastructure

While infrastructure sharing is generally beneficial,
the related costs of projects vary substantially
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2.6.1

Literature review and case studies

Transport infrastructure

Adequate public infrastructure is an essential component of
the type of enabling environment required to foster business
development and productivity (Sigam and Garcio, 2012).
Inadequate infrastructure prevents the expansion of local
industry and limits the scope of upstream and downstream
linkages developing around the EI sector (Ireland, 2015).43
However, many governments lack human and financial resources to construct, rehabilitate and maintain the transport,
power, water, and ICT infrastructure required to meet the
demands of their rising populations and foster the development of local industry, in particular through upstream and
downstream linkages (as explained in Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
In such a context, negotiating and implementing shared use
or open access arrangements with EI companies regarding
the infrastructure they require to operate can help to
facilitate spatial linkages from EI investments.

Opening up access to the resource-related transport infrastructure built by mining companies or the roads located in
the rights-of-way upon which oil and gas pipelines are located can support SMEs by facilitating the transport of their
goods or personnel around areas inadequately serviced by
public infrastructure as well as trade more generally. This can
have a particularly positive impact from a gender perspective,
as women, who are less likely to be directly employed in EI
projects, can benefit from the infrastructure to transport of
agricultural produce or supply services they are more likely to
be involved in.
However, while very attractive in principle, the financing,
coordination and regulation of shared railway infrastructure
in particular can be difficult to execute and there are few
successful examples of shared mining-related rail infrastructure. From a financing perspective, shared railway infrastructure can render a project less “bankable” if there is a
risk that opening up access to that railway line to other users
could result in operational inefficiencies and delays. This is
particularly important if the ownership of the infrastructure

42 Exhibit from “Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven
economies ”, December 2013, McKinsey Global Institute, www.mckinsey.com. Copyright (c) 2013 McKinsey & Company. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.
43 The lack of adequate infrastructure also affects investors’ decision to develop
natural resources to begin with. In the current climate of low and volatile commodity prices, the huge capital costs associated with the construction of the rail
and port infrastructure required to exploit and export some of the greenfield iron
ore and bauxite reserves in West Africa, for example, has resulted in their development being delayed or put on hold indefinitely (Ireland, 2015).

56

LINKAGES

is separated from that of the mining concession, and the
major mining company loses some operational control over
the infrastructure. Shared use of transport infrastructure also
requires a strong regulator to moderate access, set tariffs and
adjudicate disputes.

A prime example of such a shared-use transport
infrastructure arrangement are railway line, port and feeder
roads planned to be built in connection with Rio Tinto’s
Simandou iron ore project in the Republic of Guinea,
wherein the IFC has a 5% equity stake in the Guinean-incorporated company, Simfer SA, that holds the development
mining licence for the project.

Box 2.18: The Simandou Southern Growth Corridor
in Guinea

develop the Simandou deposits. A separate infrastructure
agreement was signed between the parties to procure
the financing for, construct and operate a 650km multipurpose trans-Guinean railway line from Simandou in the
northwest of the country to a greenfield deep-water port
south of Conakry, thus linking up a highly fertile agricultural region and adding shipping capacity.44 Over 1,000km
of roads are also planned to be constructed or rehabilitated along the corridor, which will be open to use by the
public and will serve to connect passengers and SMEs to
the railway line from local villages. Preliminary estimates
suggest that this Southern Guinean Growth Corridor could
unlock US$ 3 billion worth of economic activity per year
(Rio Tinto, 2015).

The Simandou mountain in northwest Guinea range is
home to some of the most substantial premier grade and,
as of yet, untapped iron ore reserves in the world. First
discovered in 1997, the infrastructure challenges associated with extracting and exporting the ore has meant
that the deposits have yet to be developed. The shortest
export route for the iron ore would be through Liberia.
However, at the insistence of the Government of Guinea
and with the assistance of the IFC, Rio Tinto agreed to
build a railway line through Guinea instead of Liberia to
export the iron ore along the “Southern Guinea Growth
Corridor”. The Southern Guinea Growth Corridor is an area
wherein linkages between agriculture and aquaculture,
services, trade and other export industries and Rio Tinto’s
anchor railway, port and road infrastructure are planned
to develop (Bastida 2014).

However, since the conclusion of the Investment Framework and infrastructure agreements, little progress seems
to have been made to raise the capital required to develop the project, which is anticipated to cost around US$20
billion. The rail and port infrastructure alone accounts for
nearly two-thirds of the estimated costs and, given the
current slump in commodity prices, there is little appetite
for a project that requires such a high capital investment.
Whether this project does indeed create the spatial linkages it has set out to create therefore remains to be seen
when the mining project is eventually developed.

In May 2014, Rio Tinto – which holds a majority stake
in the company, Simfer SA, which holds the development license with respect to blocks 3 and 4 of the
Simandou iron ore deposits – entered into an Investment Framework with the Government of Guinea, the
Aluminium Corporation of China (Chinalco) and the IFC to

Multiple lessons can be learnt from the Guinea case study:
(1) it shows the role that financial development cooperation can play in developing resource projects and associated
infrastructure (see recommendation D3); (2) it highlights
potential that spatial linkages have in terms of contributing
to economic development, but also how complex and costly
these are to implement (see recommendations E2, E3, G7);
and (3) it shows the political economy that is at play in such
large projects, which has resulted in the Guinean government
not allowing for the railway line to go through Liberia, which
was the route preferred by the investors (see recommendation
D10).

The case study also exemplifies the challenges of raising the
financing for the transport infrastructure requirements of
a large bulk commodity mine when the ownership of the
infrastructure is separated from the mine assets and the jurisdiction lacks a strong or independent regulator to
implement the shared-use arrangement. While requiring all

44 Government of Guinea, Rio Tinto, Chinalco and the IFC Joint Press Release:
“Simandou South: Signature of the Investment Framework Marks a Significant
Move Forward,” May 26, 2014, available at: http://www.riotinto.com/media/
media-releases-237_10508.aspx. See also: Di Boscio N, Slade M,Ward J: “Digging
deeper for development: the case of Simandou and the Southern Guinea Growth
Corridor.”(2014), available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13563014-0052-x.
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transport infrastructure to be open access, governments need
to carry out a proper cost-benefit analysis before requiring
shared use of all types of shared infrastructure, and particularly railway lines. The tax concessions a government will
need to make for a major mining company to agree to shared
use may outweigh the benefits of a multi-purpose railway
line. In such a case, a host government may be better off just
retaining the right-of-way on which a railway line is located,
so that roads and other types of infrastructure can be built
alongside it.

Power infrastructure

Box 2.19: How Katanga copper mining’s power
requirements have been leveraged to improve the
power system in Democratic Republic of Congo

The regular power outages, coupled with the high cost
of diesel, mean that less copper is produced at a higher
cost. This in turn means that the country forgoes tax
revenues that would otherwise have been generated
from copper exports. In a recent study, the World Bank
estimated that in 2012 power shortages resulted in a
loss of 250,000 tons of copper, which translated into lost
exports worth US$1.8 billion, a loss in GDP of US$700
million (4.4% of GDP) and a loss in tax revenues of
US$250 million (1.6% of GDP) (World Bank, 2014).

Mining demand for power can be leveraged to either
improve or expand the transmission and generation capacity of the national or regional grid or a power generation
plant constructed for a mine can be used to supply low-cost
electricity to local communities or the nation’s grid, thus improving living standards and fostering the business environment. The case study below describes how Katanga copper
mining’s power requirements have been leveraged to improve
the power system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC).

The DRC has great hydropower potential; the Inga hydropower site on the Congo River alone has an estimated
potential to produce 40,000MW. However, at present, the
DRC only has an installed capacity of 1,775MW, with an
electricity grid that reaches 11% of the population and
suffers from intermittent electricity supply and regular
power outages (World Bank, 2014). Therefore, the country
relies heavily on back-up diesel generators, which are
significantly more expensive and limit the growth potential of small businesses that cannot afford to sustain
the losses associated with regular power cuts or operate
generators for long periods of time. The power shortages and unreliable power supply have also affected the
energy-intensive copper mining industry in the south-east
of the country, which accounts for 30% of the DRC’s GDP
and 80% of its export revenues and exploits one of the
largest copper deposits in the world.45

Given the long-term nature of the mining operations and
their consistent power needs, a number of mines, including those operated by GlencoreXstrata Plc, have agreed
to invest in SNEL as well as to upgrade the national
electricity grid through a series of measures including the
repair of two turbines at SNEL’s 1,424MW Inga 2 hydropower plant and improve about 2,000 km of transmission
lines to provide power to Katanga. By doing so, the mines
will ensure they have a better, cheaper and more reliable
power supply. At the same time, SNEL will benefit from
improved infrastructure and will be better placed to support the supply of cheap hydropower to other sectors and
users in the economy.

Water infrastructure

The DRC case study highlights the potential benefits of
public-private partnerships or cooperation between the
Government and the EI sector to improve power access to
the country and at the same time lower the operating costs
for the mining companies (see recommendations E2, E3,
G7, G8).

Similar economies of scale can be achieved with regard to
water distribution and treatment infrastructure, whereby
mining-related investments in water infrastructure are made
with a view to benefit a wider range of stakeholders than
just a single mine. Large volumes of water are required at
each phase of the mining process to suppress dust, process
and mine ore, cool and wash mining equipment, manage
waste tailings, and for consumption by mining communities.
Yet, mining companies increasingly find themselves operating in water-stressed environments where there is a physical

45 More information can be obtained here: http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/
content/en/mineweb-political-economy?oid=232081&sn=Detail

58

LINKAGES

shortage of fresh water, and considerable investment in water
infrastructure is required to ensure a reliable water supply for
mining operations (CCSI, 2014). Estimates suggest that the
mining sector’s global annual expenditure on water-related
infrastructure in 2011 was $7.7 billion (Thomas, 2011).

and distribution capacity of the local water authority as
was the case with Freeport McMoran’s Cerro Verde mine in
Arequipa, Peru (see case study below). While such arrangements can go a long way for a mine to obtain a social license
from the surrounding communities, the initiatives do not
necessarily need to be done on a CSR basis. As in the cases of
Anglo American and Freeport McMoran, the treated water
can be provided for a small fee (covering at least the operation and maintenance costs of supplying such water). Instead
of making the investments or upgrades themselves, mining
companies could also provide the necessary demand by way
of a long water off take agreement46 to a water authority in
order to help the water authority obtain the external financing for an upgrade of its water infrastructure required to
serve both the mines and other users.

In the context of community concerns that mines are
draining available water resources or are polluting or altering
the course of existing water sources in areas where access
to adequate and safe water resources for the local population may be inadequate, there may be scope for mines to
collaborate with local or national water utilities to supply
mine treated water to a local authority for onward distribution (such as Anglo American’s eMahlahleni reclamation
project in South Africa), or to upgrade the water treatment

Box 2.20: The experience of Freeport McMoran in Peru
with shared water infrastructure

In 2011, the mining company thus proposed to supply the
additional water requirement through a new wastewater
treatment plant with excess capacity reserved for communities. By avoiding a deterioration of Rio Chili’s water
quality due to polluting discharges, the project would
also improve agricultural productivity in the area and reduce water-related diseases. It will also be a long-term
source of treated water for mining operations. The Regional Government of Arequipa, the National Government
and SEDAPAR (Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado
de Arequipa S.A) agreed with Freeport McMoran that the
mine will finance the engineering and construction of the
wastewater treatment plant and that the plant will be
operated by SEDAPAR. Construction started in 2013.

Freeport McMoran’s Cerro Verde mine is an open-pit copper and molybdenum-mining complex located near the
city of Arequipa in southern Peru. The mine is a zerodischarge facility that recycles approximately 85% of the
water used in the mining process. The company, however,
plans to expand and triple its production; in order to do
so, the project will require an 85% increase in its water
requirements. At the same time, access to clean water in
the region is a major challenge. The main source of water
supply, the Rio Chili, has become contaminated because
of untreated sewage discharge and there is insufficient
wastewater treatment capacity in the region.

The Peru case study shows how spatial linkages can be
created in the water sector. Close collaboration with national
and local authorities is necessary for such linkages to be
created (see recommendations E2, G7, G8).

can result in a reduction of the capital investment costs of
using a fibre optic network.47 Examples of this include CEC
Liquid Telecom’s laying of fibre optic lines along the power
lines of the mines in the Zambian copper belt.48 Similarly,
in Malaysia, Celcom, a major telecommunications company,
partnered with Petronas, Malaysia’s state owned oil company,
to build Celcom Petro Network, an installation of fibre optic
network cables that addressed Petronas’ telecommunication
needs and provided spare capacity that could be leased to
other mobile operators, ISP and corporate customers. The
system runs parallel with the National Gas Pipeline and
contains nearly 1,400km of extension (covering nearly 90%
of the country) (Toledano & Roorda, 2014).

ICT infrastructure
Economies of scope can be achieved when one type of infrastructure facilitates the development of another type, such as
placing fibre optic cables or utility lines alongside power lines
or in the right-of-way of a railway line, road, or oil & gas
pipeline to benefit a greater number of economic actors. In
fact, with regard to fibre optic networks, it is estimated that
civil works represent around 80% of total roll-out costs, so
co-locating fibre optic cables alongside existing infrastructure

47 Fibre to the Home Council Europe: “White Paper: Innovative FTTH Deployment Technologies,” (2014), available at: http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/documents/
Publications/DandO_White_Paper_2_2014.pdf. Also see http://www.unescap.org/
sites/default/files/6_Cross-sector%20ICT%20Infrastructure%20for%20Asia_Abu%20
Khan.pdf
48 Interview with corporate expert, July 2015.

46 An offtake agreement is an agreement between a producer and a buyer to
purchase/sell portions of the producer’s future production. It is usually negotiated
prior to the construction of a facility such as a mine in order to secure a market
for the future output of the facility.
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In the oil & gas sector, the right-of-ways along pipelines
are particularly suited to being shared with other types of
infrastructure, although a clear regulatory framework to both
allow and facilitate the leveraging of economies of scope

along pipelines is important. An example of a country with a
strong regulator is Brazil, which uses regulation and adjudication to facilitate and implement shared use arrangements,
as can be seen with regard to the Bolivia-Brazil Pipeline.

Box 2.21: The use of rights of way in Brazil along the
Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline

GASBOL became operational in February 1999 and is
managed by Gas Transboliviano S.A. (GTB) on the Bolivian
side and by Transportadora Brasileira Gasoduto BolíviaBrasil S.A. (TBG) on the Brazilian side. In Brazil, natural
gas as well as the infrastructure associated with it are
regulated by the Brazilian National Agency of Petroleum,
Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP), which has collaborated
with other regulators to leverage economies of scale
from GASBOL, among else by ensuring that electricity and
telecommunications lines can be built alongside the gas
pipelines. Most notably, in 1999 ANP and its counterparts
in the electricity sector, ANEEL, and in the telecommunications sector, ANATEL, issued a joint resolution on the
shared use of infrastructure which determines the sharing
of rights-of-way for utility lines, pipelines, posts, and
towers. More recently, ANP issued another resolution in
order to regulate shared use of the right-of-way of pipelines between the oil & gas sector and biofuel companies.52 Pursuant to this 2012 resolution, TBG is required to
guarantee access to GASBOL’s easement over the land on
which the pipeline is located as long as there is excess
capacity for shared use. Any party wishing to request
access to the easement for the construction of additional
infrastructure just has to submit a request to TBG, and
can then appeal to ANP for intervention if TBG refuses to
grant the request.53

The Bolivia-Brazil Pipeline (GASBOL) provides a good
example of the scope for cross-border shared infrastructure in the oil and gas context as well as the importance
of strong regulatory oversight.49 The 3,150km long pipeline
transports natural gas from Bolivia to Brazil.50
Bolivia’s and Brazil’s cooperation with respect to the
cross-border pipeline was formalised on August 17,
1992 with the conclusion of a Brazil-Bolivia Agreement
on Natural Gas Supply.51 In addition to setting out that
the countries’ state-owned oil enterprises, Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (“YPFB”) and Petroleo
Brasileiro S.A. (“Petrobras”), would establish by contract
the terms for the construction of the pipeline and the
sale of natural gas, the agreement specifies regional
integration as one of its aims and states that the Bolivian
Government will allow the transit of natural gas from
other countries towards Brazil by giving the transit the
right-of-way in Bolivia.

The Brazil case study highlights how cross-border infrastructure projects may help realize potentials for regional integration (see recommendation G9). It also shows the importance
of a regulatory framework that allows enforcement of shared
infrastructure use and the necessity of a strong regulatory
authority (see recommendations G7, D1)
49 The 1992 Note on Natural Gas Sell Agreement states that “the decision of
both the Bolivian and Brazilian governments to enter into the gas pipeline will
not only benefit the development of both countries, but also decidedly contribute
to Latin America regional integration. Therefore, a project like this pipeline is a
priority for the South Cone region,” available at: http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-
internacionais/bilaterais/1992/b_38_2011-10-14-15-30-18/
50 TBG, “Gas Pipeline – Technical Information,” available at: http://www.tbg.com.
br/pt_br/o-gasoduto/informacoes-tecnicas.htm.
51 See: Brazil. 1992 Note on Natural Gas Sell Agreement, available at: 
http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1992
/b_38_2011-10-14-15-30-18/ and Brazil. Decree 681/1992 that provide the BrazilBolivia Agreement on Natural Gas Supply, available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/
ccivil_03/decreto/1990-1994/D0681.htm

52 ANP. Resolution 42 of 12/10/2012, available at: http://nxt.anp.gov.br/NXT/
gateway.dll/leg/resolucoes_anp/2012/dezembro/ranp%2042%20-%202012.
xml?fn=document-frameset.htm$f=templates$3.0
53 Art. 22 of ANP Resolution 42 of 12/10/2012, available at: http://nxt.anp.gov.
br/NXT/gateway.dll/leg/resolucoes_anp/2012/dezembro/ranp%2042%20-%202012.
xml?fn=document-frameset.htm$f=templates$3.0
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2.6.2
		

Lessons learned from the literature
and case studies54

to require shared use. By anticipating different scenarios and
circumstances, governments can also assess other options,
such as negotiating for higher tax revenues to invest in public
infrastructure projects.

Failing to leverage EI-related investments in infrastructure to
address the lack of public infrastructure is a missed opportunity for governments to maximize the development gains of
such projects. Leveraging EI-related investments to benefit
a wider range of stakeholders than just a single EI company
could help narrow this gap. However, given that the EI sector
often operates in an enclave model, investments in physical
infrastructure are often uncoordinated with national infrastructure development plans. The country therefore misses
the opportunity to promote the shared use of the infrastructure and to take advantage of potential synergies.

While there is considerable scope for sharing at least some
of the infrastructure required for EI projects to operate, the
scope for shared use can vary substantially, depending on
the type of infrastructure and industry it was developed for.
A full cost-benefit analysis therefore needs to be undertaken
to determine to what extent the imposition of shared use for
each type of infrastructure should be required. For more information on the types of issues to take into account for each
type of infrastructure in such a cost-benefit analysis, please
see CCSI’s “Framework to Approach Shared-Use of Mining
Related Infrastructure.”55 There is often a lack of local
capacity to carry out this cost-benefit analysis and technical
cooperation could help enhance this capacity.

A master infrastructure plan or national planning across
sectors that takes into account the infrastructure requirements of the EI sector can mitigate some of the risks by
identifying multiple opportunities, users or purposes before
contract negotiations or tendering the concession. Once
there is a single user for infrastructure, it is more challenging

Table 2.5: Summary of key characteristics of spatial linkages

BENEFITS

-- Help address the infrastructure financing gap
-- Infrastructure is key to develop the economy and other linkages
-- Social benefits from access to infrastructure

DRAWBACKS

-- Sharing is not always economically feasible and difficult to implement –
especially when it comes to railway infrastructure

COMMODITY SUITABILITY

-- Bulky low value commodities require railways
-- Precious metals will require a lot of water
-- Oil and gas least suitable for spatial linkages other than through economies of
scope along roads and pipelines

REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SKILL LEVEL
EMPLOYMENT

-- Requires strong public utilities to serve as viable partners to the companies.

GENDER
MAIN POLICY MEASURES

-- N/A

RECOMMENDATIONS
(CHAPTER 4)

-- EI Companies:
1,2
-- Governments:
1,2,7,8,9
-- Development cooperation: 1,2,3,5,10

-- Improved infrastructure access is likely to lead to increased economic activity
and thereby more jobs.
-- Develop a national infrastructure master plan that takes EI sector investments
into account
-- Devise shared-use and open access policies
-- Prepare cost-benefit analyses to determine in which cases EI sector infrastructure investments should be shared
-- Setup an independent regulatory agency to oversee and implement open access
policies

54 For more detailed recommendations, please consult: CCSI: “A Framework to
Approach Shared-Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure” (March 2014), available at:
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/05/A-Framework-for-Shared-use_March-2014.
pdf.

55 Ibid.
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SWOT Analysis for spatial linkages in Africa:

Figure 2.27: SWOT Analysis for spatial linkages

Strengths (internal):
1. In many cases, resource –related infrastructure offers
clear economies of scale and scope, which in turn enable spatial linkages.
2. To save their social license to operate, companies may
be willing to share infrastructure.

Strengths

Weaknesses

Economies of scale and
scope promotes other
spatial linkages

Lack of coordination
Mines prefer to operate
in an enclave

Successful case studies

Weaknesses (internal):
1. Lack of coordination between the mining sector’s infrastructure investments and national infrastructure plans.
2. Not all types of mining projects are suited for infrastructure sharing.
3. Mining companies prefer to operate infrastructure in an
enclave model.
4. Weak regulatory institutions to regulate shared use
infrastructure.

Opportunities

Threats

High on agenda of
international development
cooperation

Not always considered
bankable

May be more attractive
when commodity prices
low

Opportunities (external):
1. High on the agenda of international development
cooperation.
2. Increasing guidance on how to operationalize shareduse infrastructure.
3. Regional integration improves the business case for
cross-border resource corridors.
4. Low commodity prices may push EI companies to share
the costs associated with infrastructure investments.

Mining companies´
concerns of operational
efficiencies

Source: Authors

2.7

Threats (external):
1. Banks may be less willing to finance mining projects
where the infrastructure assets are being shared with
other users.
2. Extractive companies are cautious due to concerns
about operational inefficiencies.

Consumption linkages

Consumption linkages relate to the demand for goods and
services resulting from the spending of earnings from the EI
sector.
Little analysis has been done on consumption linkages. This
is partly because they are notoriously difficult to identify
and quantify, and the types of consumption surveys that are
sometimes carried out – such as in relation to the Escondida
copper mine in Chile – are usually too limited in scope.
This limitation occurs either because the surveys just focus
on resident employees rather than including commuters or
because they only have examined workers that arrived when
EI activities began and did not include residents that predated EI activities to see whether they had benefited from
induced employment. The creation of jobs in the informal
sector is also not adequately considered in these assessments
(Östensson, 2014).
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Figure 2.28: Consumption linkages

Consumption linkages

Horizontal linkages

EI‘s sphere
of interest

(Induced Employment)

Employment

Knowledge linkages
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EI project
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(Indirect Employment)

(Direct Employment)

(Indirect Employment)

Fiscal linkages
Source: Authors

2.7.1

Literature review and case studies

considerably higher employment numbers than employment
created directly by the EI sector. For example, the International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM) has reported
high induced employment at mines like the Sepon mine in
Laos (13,110 induced jobs as compared to 3,155 directly
employed by the mine)56 and the Obuasi mine in Ghana
(20,000-50,000 induced jobs versus 1,000-5,000 directly
employed).57 However, the induced effect of direct and
indirect employment is lessened if an EI company provides
its employees with accommodation, food, and other services, which reduces the amount that workers spend on such
services (but may increase upstream linkages if sourced from
local suppliers).58

Writing in the context of the 1970s when markets were
heavily protected, Hirschman (1981:75) noted that the
demand for goods and services generated by employees – and
those owning the means of production – in the EI sector had
the potential to provide a major incentive for local industrial
production and manufacturing (Kaplinsky, 2011). This is
not only because the incomes generated in the EI sector were
high, but also because of the sizeable share of domestic cash
incomes they represented when other sectors were relatively
underdeveloped (Kaplinsky, 2012).
In addition to consumption linkages created from the incomes of those directly employed in the EI sector, Hirschman
argued that consumption linkages could also be generated
indirectly through the incomes of both those providing
upstream inputs for the EI sector and those processing commodities domestically downstream. To the extent that such
suppliers are local, there is a multiplier effect as incomes generated in the EI sector are spent in the domestic economy.
Thus the incomes –both direct and indirect – generated by
the EI sector have, as Hirschman concluded, the potential
to drive the creation of a domestic market for goods and
services (Kaplinsky, 2012) (and what is also referred to as
induced employment). Induced employment can account for

56 ICMM, “Utilizing Mining and Mineral Resource Endowments to Foster
Sustainable Development of the Lao PDR,” (July 2007), available at: 
http://www.icmm.com/document/1841.
57 ICMM, “Ghana Country Case Study: The Challenge of Mineral Wealth: Using
Resource Endowments to Foster Sustainable Development,” ICMM (July 2007),
available at: http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/Country%20
Case%20Study%20Ghana.pdf. See also the forthcoming CCSI working paper:
“Employment from Mining and Land-Based Agricultural Investments: How Much
Myth, How Much Reality?”
58 Forthcoming CCSI working paper: “Employment from Mining and Land-Based
Agricultural Investments: How Much Myth, How Much Reality?”
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As explained above, at the time Hirschman wrote his hypothesis, most resource-rich developing countries were inwardfocused with import-substitution industrialization policies
that sought to limit imports. Chile, for example, targeted

consumption linkages by increasing the price of imported
goods through tariffs and non-trade barriers , as set out more
fully in the box below (Sachs, L. and Maennling, N., 2015;
Silva, 2007).

Box 2.22: Chile’s import substitution industrialization
policy

non-metallic mineral products, and metallic products by
planning and subsidizing targeted industries, encouraging
public private partnerships to develop infrastructure, and
protecting these nascent local industries with high tariffs
and exchange rate policies.

Import substitution industrialization (ISI) in Chile, as in
other Latin American countries from the 1930s to the
1960s, replaced the commodity-export-led development
model that had been in place during the first half of
the 20th Century. The Great Depression of 1929, followed
by the Second World War, resulted in flat demand from
Europe and the U.S. for the primary goods being exported
from Chile. It was determined that, in order to grow the
economy and address high unemployment, Chile would
need to start its own industrial base.

However, in planning which local industries to support,
CORFO did not adequately assess which goods and services would benefit the country’s mining sector or could
be targeted to foster upstream and downstream linkages around it. Given that, at the time most inputs like
machinery and parts were imported, the impact of ISI on
the mining sector was therefore reflected in the higher
prices the sector had to pay for those imports. However,
as many of the mines were largely in U.S. hands at the
time and were benefitting from preferential tax treatment,
they were mostly able to absorb the additional costs of
imports. Other sectors that had not been internationally competitive prior to the imposition of ISI policies
fared less well. Chile’s agricultural sector, for example,
stagnated in the context of less competition from imports
and more expensive agricultural inputs. Therefore, the
expected increase in production and competitiveness of
the agricultural sector associated with consumption linkages from other local industries such as mining did not
materialize.

ISI relied on state-led efforts to develop local industries
and manufacturing to replace imported manufactured
goods, coupled with high tariff barriers, quotas and exchange controls to protect its nascent industries (Sapelli,
2003). In 1939, the Chilean Government of Pedro Aguirre
Cerde created the Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion (Chilean Development Corporation – CORFO), which
designed and implemented Chile’s industrial policy in the
1940s and 1950s. The Chilean Government associated
the expected increase in production and competitiveness
with consumption linkages from other local industries. It
built up a portfolio of non-traditional manufactured goods
in textiles, clothing and footware, chemical products,

The Chile case study shows that while consumption linkages
are more likely to occur when domestic goods are protected,
ISI policies may actually harm the sector in the long run as
companies are not exposed to competition and inputs need
to be imported.

the appreciation of the domestic real exchange rate makes
the import of foreign goods comparatively less expensive.
The consequence of this drop in support for the domestic
industry has been a rapid rise in import intensity in virtually
all resource-rich developing countries, exacerbated by the intense competition of cheap manufactured goods from China
in particular, which in turn has been helped by the global
decline in transport and logistics costs. In the case of Chile,
by the early 1960s, most of the easy substitutions of simple
imported goods had been made, and the process of import
substitution was growing less dynamic. For example, between
1950 and 1960 the annual growth rate of real industrial
production amounted to 3.5 %, less than half the growth of
the previous decade.59

Once trade regimes were liberalized in the 1980s and
1990s, after Hirschman had drawn his conclusions, many
of these consumption linkages “leaked abroad” through the
importation of less expensive or higher quality goods and
services, rather than reinforcing the demand for goods and
services domestically produced (Kaplinsky, 2012). In such
cases, the EI sector has fuelled consumption demand for
industrial sectors in other countries rather than in the host
country, showing a classical effect of Dutch Disease, whereby

59 50 years afterwards, it is clear that the opening of the Chilean economy as
well as its powerful supplier programmes have been far more effective than the
presented ISI policies in promoting linkages.
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The degree of consumption leakages abroad depends on the
extent to which tradable goods and services are produced
domestically. Some products and local services benefit from
various forms of “natural protective barriers” (Kaplinsky,
2011). For example, perishable food products are best
consumed close to the point of production. Service industries that require local presence such as restaurants or local
transport are not going to be sourced from abroad. Heavy
low-cost products such as construction materials (cement,
bricks, etc.) have a high transport to value ratio, which makes
local production more attractive. Nevertheless, despite these
examples of natural protective barriers, the effect of high

prices in the domestic market – often fuelled by the EI itself
– or the absence of policies to facilitate the establishment
of agricultural or manufacturing sectors to provide such
produce or goods means that it even becomes cheaper, or
sometimes even inevitable, to import such goods rather than
producing them domestically. For example, one interviewee
noted that in Liberia, where most farming is carried out on a
subsistence basis, mines tend to source food from neighbouring Guinea and further afield to ensure a reliable supply of
foodstuffs.60 The box below illustrates what could be done to
facilitate consumption linkages targeting agriculture produce.

Box 2.23: Targeting agricultural productivity of
smallholder farmers in Mozambique

made to promote inclusive and diversified agriculture-led
growth along the corridors. By targeting the productivity of smallholder agriculture in the region in particular, such smallholder farmers could move from largely
subsistence farming to producing produce for the national
market (including upstream and consumption linkages
from the EI sector). A number of multi-stakeholder initiatives and notably the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor
- a collaboration between government, mining companies,
farming organizations and international development partners – have been set up to identify local potential supply
opportunities along the Beira corridor and invest in them
to develop linkages. However, only modest improvements
have been evidenced to date (CCSI, 2011).	

Mozambique’s Zambezi Valley includes the area in and
between resource-rich Tete Province and the Nacala
and Beira ports, which are connected by railway corridors. Low-income rural communities along the two
corridors comprise about 80% of the population in the
Zambezi valley, with farming being the main source of
food and income for most households. However, most
of the agriculture is farmed on a smallholder basis and
agricultural productivity remains low. This population is
unlikely to benefit from the development of Mozambique’s
coal resources in Tete province unless investments are

Mozambique’s case study illustrates that given the high
proportion of the labour force involved in agriculture in
most African countries (estimated at around 65% of the total
labour force) and the high reliance of household incomes
on this sector (estimated to be around 50%), government
and company policies, as well as donor-related assistance
to improve agricultural productivity in rural areas – and
particularly in the resource corridors connected to extractive
projects - could facilitate consumption linkages (Ramdoo
2015). Such policies could include the provision of access to
finance, fertilizers, and seeds, for example, as well as R&D in
agriculture.

It is noteworthy that such policies are also in the interest of
EI companies to the extent that it can help save them their
social license to operate. Companies usually can help support
a range of economic activities that are not directly related
to their core business. The decision about which economic
activities to support should depend on existing expertise and
prospects for those economic activities to succeed - both aspects that should be addressed in a social impact assessment.
Given that in developing countries EI projects are often
situated in regions where farming is prevalent and demand
for agriculture produce is likely to increase resulting from
increased economic activity, supporting farmers may be in
the self-interest of EI companies.

60 Interviews with GIZ, West Africa, August 2015
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Gender and consumption linkages
Gender can have both a positive and negative impact on the
creation of consumption linkages. This is because the direct
employment created by the EI sector traditionally favours
men who are less likely than women to spend money on the
family or household and more likely to spend disposable
income on luxury goods such as alcohol, which, if imported,
results in leakages abroad.61 A 2009 World Bank study
on gender dimensions of the EI sector found that where
women’s livelihoods have been displaced by the EI sector and
they are forced to rely on a male provider, overall household
consumption may decrease. On the flip side, the low skill
jobs indirectly created around the EI are often in professions dominated by women, e.g. catering, laundry, clothing, uniform supply and repair, agricultural produce, and
administrative support.62 Where women have access to these
jobs, consumption of household goods and provisions for the
household has been found to increase.

2.7.2
		

•

in skilled/ managerial positions in the EI sector to keep
their earnings within the country rather than taking them
offshore.
Using fiscal linkages to create the infrastructure and public
service delivery around the sector necessary to sustain
the creation of a local economy which could be further
expanded by EI-related consumption linkages.

There is little literature on what EI companies can do in
relation to their core activities to target consumption linkages. However, EI companies may (1) collect better data on
local consumption linkage potentials through social impact
assessments prior to the start of mining activities (Östensson,
2014); and (2) support initiatives to foster local agricultural
productivity growth and mining employees’ consumption of
local produce. Investing in the collection of better data and
local produce initiatives could support not only the creation
of consumption linkages but also the creation of upstream
linkages.

Lessons learned from the literature and
case studies

SWOT Analysis for consumption linkages:

Kaplinsky argues that consumption linkages probably will
not create a major source of industrial potential. The linkage
relies on the availability of competitively priced domestic
consumption goods and services, which are often not available in resource-rich developing countries.

Strengths (internal):
1. Can be generated both directly (from the incomes of 
EI sector employees) and indirectly (through
the incomes of those employed in upstream and
downstream sectors).

To foster consumption linkages, governments could focus
on:
• Requiring mining companies to carry out social impact assessments as a pre-condition for the issuance of a
mining licence in order to gather better baseline data on
local economic conditions. This would in turn provide
governments with a basic understanding of what could be
demanded as a result of the EI project spurring economic
growth in the region (Östensson, 2014).
• Improving agricultural productivity of smallholders. The
majority of the rural work force in most developing countries is engaged in small-scale farming, which could supply
the EI sector directly or indirectly (Ramdoo, 2015).
• Supporting local industry in providing goods that have a
high transport-to-value ratio such as cement, bricks and
other construction materials for domestic consumption.
• Adopting initiatives such as tax credits or higher interest
rates in saving accounts63 to incentivize those employed

Weaknesses (internal):
1. Reliant on availability of competitively priced domestic
goods and services.
2. Dependent on development of upstream and
downstream linkages.
3. The Dutch disease can hurt the competitiveness of a
country’s non-extractive sectors, thereby having an overall negative impact on domestic consumption linkages,
which are replaced by cheaper imports.
4. Limited self-interest for EI company to support.
Opportunities (external):
1. The attention given to boosting the productivity of the
agricultural sector in international policy frameworks
(such as the SDGs) and agendas of development partners can contribute to the development of an agricultural sector.
Threats (external):
1. Availability of cheaper goods and services from abroad.

61 Eftimie, A., Heller, K., Strongman, J.: “Gender Dimensions of the Extractive
Industries: Mining for Equity,” World Bank (2009), available at: http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTOGMC/Resources/eifd8_gender_equity.pdf.
62 Ibid.
63 Further research into such policies is needed.
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Table 2.6: Summary of key characteristics of consumption linkages

BENEFITS
DRAWBACKS

-- Largest potential for job creation (induced employment) among linkages.

COMMODITY SUITABILITY

-- Precious metals have short exploitation cycles that do not leave much time to
develop linkages.
-- Given that direct and indirect employment numbers are higher in mining as
opposed to oil and gas, the total induced employment numbers are also likely
to be higher.

REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SKILL LEVEL

-- Requires a relatively diversified local economy that produces enough goods
and services that can be consumed. Such economy will generally emerge from
the existence of relatively good infrastructure and a diversified skill base.

EMPLOYMENT

-- Induced employment, when correctly measured, is higher than direct and indirect employment. The multiplier in Ghana, for example, has been estimated at
28.
-- Better baseline data of local economic conditions collected prior to the start
of mining activities would provide for better information on how to promote
induced employment.

GENDER

-- In developing countries, the construction and agriculture sectors can be
targeted by policies seeking to increase consumption linkages. The former
tends to be male dominated, while in many cultures the latter may see female
employment increase.

MAIN POLICY MEASURES

-- Improve collection of baseline consumption data,
-- Support sectors that are geographically bound - Encourage workers and
companies to keep earnings domestically.

RECOMMENDATIONS
(CHAPTER 4)

-- EI Companies:
1,2
-- Governments:
1,2,8
-- Development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,10

-- Dutch disease as a result of the EI sector may adversely affect other sectors
that could benefit from consumption linkages.
-- Limited role for EI companies to promote consumption linkages.

Figure 2.29: SWOT analysis for consumption linkages

Strength

Weaknesses

Can be created through
both direct and indirect
employment

Dependent on other linkages and competitively
priced domestic goods
and services
No self-interest for EI
sector

Opportunities

Threats

International
development interested 
in improving local
productivity in
agriculture

Availability of more
competitively-priced
goods and services from
abroad

Source: Authors
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CONSTRAINTS
ON LINKAGE
POLICIES
This chapter focuses on constraints on linkage policies.
These can be either domestic (internal) or related to international liberalization and globalisation (external). Domestic
constraints have been discussed in the previous chapters,
summarized in the weaknesses of the SWOT analyses, and
are also addressed in the recommendations in Chapter 4.
Especially the lack of an educated and skilled labour force,
underdeveloped infrastructure and a limited access to finance
are key domestic constraints. Institutional weaknesses related
to the assessment and planning of linkages as well as to the
monitoring and enforcing of agreements and regulations
further hamper the development of linkages. Short political
cycles and rent-seeking behaviour associated with the exploitation of natural resources can partly be attributed to the lack
of effective policies.64

3

The key message is that over the past 20 years, these rules
have both proliferated and become more stringent, creating a
legal framework which governs countries seeking to develop
these linkages now very differently than before the mid1990s. These developments in international law can have
significant implications for governments’ ability to adopt
local content policies in domestic laws, regulations, and
investor-state contracts. Because international law sits above
domestic law in the general hierarchy of legal rules, governments adopting local content measures that conflict with
WTO law or the rules set forth in international investment
treaties may have to abandon those local content measures
and/or pay compensation to companies subject to those local
content rules.
This section highlights these issues.

With this in mind, this chapter will focus on external constraints. Indeed promoting industrial development today is
not the same task as when developed countries embraced
their industrial development a few decades ago. Liberalization through international legal frameworks such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, globalization and the slow but sustained race to automation in the
EI sector present unprecedented challenges for developing
countries today. These three phenomena have an impact
on the scope of linkages that can be reasonably targeted by
resource-rich countries.

3.1

3.1.1

WTO Rules

When the WTO came into being in 1995, three new international agreements entered into force that set out certain
rules relevant for linkage policies. One is the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement);
the second is the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (the SCM Agreement); and the third is the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In brief, these three
agreements prevent various measures that had been used by
countries (with varying degrees of success) to promote linkages. Table 3.1 illustrates the relevant measures, the WTO
agreements restricting its use, and the linkage policies that
may be affected.

International Legal Frameworks

International law places some restrictions on the tools governments can use in order to encourage the development of
linkages between EI investments and the domestic economy.
These rules are enshrined in several WTO agreements and
numerous bilateral and multilateral trade and investment
treaties.
64 Jesse (2012) speaks about the ‘dual nature’ of local content alluding to its
role in both fostering development and as a mechanism of elite accumulation and
rent-seeking.
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Table 3.1: Overview of WTO measures and impacts on linkage policies

RESTRICTED MEASURE

WTO
AGREEMENT

EXAMPLES OF LINKAGES POLICY AFFECTED

Measures that require or favour the use of
domestic over foreign goods

TRIMs Agreement

Measures that impose quantitative restrictions
on exports

TRIMs Agreement

Prevents governments from requiring mining
companies to source goods from local providers;
countries may also not condition incentives such as
tax benefits on requirements to use local goods
Prevents governments from restricting exports of
raw materials in order to encourage or require
downstream processing or beneficiation
Prevents governments from encouraging EI firms
to source goods from domestic firms by prohibiting
governments from providing fiscal, financial, or
other benefits to companies based on their use of
domestic products
Prevents governments from providing benefits to
locally owned and/or locally established upstream
or downstream service suppliers in order to help
improve their competitiveness and ability to serve
EI firms (unless those benefits are similarly
provided to foreign-owned and/or -established
services firms)
Prevents governments from requiring a certain
amount of domestic equity in EI firms, a tool
that may be employed in order to help promote
technology transfer to domestic individuals or
entities
Prevents governments from requiring that foreign
companies investing in the EI form joint ventures
with local partners or establish local corporations

Measures that grant subsidies to domestic
SCM Agreement
companies but make those subsidies contingent
on sourcing inputs of goods from local
producers
GATS65
Measures that provide subsidies, tax breaks,
or other preferential treatment to domestically
owned and/or domestically established
service providers but do not provide those
same benefits to foreign-owned and/or
foreign-established service providers
Measures that limit the participation of foreign GATS66
capital in a services provider

Measures that require foreign investors in
services to invest through certain types of
legal entities

GATS67

3.1.2

While these restrictions are significant and – according to
at least some countries – too stringent, they are weaker in
a number of respects than the restrictions emerging from
international investment treaties. The next section briefly
discusses those agreements and their implications for linkage
policies. For an expanded discussion on WTO agreements
please refer to Annex 2.

Investment Treaties

There are presently roughly 3,000 investment treaties
concluded by countries all around the world, which contain
rules regarding government treatment of foreign investors
and their investments. These treaties, often referred to as
“international investment agreements” or “IIAs”, include
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements with investment chapters. While
the pace of negotiating these treaties has slowed over the past
15 years from a peak during the 1990s, data indicate that
the treaties are still being concluded at the notable pace of
roughly one every two weeks.

65 These GATS national treatment obligations only apply if and to the extent a
country has committed to liberalize the relevant services sector
66 These GATS market access obligations only apply if and to the extent a country
has committed to liberalize the relevant services sector
67 These GATS market access obligations only apply if and to the extent a country
has committed to liberalize the relevant services sector
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Figure 3.1: Annual and cumulative number of IIAs concluded
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There are three key ways how these treaties can prevent
countries from implementing linkage policies, namely, (i)
national treatment provisions, (ii) specific restrictions on
“performance requirements”, and (iii) obligations preventing
states from interfering with foreign investors’ “expectations”
for their operations (e.g. the “fair and equitable treatment”
obligation). Whereas the national treatment provisions are
common throughout the thousands of treaties that exist,
restrictions on “performance requirements” are less common
but impose much stronger restrictions on the use of industrial policy tools.

In the majority of investment treaties, these obligations
only apply “post-establishment”, meaning that governments
are free to treat foreign investors differently than domestic
investors with respect to whether and how they can enter the
domestic market. Nevertheless, a growing number of treaties
also include “pre-establishment” protections, meaning that
foreign investors have the right to enter and establish operations in the “host” country, and to do so under the same
conditions and terms as domestic investors. This thereby
frees those foreign investors from special conditions such
as domestic equity requirements or requirements to form
contractual joint ventures with local companies.

1.	 National Treatment
The national treatment requirement in investment treaties
prevents governments from treating foreign-owned investments differently than domestically owned investments. This
means that it can prevent governments from adopting any
policies that aim to increase the competitiveness of locally
owned goods and services providers, or to encourage the use
of goods or services produced by locally owned companies, if
those measures result in less favourable treatment of foreignowned companies.

While the post-establishment national treatment obligation
in investment treaties is similar to the national treatment
provision in the GATS, and the pre-establishment national
treatment obligation is similar to the GATS’ market access
rule, there are two important differences between those
investment treaty provisions and the GATS:
First, while the GATS is a “positive list” agreement, investment treaties are typically “negative list” agreements, meaning that they apply to all investments in all sectors unless
governments have specifically indicated otherwise. Thus, the
scope of the commitments under investment treaties is, as a
rule, considerably broader than under the GATS.

68 From World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment
Governance, by UNCTAD, © 2015 United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of
the United Nations.
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Second, while the GATS is enforced through a state-to-state
mechanism under the WTO’s rules of dispute settlement,
investment treaties usually provide for investor-state arbitration. Under the WTO’s state-to-state system, many measures
may go unchallenged. This may be mainly because the consequences of the breach for the country are not severe enough
to warrant the time, expense, or political cost of litigation or
because the state that might complain also adopted offending
measures and does not want to face similar WTO claims. In
contrast, investors do not necessarily face the same disincentives to threaten or file actions under investment treaties
alleging that the national treatment obligation has been
violated.

While some of these measures would already be prohibited
under the WTO agreements, investment treaties commonly
go beyond WTO prohibitions.
In addition to prohibiting governments from adopting
measures that require or incentivize compliance with performance requirements, treaties also often prevent governments
from enforcing prohibited performance requirements. One
interpretation of this prohibition on “enforcement” of performance requirements is that, if a government enters into a
contract with a foreign investor in which the investor agrees
to achieve domestic content or other similar targets, the government cannot take any steps to enforce those contractual
commitments.

2.	 Restrictions on Performance Requirements

Investors have used these treaty obligations to challenge a
number of performance requirements imposed by states,
including taxes imposed on producers of goods that sourced
raw materials from abroad rather than from domestic producers,69 and requirements on oil companies to make local
expenditures on education and training and R&D (See box
3.1).70

The second way how investment treaties limit efforts to
develop and strengthen linkages is through their express
restrictions on “performance requirements”. As used in IIAs
and described further below, “performance requirements”
can include a wide range of mandatory and incentive-based
measures, including measures requiring or encouraging the
use of local providers of goods and services or the conduct
of R&D in the host country. As noted above, most treaties
do not include these types of provisions; nevertheless, the
obligations, when included, are often “multi-lateralized”, and
tend to be exceptionally strong.

The Mobil vs. Canada case study shows that EI companies
have already sued countries successfully under multilateral
investment treaties for R&D and E&T provisions. The provision at issue in this dispute – which prevents governments
from imposing or enforcing commitments to purchase,
use, or accord a preference to local service providers – can
be found in a growing number of IIAs. This highlights the
importance of assessing with care what investment treaties
entail (see recommendations G10, D2).

Multilateralisation
While investment treaties are usually bilateral, provisions
restricting the use of performance requirements often state
that each country party to the treaty is barred from imposing
performance requirements on investors from any country,
not just investors from the other country party to the treaty.

Scope of prohibitions
Investment treaties often bar a range of performance requirements, including those
• Requiring investors to export a given level or percentage of
a good or service;
• Requiring investors to favour the use of local goods and
service suppliers;
• Requiring or incentivizing foreign investors to achieve a
certain amount of domestic content (through expenditures
on local labour, service providers, and goods providers);
and
• Requiring the transfer of technology.

69 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v.
Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, November 21, 2007; Cargill v.
Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, September 18, 2009; but see Corn
Products International, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Award,
January 15, 2008 (finding no violation of the performance requirements p rovision
because, inter alia, it was not directly imposed on the claimant, but on the
purchaser of the claimant’s goods).
70 Mobil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and
Principles of Quantum, May 22, 2012.
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3.	 Substantive Treatment Standards
Box 3.1: Mobil vs. Canada: IIA dispute challenging use
of “performance requirements”

The third key way how investment treaties can limit the use
of linkage policies is through substantive standards of treatment on expropriation and “fair and equitable treatment”.
In one relatively well-known dispute, several Italian nationals used investment treaties to sue South Africa, challenging
aspects of its Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) mining
policy. The investors asserted that the BEE’s requirement
that mining companies sell 26% of their shares to Black or
Historically Disadvantaged Individuals at market prices constituted an unlawful expropriation of the investors’ property
and violated the fair and equitable (FET) obligation. The
proceedings were discontinued before the tribunal reached
any decision on the merits of the investors’ claims.73

In 1979, oil was discovered off the coast of Newfoundland (NL), Canada. At the time, unemployment in NL was
15%, nearly twice the national rate, and GDP was roughly
half the national average. With the discovery of oil, the
“Government of NL quickly recognized that the resource
could be used to promote the sustainable development
of NL, but only if it was used properly. The Government
realized that any development resulting from the oil
would only be sustainable if the oil was used to develop
skills and expertise in NL.” 71 The Government of NL and
the federal government thus adopted legislation requiring, among other things, any petroleum operator looking
to be licensed for activities in the area to submit and
secure approval of a Development Plan laying out how an
oil field would be developed and a Benefits Plan explaining how NL and Canada would benefit from the project. In
one component of the Benefits Plan, the company had to
set forth its plans for conducting R&D and education and
training (E&T) in the area.

In another dispute, mining companies initiated a dispute
against Indonesia under the investment treaty signed between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The investors challenged various government measures aimed at increasing
the domestic processing of copper, including new export
conditions, a new export duty, and a 2017 ban on the export
of copper concentrate. The dispute was discontinued shortly
after it had been initiated.74
The line between, on the one hand, a legitimate regulatory
act (that has a negative impact on an investor) and, on the
other, an expropriation or violation of the FET obligation,
can be difficult to draw, not least because of the varying
interpretations tribunals, states, investors, and other commentators have given to those provisions. Consequently, it
may be difficult for a state to know in advance whether a
given measure will prompt a treaty claim and, if so, whether
that claim will succeed.

The claimants, two US companies, each indirectly owned
minority shareholdings in two offshore oilfields in NL that
were governed by Development and Benefits Plans. In 2007,
the companies filed a case against Canada under an IIA,
the North American Free Trade Agreement, arguing that
the requirements to conduct R&D and E&T in Canada
violated the IIA’s restrictions on performance requirements.
More specifically, the companies argued that the m
 easures 
violated the treaty’s provision prohibiting states from
“impos[ing] or enforc[ing] … requirements … to purchase,
use or accord a preference to goods produced or services
provided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services
from persons in its territory.” (NAFTA, Art. 1106(1)(c)).

4.	Exceptions
Some treaties contain exceptions that can enable states
to maintain and even adopt new measures aimed at the
development of linkages, even though those linkages would
otherwise be inconsistent with the treaty.

The tribunal of three arbitrators appointed to decide
this dispute agreed with the claimants. The arbitrators
concluded that R&D and E&T are “services”, and that
requirements to make local expenditures on those
services constituted requirements to purchase or use
services in the host country in violation of the NAFTA. 
The tribunal subsequently ordered Canada to pay CDN$
17 million to the companies as compensation for the
unlawful performance requirements.72

73 Piero Foresti et al. v. South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award,
August 4, 2010.
74 See, e.g., PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara, Press Release: Arbitration Filed Over
Export Restrictions in Indonesia (July 1, 2014); Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V. and
PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/15, Order of the
Secretary-General Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceedings, August
29, 2014.

70 Mobil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Canada’s Counter-Memorial,
December 1, 2009, para. 14.
71 Mobil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Award, February 20, 2015.
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States might exempt a
• particular sector (e.g., mining, oil & gas),
• policy aim (e.g., aiding the development of historically
disadvantaged groups),
• government domain (e.g., taxation),
• level of government (e.g., local government),
• type of measure (e.g., subsidy), or
• actual measure (e.g., rule requiring local processing of raw
materials)

from all or some of the treaty’s substantive obligations.
Usually, these exceptions restrict the treaties’ articles on
national treatment and restrictions on performance requirements. It is much rarer for states to include such exemptions
from the obligations relating to expropriation and FET.
States might also or instead exempt matters from their
treaties’ investor-state dispute settlement provisions, and subject certain claims to special rules of adjudication, including
a mechanism whereby the state parties to the treaty can agree
to block an investor’s arbitration claim.

Table 3.2: Restrictions on local content measures under international investment treaties

RESTRICTIONS

Depending on the treaty, investment treaties can e.g. prevent:
Measures barred by the TRIMs Agreement
Measures that require or incentivize foreign investors to make expenditures on domestic goods,
services, and labour
Requirements to establish a joint venture with domestic entities or to have a certain amount of
domestic equity
Requirements to locate headquarters in a specific region
Requirements to transfer technology, production processes or other proprietary knowledge to
individuals or entities in the host country
Requirements to invest in R&D
Measures (e.g., subsidies) that are only provided to or that otherwise treat locally-owned
enterprises more favourably than foreign-owned enterprises
Measures that have negative impacts on the operations or profitability of investments such that
they constitute an expropriation or violation of FET

DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT

3.1.3

Investor-State

Lessons Learned

policies they bar and the investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism embedded in IIAs, which makes it relatively easy
for companies to challenge and seek compensation for government measures that violate treaty provisions. Options for
governments to consider include not concluding IIAs, narrowing the substantive obligations by, for example, excluding
restrictions on performance requirements, and including
exceptions for particular sectors, activities, or policy goals.

Governments need to ensure policy coherence when signing
investment treaties. For governments wishing to have the
broadest set of tools possible to foster linkages, it is important to ensure that these treaties do not prohibit the adoption of measures desired by the state. This is particularly the
case in light of both the growing number of IIAs going well
beyond WTO agreements in terms of the types of domestic
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3.2
3.2.1

Changing production processes

Developing countries stay excluded from global value chains
if they fail to provide the specialized inputs increasingly
demanded by EI companies. This increased specialization
can increase barriers to entry for “less efficient and specialized countries” (Hansen 2014) and diminishes the scope for
upstream linkages.

Fragmentation of the global value chain

“The growing importance of global value chains in the production process is today at the heart of the world’s economic system”
(Ramdoo, 2013). Production processes are increasingly
fragmented as the organization of global value chains leads
countries to be more and more specialized in specific tasks
and business activities (rather than in specific goods and
services) (Ramdoo, 2013).75

Some analysis of GVCs has shown that the extent and depth
of countries’ participation in GVCs is positively correlated
with income, growth, and development, but GVC participation has been happening differently from one country to
another. For roughly 65% of countries, their increased participation in GVCs over the past 20 years has led to a reduction in the share of domestic value-added in their exports.
However, thanks to their increased participation in GVCs,
countries’ export growth significantly overcompensated the
decline in the share of domestic value-added in exports, causing greater participation in GVCs to overall increase GDP.
Another 15% of countries (mostly in East Asia) increased the
share of domestic value-added in their exports, often after
initially experiencing rapid surges in GVC participation,
mostly by upgrading within and across GVCs. Nevertheless,
the remaining 20% of countries have neither seen improvements in GVC participation nor in the share of domestic
value added in their exports, with the former occurring either
because their participation first increased and then dropped
below the starting point or because it stayed at a low level
or dropped (UNCTAD 2013, p. 171). Figure 3.2 illustrates
those different paths of GVC upgrading.

The EI sector is a latecomer to adopting these fragmented
production processes. However, the past decade has seen a
transformation of the mining sector with a combination of
heightened commodity price volatility and increased competition from emerging market players, driving the necessity
to lower costs and focus on core activities. In the 1990s, the
downturn in oil prices had also led to a similar restructuration of the oil and gas industry. Global EI companies have
now put in place leaner supply chain management, which
implies the outsourcing of non-core activities to low-cost
suppliers subject to high and demanding standards. While
the number of these suppliers decreased within the last years,
the remaining ones hence grew in size. (Ramdoo, 2015)
Furthermore, higher value added functions concentrate
in the global centres situated at the technological frontier,
whereas lower value added activities are performed in countries with inexpensive low skill labour. Thus, if EI multinationals outsource more non-core competencies to suppliers in
Africa (Morris et al., 2012), they tend to do so for low value
added functions.

For most resource-rich developing countries, GVC participation “stems from upstream participation, presumably from
exports of natural resources and raw materials.” (Bruhn 2015).
However, “low growth in downstream participation” (Bruhn
2015) is avoidable, as the examples of Thailand, Malaysia
and the Philippines show in the figure above.

Due to the fragmented production processes, EI companies
are in a stronger position to 1) decide which functions will
be located in which countries, 2) set the standards to be met
by supplier companies in order to stay in the value chain,
and 3) manage suppliers that meet the standards. Some
developing countries will benefit from this pattern and others will not: the former will get assistance from companies to
upgrade their capabilities and participate in the global value
chain, while the latter that do not meet the requirements to
receive this assistance will remain excluded (UNECA, 2013).

Greater and deeper integration in the GVCs could start at the
regional level as regional integration leads to higher integration in GVCs. Countries within the East African Community,76 the most integrated trade block in Africa, have a higher
participation in GVCs than their neighbouring countries
and other regional economic communities on the continent
(Ramdoo, 2015). It is also consistent with the finding highlighted in Chapter 2 that regional integration helps expand
the impact of linkage policies and makes market-driven linkages more viable (see recommendation G9).

75 According to WEF (2012), intermediate inputs constitute more than half of
imports in OECD countries and nearly 75% of imports in countries like China and
Brazil.

76 The EAC’s member countries include Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan,
Tanzania, and Uganda.
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Figure 3.2: GVC Development Path by Country
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In turn, spatial linkages from the EI sector can be a catalyst
for regional integration (Toledano, 2015; World Bank, 2015)
if the EI project and export point are located in different
countries. EI companies are powerful and influential players
with profit maximization objectives that will favor the most
direct route to export their commodities in order to minimize capital and operational expenditures. The most direct
route may require crossing borders. EI companies will insist
on competitive transport pricing and timely delivery, which
will require neighboring countries to cooperate and agree on
cross-border arrangements. Improvements for the EI project
are also likely to improve cross-border hard and soft infrastructure for other sectors. Such resource corridor collaboration can catalyze further regional integration.
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As Milanovic alludes to, GVCs can also worsen the conditions of workers and suppliers, and increase inequality
between and within countries. To mitigate those risks, EI
companies should at the very least conduct human rights due
diligence to “identify, address and mitigate adverse human
rights impacts” with which they may be implicated – either directly or indirectly through their transactions with
contractors and suppliers (Shift, 2012). In the context of
GVCs, doing so may not be feasible, especially as there may
be hundreds, if not thousands of supply chain relationships
that an EI company would need to investigate. Therefore, EI
companies often need to prioritize those upstream business
relationships for which it is most critical to conduct human
rights due diligence. EI Companies can address this very
briefly by mapping out their supply chains, focusing on business relations in their supply chains above a certain threshold, obtaining these relations’ buy-in in the mapping process,
and then working with those entities to address and mitigate
human rights grievances (Shift, 2012).

The malign side of GVCs
“Globalization thus has two faces: a benign side accelerating the
participation of developing countries into the world economy
with positive impacts on industrialization and income levels,
and a malign side increasing inequality and leading to major
stress on workers and the environment.“ (Milanovic, 2003)

3.2.2 Automation
There is an increasing trend in the EI sector to move towards
automation. This will increase productivity and improve
the health and safety record of the industry, but, at the same
time, it will further reduce the number of people employed
in the sector and alter procurement requirements.

77 From World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and 
Trade for Development by UNCTAD, © 2013. United Nations. Reprinted with the
permission of the United Nations.
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Recent decades have seen substantial process innovation
in the EI sector (such as larger, more durable and efficient
shovels, haul trucks, crushers, grinding mills, flotation cells,
and better chemistry to improve processing recoveries). In
the nearby future, the EI industry will likely experience an

unprecedented transformation with regard to automation’s
scale and distribution, especially during the next decade (see
figure below). Australia is today at the forefront of this evolution (see Box 3-2).

Box 3 2: Automation is already happening

Beyond Australia, Sandvik, a mining supplier of equipment, has introduced an automated loading and hauling
system for underground hard rock mining, called Sandvik
Automine. It is currently in use at a Codelco Mine in
Chile (since June 2004), a mine in Finland (since January
2005), a mine in South Africa (since August 2005) and a
mine in Canada (June 2007). Atlas CopCo, another mining
supplier of equipment, has also tested remote haulage
zones with two fully automated trucks at Nordana’s
Brunwick Ore Mine in Quebec, Canada (Horberry, 2012).

Rio Tinto’s Pilbara mine in West Australia is the epitome of the mine of the future. In April 2013, Rio Tinto
announced that the project had moved more than 100
million tons of earth since automating their trucks fabricated by Komatsu Ltd.78 Rio Tinto has also designed a
fully automated train network for its mine. The project
is estimated to cost $518M USD and will be the world’s
first automated long-distance heavy-haul rail operation.79
Similarly, BHP Billiton has been working with Caterpillar
since 2007 to produce autonomous driver technology at
its Australian mines.80

Figure 3.3: The shifting nature of value chain integration
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Source: Peterson et al. (2001), New Forces at Work in Mining: Industry Views of Critical Technologies
78 http://www.riotinto.com/media/media-releases-237_8441.aspx
79 Rio Tinto pushes ahead with driverless trains in Pilbara, Sydney Morning Herald, March 10, 2015 http://www.smh.com.au/business/mining-and-resources/rio-tinto-pushesahead-with-driverless-trains-in-pilbara-20150309-13z28v.html
80 Top Driverless Trucks in the Mining Industry Today Plus Future Concepts, Mining Global http://www.miningglobal.com/machinery/947/Top-Driverless-Trucks-in-the-MiningIndustry-Today
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Automation will probably decrease the number of low to
semi-skilled operational jobs (drilling, blasting, train and
truck driving) and create new jobs in the development,
observation, servicing and maintenance of autonomous and
remotely controlled equipment. Other traditional jobs such
as site rehabilitation, road building and other site works are
likely to remain.

Figure 3.4 shows the employment impact of the diffusion of
different technologies by plotting the estimated duration of
a technology’s diffusion (x-axis) against the number of displaced employees at a representative high-production mining
site (y-axis).

Figure 3.4: Employment impact of different technologies implemented over time
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Caption:
1.	 Autonomous Haul Trucks and Loaders
2.	 Autonomous Long Distance Haul-Trains
3.	 Tele-remote Ship-Loaders
4.	 Semi-autonomous Crushers/Shovel Swings/Rock Breakers
5.	 Automated Drilling Systems
6.	 Automated Dragline/Long-wall Plough and Shearers/Earth Moving Systems
7.	 Geographic Information Systems and GPS
8.	 Autonomous Equipment Monitoring
9.	 Programmable Logic Controllers
10.	Control Systems

77

CONSTRAINTS ON LINKAGE POLICIES

Along with automation’s impact on direct employment,
which in turn will have an impact on consumption linkages,
procurement will also be affected. Given that in-pit mine
staff is likely going to decrease, the demand for catering,
protective gear, and other goods and services used by in-pit
mining staff will also decrease. These items are often the
“low hanging fruits” which can be sourced locally even in
countries with a less developed supplier base, as they do not
require high-skilled inputs. Other upstream services such as
mining and drilling, transport and logistics, analysis and testing will likely require higher technological content. This in
turn will increase the barriers to entry for suppliers and will
require government efforts to build NSIs to help suppliers
adapt to these new technologies.

3.2.3

Lessons Learned

Globalisation and automation restrict the tools available to
governments for the promotion of linkages between foreign
investors and the domestic economy.
Host governments have limited control over globalisation
and automation of the EI sector, two processes run by
market forces. Resource-rich countries that do not adopt a
forward-looking policy centred on education, skills training,
and technology development incur the risk of being excluded
from global value chains and suffering from drastic job losses
in an automated world. This also speaks to the need for governments to improve their “capacity to embrace policy shifts”
(Ramdoo, 2015) as the economic situation of their countries
evolves in response to globalization. To develop linkages,
governments need to adopt forward-looking policies in line
with changing circumstances.
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4

RECOMMENDATIONS
BY STAKEHOLDER
tion addresses most directly is listed in brackets.81 The figure
below summarizes the recommendations to stakeholders by
linkage type.

This section provides recommendations on how EI
companies (“E”), governments (“G”) and development
cooperation (“D”) can contribute to the creation of linkages
to the EI sector. The linkage type that each recommenda-

Figure 4.1: Relevant recommendations by linkage type and stakeholder

UPSTREAM

-- EI Companies: 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10
-- Governments: 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10
-- Int. development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10

DOWNSTREAM

-- EI Companies: 2,5
-- Governments: 1,2,4,8,9,10
-- Int. development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,8,10

HORIZONTAL

-- EI Companies: 7,8
-- Governments: 1,2,4,5
-- Int. development cooperation: 1,2,4,7,8,10

KNOWLEDGE

-- EI Companies: 1,2,3,4,7,8
-- Governments: 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10
-- Int. development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10

SPATIAL

-- EI Companies: 1,2
-- Governments: 1,2,7,8,9
-- Int. development cooperation: 1,2,3,5,10

CONSUMPTION

-- EI Companies: 1,2
-- Governments: 1,2,8
-- Int. development cooperation: 1,2,3,4,10

Source: Authors

81 It is difficult to draw a line as to when a linkage type is directly or only indirectly affected by a recommendation. Efforts were made to be consistent in this
somewhat subjective selection process.
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4.1

Extractive industry companies

expenditure can be reduced significantly through economies
of scale if infrastructure investments in power plants and
transmission lines, water facilities, railways, pipelines, and
ports are shared among EI companies. Standardizing policies,
such as the prequalification criteria for suppliers, can reduce
the tendering costs of SMEs. EI activities may be coordinated through the respective chamber of mines or chamber
of oil & gas. The creation of such chambers or alternative
coordination mechanisms should be considered, if they do
not already exist.
[Upstream, knowledge and technology, spatial linkages]

Recommendation E1
Instil the importance of linkage creation in the corporate
identity to ensure a common understanding and goal of
the employees within an EI company to be embedded in
the countries of operation. A corporate vision and a team
championing linkages can support this. More importantly,
though, such considerations should be taken into account by
operational departments. Therefore, in-house trainings on
linkage opportunities should be given throughout the company at various management levels and in-country offices.
These trainings should explain what the EI company’s responsibility to respect human rights means in the context of
linkages and GVCs. An early social impact assessment prior
to the start of operations, bringing up baseline information
on local economic conditions, would help embed the need
for linkages in the corporate mindset while also accommodating the planning needs related to the development of consumption linkages in particular. A cross-departmental linkage
committee integrating the key business functions could be
created to achieve a buy-in across the whole company.82
[Upstream, knowledge and technology, spatial, consumption
linkages]

Recommendation E4
Manage expectations regarding the impact of linkages on the
domestic economy to avoid disappointments on the side of
the government or at the national, local, and community levels. This is especially important in countries and regions not
experienced in resource extraction, since the industry is not
yet well understood and the domestic skills needed to create
linkages do not exist. Rather than providing total procurement opportunities or employment figures, companies should
provide a breakdown of the number of national, provincial
and local opportunities along the project life phases. Public
awareness campaigns explaining how the sector works and
what impacts the project may have on the day-to-day life of
citizens, including those not directly or indirectly employed
by EI companies, should also be rolled out. Communication
strategies should also help manage suppliers’ expectations in
order to avoid overcapacity without outlet.83
[Upstream, knowledge and technology linkages]

Recommendation E2
Liaise with relevant government agencies prior to making
investment decisions to understand the priorities and assess opportunities for linkage creation. Within the government, the agencies responsible for education, industry, and
infrastructure are of strategic importance. Existing national
development strategies should be reviewed and companies’
actions should be adapted to fit them. Utility providers (water, power and telecommunications) should also be consulted
to explore potential synergies with EI–related infrastructure.
While not related to the core business of EI companies,
support for agriculture programmes as in Mozambique can
be critical to save companies’ social license to operate and in
turn facilitate the creation of consumption linkages.
[Upstream, downstream, spatial, knowledge and technology,
consumption, linkages]

Recommendation E5
Provide governments with pre-feasibility studies on downstream processing projects to assess whether such projects are
economically feasible. Vertically integrated EI companies,
such as Shell in the petroleum sector and ArcelorMittal in
the iron and steel sector can explore the possibilities to setup
downstream industries themselves. Non-vertically integrated
companies can assist the government in preparing pre-feasibility studies and reach out to the businesses specialized in
downstream processing that will assess whether the investment is commercially feasible.84
[Downstream linkages]

Recommendation E3
Coordinate among EI companies before making investment decisions in order to explore synergies and opportunities for linkage creation. EI companies operating and
desiring to operate in the region should be contacted. Capital

83 In Madagascar such overcapacity occurred, as the mining company supported
farmers, set up a training center, and enhanced their productivity, but the company
ended up not being able to buy all of the farmers’ produce (Interview with GIZ
South Africa, August 2015).
84 In 2005 Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (today Vale) provided the Government of
Mozambique with pre-feasibility studies for seven satellite projects that could
be linked to the coal mining project (cement plant, coking coal plant, aluminium
smelter, bio-fuel project, steel mill, ferro-alloy plant and charcoal project) the
company was developing at the time. The Ministry of Industry and Trade then
provided these studies to interested investors.

82 GIZ, Policy Note: Maximizing Local Content in Madagascar’s Mining Sector,
Lessons learned from Madagascar and abroad, September 2014
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Recommendation E6

Recommendation E9

Prepare long-term procurement plans during the feasibility study of the project so that potential suppliers have
sufficient time to prepare for tenders and support can be provided to satisfy the standards required by EI companies. This
will require a needs assessment that defines the companies’
demand for labour, capital goods, consumables, and services.
A gap analysis, which assesses what is needed to increase
local procurement in the medium- and long-term, should accompany this process. The figures in Annex 1 illustrate how
opportunities can be assessed and how the procurement plan
will need to reflect the various stages of the mining life cycle.
[Upstream linkages]

Adapt tenders to local realities, have woman employment
as a bidding criterion, update local procurement plans,
and impose local content requirements on international
sub-contractors to ensure that domestic gender balanced
procurement opportunities can be maximized. This may
require using different communication channels such as local
newspapers, online portals, radio announcements, events
at the national and regional level, and announcements at
town halls. It may also involve unbundling large tenders that
require different levels of expertise. Furthermore, local procurement plans will need to be updated on a regular basis to
reflect changing project needs and local market conditions.
In addition, when the company outsources a lot of its operations to international subcontractors, the company could
require or reward local content commitments of subcontractors when awarding tenders in order to foster linkages further
up the value chain. In order to prevent adverse human rights
impact in their business relationships, companies should
communicate their human rights policy to their business
partners and carry out human rights due diligence. Finally, to
encourage woman participation in the supply chain, woman
employment can be a criterion in bid for suppliers.
[Upstream linkages]

Recommendation E7
Support vocational training for both men and women to
train them to become future employees and service providers
of the EI companies, and to develop skills applicable in other
sectors of the economy. In order to create a curricula tailored
to the EI sector’s needs, companies need to help identify the
level of technological know-how required for the production
of various capital goods, consumer goods, and services over
the lifetime of the project. This should be part of an early
assessment, which feeds into the procurement plan. During
operations, training to suppliers should focus on increasing
the quality standards required for technically more advanced
tenders. Transferrable skills required by both the EI and
other sectors in the economy include management skills (accounting, business planning, budgeting procedures, international standard requirements, etc.) and mechanical skills such
as welding. Such skills will also be valuable to employees and
suppliers once they no longer work for EI companies. To address women unemployment, specific training modules need
to be designed to specifically address woman entrepreneurship needs.
[Upstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology linkages]

Recommendation E10
Provide financial assurances and support to local suppliers in order to help SMEs grow to a size at which access to
finance is less problematic. This may be done by engaging
with banks and sharing information about the project and
supplier to reduce the perceived risk and thereby borrowing rates. Funds can be created that provide direct financing
for domestic suppliers at beneficial rates. Forward purchasing agreements and advance instalments at the time of
awarding the bid may help smaller enterprises, which do
not have sufficient capital to purchase the required inputs,
thereby lowering borrowing and production costs. Finally,
equity partnerships with domestic suppliers may provide
the required capital and reduce the risk perceived by banks,
thereby lowering borrowing costs.
[Upstream linkages]

Recommendation E8
Create joint research projects with universities, like in Brazil and Norway, with the aim to specialize and improve the
technology suited for the geology in the host country. Apart
from potentially creating an environment that may lead to
technological innovation, which in turn may reduce costs
to EI companies, such projects have the potential to create
knowledge spillovers and enhance the comparative advantage
of the country.
[Upstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology linkages]

81

RECOMMENDATIONS BY STAKEHOLDER

4.2

Governments
The industrial diversification policy should be supported
by the corresponding allocation of government resources
as well as incentives and sanctions for the private sector in
order to make it effective.87 GIZ-UNIDO’s EQuIP toolbox88
can be used as a guide for this purpose. Economic zones
with specialized infrastructure as well as targeted vocational
training aimed at the identified sectors and linkages can
support the strategy. The formation of clusters with industries that have synergies with the EI should be encouraged to
increase the possibility of horizontal linkages. Support needs
to be provided at the local government level to implement
the strategy. Monitoring and evaluating the impact of these
policies is key to determine when they should be adapted or
abandoned.
[All linkages]

Recommendation G1
Prepare a long-term development strategy in order to guide
policy coherence and achieve development goals and targets.
In resource-rich countries, the EI sector should play an important role in economic development (see recommendation
G3). Clear policies, laws and regulations should guide
sustainable investments.85 Import exemptions, for example,
should be reviewed as they can be a roadblock if ill-designed,
as in the case of Nigeria. Coordination among government
agencies is crucial to implement such a strategy, given that
linkage creation is a multi-disciplinary endeavour.
[All linkages]

Recommendation G2
Develop an industrial/diversification policy, which sets out
how the country aims to develop economically. An important aspect of this policy should be improving the business
environment by, for example, cutting red tape. The policy
should also target sectors based on the competitive advantages the country has to offer, the objectives that the country
wants to achieve (see recommendation G1), and the expected
future developments in terms of demand and technological progress. The linkages to the EI sector should be part
of the assessment needed to develop an industrial strategy
in resource-rich countries.86 Downstream linkages, however, should be analysed with care, given that the location
advantage does not seem to be a major factor determining
comparative advantage. The assessment should also take into
account the future role that the country can hope to play in
the global value chain and which impact the automation of
processes in the extractive industry will have. The forecasted
domestic demand (consumption linkages) resulting from
increased economic activity in the zones where EI companies
are or will be operating should also feature in the assessment.
Special focus should be placed on sectors where domestic
demand is going to increase most rapidly and where the
location advantage is large; in countries with a low GDP
per capita, these include mainly the agriculture and construction sectors.

Recommendation G3
Develop a local content policy to provide EI companies
with a framework in which to operate in. Focus should be
placed on local value added rather than local ownership as
Nigeria and Mexico have done.89 The policy should be developed in close coordination with the EI sector, for example
through public-private dialogues, to set the right targets.90
The targets should be updated on a regular basis to reflect
the development of the country and the resource sector.
To ensure that the company complies with its local content commitments the government should set detailed and
regular reporting requirements and define a clear process for
approval.91 The local content policy should however consider
that the realization of upstream linkages anchored on these
local content targets is a shared responsibility between the
public and private sector. Thus, the government should identify what investments are necessary to complement, facilitate,
and maximize the private sector’s intervention. The local
content policy should also be forward looking and take into
account the technological changes that the EI is undergoing.
[Upstream, knowledge and technology linkages]

85 Experience shows that the lack of coherence and clarity is the biggest
roadblock to linkage creation (Interview with GIZ, South Africa, August 2015).
86 However, especially the downstream sector should not be treated significantly
differently from other sectors in the economy; given that the location advantage
of the resources does not seem to be a key determinant of countries’ ability to
move downstream competitively, cost-benefit analyses are needed. The government should be aware that the use of prescriptive methods aimed at fostering
downstream integration may adversely affect the EI sector and reduce associated
revenues in the short term (Interview with EI advisor, August 2015).
87 Positive incentives, for example tax deductibility for training expenses, are
thought to be more effective than sanctions (GIZ, Policy Note: Maximizing Local
Content in Madagascar’s Mining Sector, Lessons learned from Madagascar and
abroad, September 2014).
88 www.equip-project.org

89 Local ownership can lead to the creation of trading companies, which do not
create many employment opportunities or knowledge and technological spillovers
since they often import the goods and services demanded by the EI sector instead
of producing them locally.
90 If the targets are too low, there is a missed opportunity for the domestic
economy. If they are too ambitious, extractive companies will not accomplish them
and rather pay penalties in place where they are in place.
91 CCSI offers a series of local content legal and policy profiles, which highlight
sectors’ reporting requirements (see: http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/localcontent-laws-contractual-provisions/).
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Recommendation G4

diligence analysis on each local company’s structure, management processes and technical and financial qualifications.93
Financial support should be provided to SMEs as in Australia. Special attention should be paid to those SMEs that are
not yet sufficiently qualified to win tenders of EI companies
and therefore do not benefit from supplier programmes.
Feedback from unsuccessful bids is crucial to improve
performance and the government should liaise with the EI
company in order to provide this feedback. In many countries, there is also a large geographical disparity in terms of
expertise of SMEs. Governments can incentivize business association between SMEs located in the capital city and SMEs
in rural areas, where EI projects are often located, in order to
promote “local local content”.94 Furthermore, governments
should leverage companies’ and development partners’ help
to ensure women’s organizations receive support in the form
of trainings on business skills. Helping these organizations’
capacity to support each other can lead to further empowerment and female entrepreneurship.
[Upstream, knowledge and technology linkages]

Strengthen the absorptive capacity of the local population. The lack of human capital in resource-rich countries is
one of the key constraints to the creation of linkages to the
EI sector. This issue affects all levels of education, including
primary education. Governments and companies can only
provide specialized trainings where there is a good educational base to build upon. Governments should also encourage
vocational training by co-investing into relevant programmes
and ensure that training curricula serve the needs of the EI
and other sectors, as was done in South Africa. This issue
especially affects women and girls, which is why their specific
needs should be taken into account in the design of such
programmes.
[Upstream, downstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology
linkages]

Recommendation G5
Promote higher education and R&D programmes and
include such components with clear targets and monitoring
mechanisms in the local content policy (see recommendation
G3) in order to increase the productivity of the country
through higher skills and expertise. This will require a
technological gap assessment measuring the existing technological know-how, what is required, and how new technological expertise can be developed. Intellectual property
rights should be adapted to the existing level of technological
know-how. Targets for EI companies could include a dollar
value that the company needs to pay into an R&D fund as
in Brazil92 and/or a number of scholarships that the EI will
fund. Governments should also contribute financially to
these R&D programmes on a matching grant basis – especially in countries where labour turnover is likely to be high
and therefore incentives for the EI to provide higher education low. R&D programmes looking to create horizontal
linkages are unlikely to be financed by EI companies. Therefore, governments should place a special focus on them.
[Upstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology linkages]

Recommendation G7
Create the legal framework to allow for shared-use infrastructure access and include existing and planned EI
investments in the infrastructure planning process in order
to ensure that the economies of scale and scope of private
sector infrastructure investments foster the development of
infrastructure linkages. However, sharing infrastructure can
come at a cost to both the EI company and the country (in
the form of lower tax receipts). Therefore, project-specific
cost-benefit analyses are required rather than a blanket shareduse rule. There should however be a clear legal framework
allowing the government to intervene into infrastructure
projects if the intervention’s benefits exceed its costs. For
infrastructure investments covering long tracks of land (such
as pipelines, transport, power infrastructure), governments
should also always keep the ‘right of way’ in order to facilitate
the construction of additional infrastructures at a lower cost
as is done in Brazil. When trunk infrastructure is shared, the
government will need to develop feeder infrastructure in order
for surrounding regions to benefit from access. A regulatory
entity responsible for arbitrating disputes is also necessary.95
[Spatial linkages]

Recommendation G6
Create SME support mechanisms to help the EI sector
meet its local content targets (see recommendation G3) and
support women’s economic participation. A local content
policy will only be successful if the government also commits funds and resources to its achievement. The government
should create enterprise maps that include all available goods
and service providers in the country, as well as a brief due

93 Positive experiences have been reported by programmes in Ethiopia, Ghana
andTanzania, which were supported by the International Growth Centre (http://
www.theigc.org). The enterprise maps contain sector profiles, detailed supply
chains, and in-depth information on major companies within each sector and on
their sources of inputs. This information should be useful to both governments
identifying potential areas for the promotion of upstream linkages and to potential
suppliers (Africa Development Bank et al., 2013).
94 Interview with GIZ South Africa, August 2015.
95 For more specific recommendations, see: CCSI: “A Framework to Approach
Shared-Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure” (March 2014), available at: http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/05/A-Framework-for-Shared-use_March-2014.pdf

92 In Brazil such a fund finances the National Petroleum Agency for Human
Resources Programme, which includes higher level training for petroleum specific
disciplines into the curriculum of research institutions and grants scholarships for
studies in this area (UNCTAD, 2012).
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Recommendation G8

Recommendation G10

Cooperate and coordinate with the EI sector when
developing linkage plans to ensure that these are realistic and
manageable. The EI companies are best placed to provide
needs assessments and inputs regarding targets and timelines
based on their experience in other countries. In particular,
governments should require EI companies to carry out social
impact assessments as a condition for obtaining a mining
licence in order to ensure that EI companies collect baseline
information on local economic conditions, which can then
be used to properly assess and plan the creation of consumption linkages. If a state-owned company manages a country’s
extractive sector, consider partnering with EI companies in
order to maximize knowledge and technology spillovers. The
cooperation agreement should point out how this may be
achieved.
[Upstream, downstream, spatial, knowledge and technology
linkages, consumption linkages]

Ensure that international commitments in new trade and
investment agreements leave governments space to use
policy tools that can help to create linkages. Many governments are already subject to WTO rules that restrict measures favouring the use of local goods. Governments should
review their existing commitments to avoid being taken to
court. Furthermore, new trade and investment agreements
increasingly go beyond WTO restrictions and impose additional restraints on what measures may be taken to support
local service providers, build up domestic capacity, and
require domestic research and technology transfer.
[Upstream, downstream, knowledge and technology linkages]

Recommendation G9

Recommendation D1

Consider regional markets when assessing the opportunities for linkages to benefit from regional cooperation, as
larger markets are often necessary for the viability of linkages.
Larger pools of resources make ‘regional content’ more attractive to investors,96 especially when a significant operating
scale is required for procured goods (such as chemicals and
plastics). Regional procurement could count towards local
content.97 To support such policies, regional bodies could
create regional supplier lists, help standardize the definition
of local content and set standards.98 High-capacity downstream projects, such as smelters, are more likely to be viable
if viewed from a regional rather than national perspective.99
Specialized regional training centres can also reduce costs
for participating countries. Spatial infrastructure solutions
should be considered at the regional level. Given that ore
deposits cross national boundaries, there are opportunities
for economies of scale in infrastructure investments.
[Upstream, downstream, spatial, knowledge and technology
linkages]

Support the government in addressing the institutional
failures constraining linkage creation. These failures result
from a lack of coordination both between the relevant ministries and government agencies and EI companies as well
among the government bodies themselves.100 Policy cohesion
and coordinated actions in support of linkage creation are
crucial in order to be successful. Development partners’ experience with inter-ministerial coordination could be beneficial
here. Furthermore, specific linkages would benefit from key
institutions that are often missing. For instance, a strong
independent regulatory authority making impartial decisions is required for the creation of spatial linkages. For the
creation of upstream linkages, a dedicated agency in charge
of planning for and implementing local content requirements is often seen as being effective. International development cooperation can play a key role in supporting the setup
of such entities. Herein, German Development Cooperation
may benefit from being widely perceived as a neutral agent
and honest broker between governments and EI companies.
[All linkages]

4.3

International Development 	
Cooperation

Recommendation D2
Align policy advice and coordinate development a ssistance
in order to provide coherent and consistent support to
resource-rich countries. As with governments (see recommendations G1, D1), it is crucial for development partners

96 Interview with corporate expert, August 2015.
97 Interview with advisor, August 2015.
98 Interview with corporate expert, August 2015.
99 There is only demand for a limited number of smelters and refineries on the
African continent, for example. It is therefore unrealistic for each country having
oil or mineral reserves to build refineries and smelters. Of course, it is politically
difficult to decide where a refinery should be built.

100 Morris, Kaplinsky, and Kaplan (2011) believe that the lack of coordination and
misalignment within agencies and between the public and private stakeholders
has been the key obstacle to creating linkages in Africa.
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Recommendation D4

to develop a strategy determining which policies will be
supported. Without an internal alignment, conflicting policy
advice may be given. For example, as highlighted in section
2.5 and Chapter 3, advice on intellectual property rights
and trade and investment treaties can be in direct conflict
with advice given on local content or industrialisation policies. Advice on these topics is generally provided by different departments, which often have different views about
the optimal level of government intervention.101 It is also
important to liaise with other development partners advising in a particular resource-rich developing country to avoid
duplication of efforts or conflicting programmes. Germany
has a number of agencies that invest in, provide financial
resources to, and advice to resource-rich countries on issues
closely related to linkage creation.102 Coordination among
these stakeholders is key to maximize the benefits of German
Development Cooperation in creating linkages to the extractive sector.
[All linkages]

Help develop industrial policies, given that the laissez-faire
approach has not worked in creating linkages to the extractive sector. Industrial policy support is still very uncommon
among international development cooperation (there are
exceptions, as shown by the EQuIP Toolbox103, which aims
to support governments to develop evidence-based structural
industrial policies). This is largely because the role of development partners in the 1980s and 1990s was often limited
to privatizing state-owned EI and liberalizing investment
and trade regimes to allow FDI to flow freely. Attracting
investment was seen as an end rather than a means to an end,
which should be sustainable economic development. This
has led to a very suboptimal exploitation of linkage potential
in the past.104 Apart from focusing on general policy advice
that may foster linkage creation such as the improvement of
the business environment, international development cooperation should help countries assess what sectors may have a
comparative advantage and what type of linkages to existing
FDI projects could be developed. The analysis should include how national and local demand (in particular for local
produce) will develop due to the economic activity related
to the EI sector (as also discussed in recommendation G2)
and, consequently, how development partners’ intervention
in support of small-scale agriculture would help maximize
consumption linkages.
[Upstream, downstream, horizontal, consumption, knowledge
and technology linkages]

Recommendation D3
Provide project and infrastructure financing in order to
make EI projects located in developing countries financially
viable if they are too risky for commercial banks to invest
initially. Apart from making financial support conditional on
high social and environmental standards, financial development institutions should also review and support any
associated investments that help to create linkages. Especially
capital-intensive investments in infrastructure solutions and
opportunities for spatial linkages should be assessed in detail.
Apart from the trunk infrastructure, financial development
institutions can also support the feeder infrastructure (see
recommendations G7). In both of these areas, Germany can
draw on the financing experience of the KfW banking group.
[Upstream, downstream, consumption, spatial, knowledge and
technology linkages]

Recommendation D5
Assess which private sector actors would benefit most
from support initiatives in order to maximize the impact of
development assistance. While the largest oil, gas and mining
companies have the largest EI projects in their portfolio,
which in turn may create large opportunities for linkages in
absolute terms, these companies are also the most advanced
in thinking about linkages and can draw on experiences
from other projects. Mid-tier companies, however, may not
possess the internal knowledge on how to create linkages, so
the impact of supporting these companies may be larger. By
working through the national chambers of mines or of oil
and gas, international development cooperation may reach
a larger group, which is likely to be composed of companies
from all tiers and could help to coordinate EI companies’

101 By the very nature of their training and experience, trade economists, for
example, will be more likely to support policies geared towards less government
intervention.
102 These agencies include the following: (i) GIZ, which (among else) provides
technical advice on good governance, private sector development, and trade policy;
(ii) the International Project and Export Finance Bank (KfW IPEX-bank), which
invests in the development of oil, gas, mining, and infrastructure projects; (iii) the
Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (KfW DEG), which supports
German companies with their foreign investments and provides financing for SMEs
in developing countries; (iv) the KfW Entwicklungsbank (KfW), which provides
financing for developing country governments to build up financial systems and
invest in energy and water infrastructure; (v) the Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR), which provides technical support to developing
countries on matters related to geology and extractive resources; and (vi) the
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), which provides advice on intellectual
property rights and helps companies in developing countries meet certification
standards for export purposes.

103 www.equip-project.org
104 Morrissey (2012) argues that “The fact that organizations such as the World
Bank (and donors more generally) did not advocate industrial policy diminished
the importance of such policy issues on the domestic agenda. For sub-Saharan
African countries, this is one of the reasons why they failed to develop the
domestic capacity to benefit from FDI.”
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Recommendation D7

action with regard to linkage creation across the industry,
thereby achieving economies of scale. Development partners
should also carefully assess which companies to support in
their supplier programmes. While international development
cooperation often prioritizes the promotion of SMEs, the
technology gap of these companies in developing countries
may be too large to create lasting upstream linkages. It may
therefore be worthwhile for development partners to concentrate on supporting those larger local firms able to create
lasting upstream linkages.
[Upstream, downstream, spatial, knowledge and technology
linkages]

Leverage the experience and expertise of private sector
development initiatives and vocational training programmes. While EI companies understand what is needed
to make their operations efficient and profitable, they are less
familiar with private sector development not directly related
to their operations. However, governments’ policy decisions on private sector development are often constrained by
political pressures, wherefore they might design unrealistic
local content targets (see recommendation G3). Development partners, although not necessarily focused on linkages
to the EI sector, do often have experience in private sector
development initiatives elsewhere. They are therefore well
placed to advise both governments and companies on how to
create linkages.107 The most critical factor in developing linkages in resource-rich countries is the lack of local industrial
capacity and expertise. Educational support and training is
another area in which international development cooperation
is heavily involved. Especially Germany is well known for
its dual education system and its vocational training programmes.
[Upstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology linkages]

Recommendation D6
Help local companies, in particular those owned by
women, access finance and meet the standards required
to service EI companies in order to increase local procurement opportunities. International development cooperation
can provide financing since many resource-rich developing
countries’ financial markets suffer from severely limited
access to credit and high interest rates. In some countries,
female entrepreneurs are excluded from this by limited access
to finance, as discussed in section 2.2. Development partners
should adapt their programmes to increase the financial
inclusion of women. Technical Cooperation can also support
local companies by linking them up with their peers in the
investors’ countries, which may lead to joint ventures and
knowledge transfer.105 More developed local companies’
access to foreign markets can be supported by helping them
to achieve certification standards and providing contacts to
mining subsidiaries in other jurisdictions, as was done in
Chile. Given the well-recognized “Mittelstand” companies in
Germany, German Development Cooperation is well placed
to provide support to small and medium sized companies.106
This is also a key component of German Technical and
Financial Cooperation.
[Upstream and knowledge and technology linkages]

Recommendation D8
Long-term support programmes are required in order to
create linkages given that it takes time to build and sustain these successfully.108 While aid might be subject to the
diplomatic and political cycles of donor countries, a cyclical
approach to linkages is unlikely to succeed.
[Upstream, downstream, horizontal, knowledge and technology
linkages]

Recommendation D9
Place cautious focus on artisanal mining, given that this
sector provides substantial employment opportunities109 and
therefore can be a driver in poverty reduction, but at the
same time has had devastating impacts on health and the
environment. Furthermore, EI company investments often
clash with local communities if a large-scale mine is to be

107 For instance, GIZ South Africa organized a workshop with the Chamber of
Mines in Madagascar to present government officials with international experiences on linkages and local content (Interview with GIZ South Africa, August 2015).
108 As highlighted by Buur et al (2013), “[t]he start-up and development of
industries linked to extractive industries is slow, takes time and requires funds as
well as the technical and institutional knowhow that some donors may be able to
provide”.
109 ASM is estimated to directly or indirectly employ over 100 million people
around the globe and to account for over one-sixth of the world’s non-fuel mineral
output (Communities and Small-Scale Mining, Working Together: How Large-Scale
Mining Can Engage with Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, (Washington, World
Bank IFC, January 2008), 5). In a 2013 report, the World Bank estimates that 13
million people in 30 countries work in micro and small artisanal mining (World
Bank (2013): Small-Scale Mining in: http://webworldbankorg).

105 This is also an approach in development at a leading oil company (Interview
with corporate expert, August 2015).
106 In this context, please note recommendation D5, which states that it may also
be worth to consider supporting larger national companies and not only SMEs.
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built in an area that was previously home to artisanal mining.
While artisanal mining is complex and politically very sensitive because these operations are largely occurring in the
informal sector, development partners could play an important role in trying to help formalize the sector and provide
trainings and tools that reduce its adverse impacts on health
and the environment.
[No immediate linkage]

Recommendation D10
Be aware of the political economy of resource-rich
developing countries before assisting governments and
promote good governance in order to both determine the
‘political will’ for broad-based linkage creation and avoid
clientelism and patronage. The EI sector is characterised by
large investment flows and rent-seeking behaviour. Furthermore, linkage creation is a long-term endeavour where results
are unlikely to be highly visible within one election cycle.
These attributes create incentives for the political elite to personally benefit from short-term upstream and downstream
contracts or infrastructure solutions that are sub-optimal
from an economic and regional perspective. Such decisions
may impede longer-term broad-based transfer of knowledge and technology as well as diversification and regional
integration. Thus, development partners face the difficult
challenge of designing their linkage support programmes in
a way that reflects good practices while fitting local contexts,
institutions, and politics. Trade-offs regarding good practices
may be required to get the political buy-in necessary for a
successful implementation of linkage creation programmes.
In jurisdictions where corruption is high and governance is
weak, it will be very difficult to create sustainable long-term
linkages that do not only benefit a selected few in the political elite. In such cases, international development cooperation may want to consider placing greater emphasis on the
development institutions and the promotion of transparency
on who owns the companies that benefit from EI contracts.
[All linkages]
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Annex 1 - Visualization of frameworks designed to expand
local procurement opportunities over the life of an EI project
Figure 6.1: Opportunities for upstream linkages along the mine life cycle
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Figure 6.2: Procurement opportunities along the oil and gas value chain
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Figure 6.3: Assessing available upstream linkage opportunities
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Figure 6.4: Adjusting local content policy throughout the mine cycle 110
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110 Two other phases could be added to this figure, namely, the expansion phase and the cost reduction phase. The former requires high quality and fast response suppliers,
while the latter requires cost effective suppliers. Those requirements will only be met through intensified partnerships with training organizations (GIZ, Policy Note: Maximizing Local Content in Madagascar’s Mining Sector, Lessons learned from Madagascar and abroad, September 2014).
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Annex 2 – World Trade Organization and Local Content –
Detailed information
When the WTO came into being in 1995, three new international agreements entered into force that set out certain
rules relevant for linkage policies. One is the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement);
the second is the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement); and the third is the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

1.

the domestic content requirements it had imposed on large
renewable energy projects and lowered the domestic content
requirements on small and “microFIT” renewable projects.114
The second category prohibits WTO Members from imposing certain trade-balancing and exchange-balancing measures
restricting imports and forbids them to restrict exports.
Measures restricting imports can be used to favour or require
the use of locally produced goods, while measures restricting
exports can be used to encourage or require the domestic
processing or beneficiation of raw materials.

TRIMs Agreement

Briefly, the TRIMs Agreement bars two main types of provisions: (1) those that favour the use of domestic over foreign
goods, i.e., measures inconsistent with Article III of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),111 or (2)
that impose certain quantitative restrictions on imports and
exports (i.e., measures inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT).112 Importantly, it only covers measures relating to
trade in goods, not trade in services.

In 2014, China was held to have breached its WTO obligation
not to restrict exports by imposing duties and quotas on the
export of various forms of rare earths, molybdenum, and
tungsten. China argued that its export restrictions were
imposed in order to conserve its exhaustible natural resources
and were necessary to reduce harmful environmental pollution
caused by mining. Consequently, China argued, those export
duties and quotas were covered by relevant exceptions under
the WTO, namely Articles XX(b) and XX(g) of the GATT,
which, respectively, safeguard measures “necessary for the
protection of human, animal, or plant life or health” and
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”

The first category of measures prevents countries from imposing measures that would, for example, require or incentivize companies (i.e., by providing tax breaks, subsidies, or
other advantages contingent upon the use of domestic goods)
to purchase or use locally manufactured equipment instead
of foreign-manufactured equipment.

The WTO panel agreed that mining of the raw materials had
in fact caused grave harm to the environment in China, and
that, in principle, such export duties or quotas on extraction of natural resources could be shielded by Article XX.
Nevertheless, the panel determined that neither exception
applied. The panel determined that under the terms upon
which China had become a party to the WTO, the Article
XX exceptions were not available to it. More relevant for the
purposes of linkage policies, the panel concluded that even
if the Article XX exceptions were available to China, they
would not have covered the measures imposed by China. According to the panel, China’s export duties and quotas were
not truly or adequately tailored to address those environmental, health, or conservation issues. Instead, at least some of
the evidence submitted in the dispute, including statements
by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology,
“seem[ed] to indicate that, contrary to China’s assertions, the
export duties at issue are designed and structured to promote
increased domestic production of high value-added downstream products that use the raw materials at issue in this
dispute as inputs”.115 Similarly, with respect to the quotas,

In 2013, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted rulings finding that Canada had breached its obligations
under the TRIMs Agreement by requiring renewable energy
projects’ participation in a sub-national “feed-in-tariff ” (FIT)
programme in order to achieve a certain amount of domestic content. Evidence submitted during the dispute showed
that the requirements adopted by the Canadian province of
Ontario could not be satisfied through expenditures on domestic labour and services alone, which would be permitted
under the TRIMs Agreement. Instead, meeting the domestic
content targets would also require the use of goods manufactured, formed, or assembled in Canada, which resulted in
the requirement being inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement and Article III of the GATT.113 In order to comply with
the DSB’s rulings and recommendations, Ontario dropped
111 These are measures violating Article III of the WTO’s General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). There are certain exceptions under which such measures
may be permitted, e.g., if they are either imposed in connection with government
procurement (GATT Art. III (8)) or covered by one of the GATT’s general exceptions
(GATT Art. XX).
112 These measures would violate Article X1:1 of the GATT.
113 Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Feed-In Tariff Programme,
paras. 7.155-7.166, WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R (December 19, 2012). The panel’s
finding was not challenged before the Appellate Body.

114 Communication from Canada, Canada – Renewable Energy/Feed-In Tariff
Programme, WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R (June 6, 2014).
115 Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.169, WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R,
WT/DS433/R (March 26, 2014).
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the panel stated that the allocations did not seem to relate to
the “abundance or scarcity of a given rare earth material,” but
instead “seem[ed] to focus on industrial policy concerns, including prior export performance and overall value of exports
from China”.116

resource - and incur the resultant environmental harm simply to supply the world market, when the rest of the
world refuses to do so? Why not limit the use of exhaustible natural resources to its home market, as the United
States has done with liquefied natural gas?

The key lesson of this decision is that restrictions on exports
of raw materials can be permitted in some cases. But when
such restraints are imposed in order to promote domestic
industrial policy, they are likely to conflict with WTO law
unless covered by a relevant exception for measures appropriated targeted at environmental or other policy aims protected
under WTO law. Evidence of an illegitimate industrial policy
aim may, as in China’s dispute on export bans on rare earths,
cause a panel to determine that the government’s measure was
in fact not aimed at a legitimate purpose. As some commentators have noted, however, motives are often mixed, and measures
aimed at developing and deepening linkages may be seen as
producing benefits needed to compensate for the costs of
mineral extraction.117 The case of China is described below.

For Chinese policymakers, a key factor in analysing the
cost-benefit equation at hand is whether the minerals are
used domestically or exported. Under both scenarios, the
costs are the same: upstream extraction and processing
generates negative environmental externalities. However,
the offsetting benefits differ greatly, at least in Chinese
eyes, depending on whether the mineral is subsequently
exported for use by a foreign manufacturer or kept for
domestic use.

Box 6.1: China’s rare earths dispute from the point of
view of Chinese policy-makers

When kept in China, the downstream Chinese manufacturer later remits taxes back to the Chinese government
on profits made from use of the mineral as an input.
Although such taxes are not designated for environmental
cleanup, they increase the central government’s fiscal
capabilities to cover remediation costs. The same is not
true of an overseas manufacturer who needs not remit
any share of its profits to the Chinese government.

Today, China bears a disproportionate share of the world’s
“dirty” mining. With only one-third of global reserves,
China supplies 97% of the world’s rare earths. The United
States, once the world’s leading producer, shut down all
production in 1998, following environmental outcry over a
radioactive spill into a California desert. The same story
is true of other raw materials such as fluorspar. Other
than Spain, no industrialized country mines fluorspar
because of the associated environmental hazards, even
though both the United States and France have an ample
base of reserves.

More importantly, the extracted minerals serve as key
inputs for several strategic industries, such as defence,
high tech, and pharmaceuticals. When kept in China, the
inputs presumably increase Chinese capabilities in these
sectors and generate positive spillover effects for the
rest of the economy (through supply chain linkages, innovation, jobs, etc.). For example, lanthanum extracted from
Chinese mines is a key input for Chinese manufacturing
of rechargeable car batteries. This, in turn, has sparked
the development of an electric car industry in China and
innovation in hybrid technologies.

As China has grown wealthier and its domestic manufacturing base has expanded, its policymakers ask: Why
should China aggressively mine an exhaustible natural

Put crudely, China’s view is that so long as the mineral
is consumed within its borders, the positive externalities
that emerge from domestic downstream use will more
than compensate for the negative externalities that result
from upstream extraction. Potentially environmentally
harmful acts are acceptable if they trigger greater downstream benefits that will more than cover the remediation
costs. However, once the mineral is exported, China fails
to capture any positive downstream externalities but is
left with the cost of upstream environmental harm. Export
restrictions, unlike overall production limits, allow China
to account for this difference (Wu and Salzman, 2014).

116 Id. para. 7.484.
117 Not all such measures will give rise to a formal dispute. In inter-state
discussions in the WTO’s Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures,
a number of countries such as the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia,
and the European Union have similarly raised questions regarding the measures
adopted by Indonesia to encourage the domestic processing of minerals, and
increase investment (by foreign and domestic companies) in local suppliers
of goods and services to the mining industry. These countries have questioned
whether the measures are consistent with the TRIMs Agreement, and have
asserted that the measures risk discouraging foreign investment in Indonesia.
Nevertheless, as of July 30th, 2015, they had not initiated any formal dispute
settlement proceedings to challenge Indonesia’s actions. See, e.g., Committee
on Trade-Related Investment Measures – Minutes of the Meeting Held on
October 8, 2014, paras. 17-43, G/TRIMS/M/37 (November 21, 2014).
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Notably, neither the TRIMs Agreement nor the GATT
prevents governments from giving subsidies or incentives to
domestic producers of goods, even if those subsidies or incentives may result in those domestic goods being more competitive than imported goods. Consequently, if a government
wishes to increase the EI sector’s use of products produced by
domestic manufacturers, while also abiding by its obligations
under the TRIMs, it should consider granting subsidies or
other assistance to domestic companies to help increase their
competitiveness as opposed to imposing requirements on
or incentivizing EI companies to purchase domestic goods.
Similarly, a government wishing to ensure compliance with
the TRIMs Agreement should seek to promote beneficiation
by granting subsidies to improve the competitiveness of its
relevant domestic industries and increase the attractiveness of
local beneficiation, as opposed to imposing quotas or other
restrictions on exports of raw materials.

case were certain collaborative agreements for R&D that the
US airplane manufacturer, Boeing, entered into with the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
Department of Defence (DoD). As the WTO panel described, those agreements constituted subsidies that were part
of “strategically-focused R&D programmes” undertaken by
the government “in collaboration with the U.S. industry to
provide competitive advantages to U.S. industry by funding
research into high risk, high pay-off research of the sort that
individual companies are unlikely to fund on their own”. 118
Because the R&D agreements were neither contingent
on the use of local goods, nor on exports, they were not
prohibited per se. Nevertheless, according to the panel, they
were inconsistent with the SCM Agreement due to their
adverse effects on the interests of other WTO Members.
More specifically, the panel stated that the government’s
R&D incentives aimed at and were effective in overcoming
the “large disincentives for private sector investment in long
term, high risk […] R&D (stemming from the inability of
individual companies to fully capture the benefits from the
research efforts)”.119 Those R&D incentives made a “genuine
and substantial contribution” to technological development
and innovation that, among other effects, enabled Boeing to
build better and cheaper products and to do so more quickly
than it would have without the subsidy. As a result, the panel
concluded, the agreements gave the US company a competitive advantage that caused “adverse effects”. 120

As noted below, however, depending on the design and/or the
effects of the subsidies, they might violate the SCM Agreement,
GATS, or the provisions of international investment treaties.

2.

SCM Agreement

While subsidies to domestic producers are allowed under the
TRIMs Agreement and the GATT (even though subsidies
to consumers contingent upon purchase of domestic as opposed to foreign goods are not), some subsidies to domestic
producers are restricted under the SCM Agreement. This
can limit the policy tools available to governments seeking
to increase the competitiveness of their domestic companies,
and build and strengthen linkages between those companies
and EI projects.

This case helps illustrate that policies that aim to use publicprivate collaboration to advance R&D and increase domestic
competitiveness can violate WTO rules and that the more
effective policies are from an industrial policy perspective the
more likely it is that they will be deemed inconsistent with
the SCM Agreement. Nevertheless, not all such measures
will result in a claim or a finding of liability as establishing “adverse effects” in WTO disputes, which necessitates
a complex, fact-specific analysis, and can be a difficult and
time-consuming element to establish. This, in turn, may
discourage governments from initiating formal claims before
WTO bodies to challenge subsidies that are not prohibited
(export-contingent and import-substitution subsidies). 121

More specifically, subsidies to domestic producers are prohibited under the SCM Agreement if the subsidies are contingent on (1) the use of domestic instead of imported goods or
(2) export performance.
If a measure does not fall within one of those two categories
of subsidies that are per se prohibited, it will only be barred
if there is proof that it causes “adverse effects” to other WTO
Member States. In brief, this requires proof that the industry
of another Member States has been harmed, or that their
benefits under the GATT have been impaired or nullified.

118 Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
para. 7.1764, WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011).
119 Ibid.
120 The panel’s findings were later upheld on appeal. Appellate Body Report,
United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 960-1012,
WT/DS353/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2012).
121 Under the SCM Agreement, governments that do not wish to initiate a case
before the WTO’s dispute resolution bodies may in certain cases pursue unilateral
actions, imposing “countervailing duties” on products produced by companies that
received the subsidy.

The panel and Appellate Body decisions in United States –
Large Civil Aircraft help illustrate the implications of these
rules for linkage policies. Some measures challenged in that
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3.

GATS

in their ability to adopt measures supporting domestic service
providers and encouraging EI companies to contract with
them if those measures result in the less favourable treatment
of foreign-based service providers.123

While the TRIMs Agreement and SCM Agreement deal
with measures relating to trade in goods, the GATS covers
measures relating to trade in services. The provisions most
relevant to linkage policies are its market access (Article XVI)
and national treatment (Article XVII) obligations.

- Market Access:
The article on market access (Article XVI) prevents members
from applying measures that fall into an exhaustive list of six
prohibited measures. These are measures that:

Importantly, the GATS is based on a “positive list” system.
This means that countries are only bound to those obligations if and to the extent they have agreed to be committed.
If they have not “scheduled” a sector, they can maintain or
adopt new measures relating to that sector that would otherwise be inconsistent with GATS provisions. Moreover, when
scheduling sectors, they can negotiate for exceptions limiting
the scope of the commitments they make.

(a) limit the number of service suppliers,
(b) limit the total value of service transactions or assets,
(c) limit the total number of service operations or quantity
of service output,
(d) limit the total number of natural persons permitted
to be employed,
(e) restrict or require certain types of legal entities, and
(f ) limit the participation of foreign capital.

When, however, a country schedules a sector and subjects it
to the national treatment and market access commitments,
and does not insist on any relevant exceptions, several important rules can apply that might prohibit the use of various
tools aimed at developing and deepening linkages.

For scheduled sectors without reservations, these rules can
allow the unrestricted entry of foreign investors into the
domestic market, which may crowd out domestic companies and cause them to go out of business. Moreover, Article
XVI(e) and (f ) can prohibit such measures as joint ventures
or domestic equity requirements, tools that governments
have used in the past to help promote technology transfer.

- National Treatment:
With respect to the national treatment obligation, which
prevents governments from treating foreign service suppliers
less favourably than domestic service suppliers, a government
might breach this obligation by providing subsidies or other
benefits to locally owned and established service companies
but not providing those same subsidies or benefits to foreignowned and domestically established companies.

4.

Summary of Relevant WTO Rules

Overall, the WTO imposes various rules restricting the use
of measures that, in the past, have been used – though not
always with success – to create linkages between investments
in the EI and the domestic economy.

The national treatment rule can also prevent a WTO
Member from implementing measures that favour locally
established service companies over service companies located
in other countries if those measures negatively affect the competitive position of those foreign service suppliers.122

While these restrictions are significant and – according to
at least some countries – too stringent, they are weaker in
a number of respects than what has been emerging under
international investment treaties.

Consequently, depending on the national treatment commitments made under the GATS, governments may be limited

122 Panel Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
paras. 10.291, 10.307-10.308, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R (Feb. 11, 2000).
123 More recently, the panel in China – Certain Measures Affecting Electronic
Payment Services – came to a similar conclusion, stating:
Furthermore, in the particular circumstances of this case, we do not see how our
conclusion on “likeness” of services could be different depending on whether EPS
suppliers of other Members supply EPS through mode 1 or through mode 3.
Panel Report, China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services,
7.704, WT/DS413/R, (July 16, 2012).
Although service suppliers based in different locations can be “like”, the GATS
– in footnote 10 to the national treatment provision – also recognizes that the
article does not require “any Member to compensate for any inherent competitive
disadvantages which result from the foreign character of the relevant services or
service suppliers.”

122 Panel Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
paras. 10.291, 10.307-10.308, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R (Feb. 11, 2000).
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